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ABSTRACT
Some philosophers -  such as Popper and Kuhn -  have cited the theory-shift from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics as one of the great scientific revolutions. This thesis 
argues against this that the shift was ‘evolutionary’ and exhibits a high degree of 
continuity (or quasi-continuity). I will develop a view that selects the relationships 
between events -  one specified by dynamical laws at issue -  as the essential elements 
within these two physical theoretical frameworks. This view brings together the 
dynamical perspective of space-time (developed by Harvey Brown, Robert DiSalle 
and Nick Huggett) and structuralism (developed by Henri Poincare and Pierre Duhem, 
and more recently resuscitated by John Worrall). The former view turns our attention 
away from the structure of space-time to the dynamical laws. While the second view 
will clarify to what extent the theory-change is evolutionary.
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter discusses the failures of existing 
views on the theory-change. The second chapter develops my own positive view - 
building, as indicated, on the work of the two aforementioned perspectives. The third 
and fourth chapters consider detailed aspects of the particular theory-change from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics from the point of view. The final chapter discusses 
the strengths of my view in comparison to the existing accounts of the theory-change.
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Chapter 1
Formal, Conceptual and Ontological Aspects of the Theory- 
Change from Newtonian to Einsteinian Physics
1. Introduction
In a special edition of Time magazine published on December 31st 1999, Albert 
Einstein was selected as “the person of the century,” reflecting the intellectual and 
technological significance of his achievements. Stephen Hawking there states that 
the theories of relativity brought about a “conceptual revolution of time, space, and 
reality,” which enabled physicists to develop the empirical theories of modem 
cosmology. Einstein’s achievement may be considered as a revolutionary one in that 
his theories replaced the Newtonian concepts of space and time, and thus made 
possible novel theories of matter, light and the overall structure of the universe.
The theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics has in fact been regarded 
as an archetypal example of a revolution in science by both scientists and 
philosophers. For example, the physicist Max Bom identified the development of 
the theories of relativity as “the Einsteinian revolution” which opened “the 
beginning of a new era.” (Bom 1965, 2) And the philosopher of science Karl Popper 
wrote that “Einstein revolutionized physics.” (Withrow 1967, 25) After the 
prediction made by general relativity of the deflection of light due to the sun’s
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gravitational field was confirmed by observations, the London Times on November 
7th 1919 famously ran the headline “Revolution in Science” with a sub-heading 
“Newtonian Ideas Overthrown.” In view of the fact that Einsteinian physics is 
founded on his novel understanding of the concepts of space-time and of the 
equivalence of mass and energy, which are quite alien to the Newtonian frameworks, 
it seems difficult to deny the intuition behind the idea that this episode of theory- 
change was indeed revolutionary.
Einstein himself, however, rarely employed the term “revolution” in order to 
characterize his theories of relativity. (Cohen 1985) He instead warned that the term 
“revolution” mischaracterizes the way that the special and the general theories were 
developed. Their development is considered as one which “slowly leads to a deeper 
conception of the laws of nature” based on results of “the best brains of successive 
generations.” (Klein 1975, 113) Although Einstein referred to the theory-change 
from Newton to Maxwell as a revolution in that “action at a distance is replaced by 
the field” (Einstein 1949, 35), he did not maintain that the theories of relativity were 
new fundamental theories. The special theory of relativity is claimed as “simply a 
systematic development of the electromagnetics of Maxwell and Lorentz”. (Einstein 
1954, 230) As for the general theory it was “the last step in the development of the 
program of field theory, ... [and] it modified Newton’s theory only slightly” (ibid., 
260).
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Two opposing points of view have characterized theory change in science as either 
evolutionary or revolutionary. The dispute between the two views is concerned with 
whether or not the development of scientific knowledge has an accumulative (or 
quasi-accumulative) nature, and is closely related to other epistemological issues, 
such as those of scientific realism and scientific rationality. The evolutionary view, 
supported by Duhem (1904/1954) and logical empiricists such as Hempel (1960), 
maintains that scientific change is an essentially continuous and cumulative progress. 
On the other hand, Kuhn (1962) explicitly articulated and defended a revolutionary 
view involving “paradigm changes.” According to Kuhn, two different paradigms 
are incommensurable in their assertions about the world, aims, criteria of appraisal, 
conceptual frameworks, and even observational basis.
Advocates of both the evolutionary and the revolutionary views have employed the 
case of theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics in order to support 
their position. While Zahar (1973) and Friedman (1989) point out the commonality 
of mathematical formalisms in both theories as evidence of the accumulative nature 
of the theory-change, Kuhn considers the conceptual discontinuities concerning 
notions such as ‘mass’ and ‘space-time’ as evidence of the occurrence of a 
revolution brought about by Einsteinian physics.
This chapter will critically examine the above two views. It consists of criticism of 
four different approaches that attempt to decide in which aspects either continuity or
9
discontinuity holds between Newtonian and Einsteinian theories. In the next section, 
Kuhn’s view will be considered as a representative of revolutionary views. It will be 
argued here that Kuhn’s revolutionary view is not supported by his argument that 
the concepts of mass and of space-time measurements of the two theories involved 
in the two theories are incommensurable. In the third section, two different attempts 
to show formal continuities between classical and relativistic physics will be 
considered: (1) the existence of a limiting relationship between the equations in 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics (Zahar) and (2) the extension of covariance, 
which requires the equations expressing the laws to be satisfied in all inertial 
coordinate systems (Friedman). I will argue in this section that these two formal 
properties are insufficient to capture the essential elements of an acceptable 
evolutionary account of the development of the special and the general theories of 
relativity. In the fourth section, a case for the ontological continuity between the two 
theories based on a substantivalist interpretation of both Newtonian and relativistic 
space-times will be considered. In the fifth section, two cases for ontological 
discontinuity based on a substantival interpretation of Newtonian space-time and a 
relational interpretation of relativistic space-times will be examined. I will argue 
here that these interpretations of space-time have problems in that they miss the 
main objective of space-time theories, that is, the clarification of the relationships 
between the structure of space-time and the laws of motion. In the concluding 
section, I will argue that the lessons of this chapter are that the extent to which this 
theory-change was either continuous or discontinuous is best analysed from the
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structuralists’ perspective, which can capture the real relationships between the 
structure of space-time and the laws of motion.
2. Kuhn’s Scientific Revolution And Conceptual Changes in Einsteinian Physics
Thomas Kuhn famously argued in his Structure o f Scientific Revolutions that there 
have been major discontinuous changes in the history of science. He explicitly cites 
the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics as a case strongly 
supporting his claim. (Kuhn 1962)
The concept of paradigm in Kuhn’s view plays a key role in characterizing the 
different stages of science. In the stable stage during which a specific scientific 
discipline matures, the discipline, which Kuhn calls a ‘normal science,’ “is 
predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is 
like.” (Kuhn 1962, 5) Scientists make great efforts to preserve this assumption, to 
the extent that “normal science often suppresses fundamental novelties because they 
are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments.” (ibid.) Research within 
normal science is thus based on a ‘paradigm,’ which consists of the scientific 
community’s metaphysics, conceptual frameworks, theories, methodology, and 
goals. A paradigm is essential to normal science, in that “no natural history can be 
interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical 
and methodological belief.” (ibid., 16-7) Adopting a paradigm is “an attempt to 
force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible [conceptual] box that the
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paradigm supplies.” (ibid., 24) So, “[n]ormal-scientific research is directed to the 
articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies.” 
(ibid.)
However, with the advent of a crisis within the paradigm (if only in some vague 
sense) caused by the continuing failure to solve anomalies, the paradigm confronts 
challenges from competitors that question the fundamental assumptions underlying 
the earlier normal science: “[NJature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced 
expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less 
extended exploration of the area of anomaly.” (ibid. 52-3) And the “crisis may end 
with the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and with the ensuing battle 
over its acceptance.” (ibid. 84)
One of the competing paradigms, because of its success in solving the anomalies, 
attracts advocates who set the direction of their future research according to the new 
paradigm. “The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new 
tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process ... Rather it 
is a reconstruction of field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes 
some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations.” (ibid. 84-5) A 
scientific revolution occurs when the new paradigm replaces the old one. One result 
is that different paradigms are “incommensurable” in their aims, conceptual 
frameworks, and even observational bases: “The normal-scientific tradition that
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emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually 
incommensurable with that which has gone before.” (ibid. 103) Kuhn’s 
incommensurability thesis involves several radical claims -  for example that even 
the empirical data for a given theory cannot be translated in a way that is neutral 
between competing paradigms:
Scientists then often speak of the “scales falling from the eyes” or of the “lightning flash” 
that “inundates” a previously obscure puzzle, enabling its components to be seen in a new 
way that for the first time permits its solution. ... No ordinary sense of the term 
‘interpretation’ fits these flashes of intuition through which a new paradigm is born. 
Though such intuitions depend upon the experience, both anomalous and congruent, gained 
with the old paradigm, they are not logically or piecemeal linked to particular items of that 
experience as an interpretation would be. Instead, they gather up large portions of that 
experience and transform them to the rather different bundle of experience that will 
therefore be linked piecemeal to the new paradigm but not to the old. (ibid., 122-3)
In order to support his revolutionary view, Kuhn suggests that there were two 
separate aspects of the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics that 
support the incommensurability thesis. These are the conceptual change in the 
meaning of notion of “mass” (ibid., 102), and the absence of any neutral 
observational basis to evaluate the strengths of the two theories due to the “theory 
ladenness” of the space-time measurements in the two theories, (ibid., 149-150)
In the next section, I will argue that these two claims fail to support the 
incommensurability thesis.1 As for the conceptual change in the meaning of the 
notion of mass, we will see that the concept of “relativistic mass,” which Kuhn 
claims to be incommensurable with its classical counterpart, is not in fact a
1 My arguments against Kuhn’s cases for incommensurable thesis are developed from 
Cho(1994)’s brief accounts.
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physically meaningful concept at all. And in the case of space-time measurements, I 
will show that although such measurements are in a sense theory-laden, a neutral 
observational basis between the two theories can nonetheless really be secured.
1) The Case of the Concept of Mass
According to Kuhn, although the terms employed in Newtonian physics such as 
mass are also employed in Einsteinian physics, the referents of these terms are not 
the same:
[T]he physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts [mass] are by no means identical 
with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. ... Only at low relative 
velocities may the two be measured in the same way, and even then they must not be 
conceived to be the same. (Kuhn 1962, 102)
In the same spirit, Paul Feyerabend pointed out:
[I]n classical, prerelativistic physics the concept of mass (and, for that matter, the concept 
of length and the concept of time duration) was absolute in the sense that the mass of a 
system was not influenced (except, perhaps, causally) by its motion in the coordinate 
system chosen. Within relativity, however, mass has become a relational concept whose 
specification is incomplete without indication of the coordinate system to which the spatio- 
temporal descriptions are all to be referred. ... what is measured in the classical case is an 
intrinsic property of the system under consideration; what is measured in the case of 
relativity is a relation between the system and certain characteristics of [the coordinate 
system] D’. (Feyerabend 1962, 80)
Although the term ‘mass’ appears in both theoretical frameworks, the Newtonian 
mass of a body is the same irrespective of its state of motion, whereas the 
Einsteinian mass varies depending on the motion of a body relative to the frame 
within which its mass is measured:
[T]he total mass of a system is not a scalar quantity in relativity theory, so that its value 
depends on the reference frame with respect to which it is measured. For example a particle
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whose mass is m, as measured in its own rest frame, appears to have a larger mass when 
measured in a second frame with respect to which it is moving. (Penrose 2004, 435)
In other words, the Newtonian mass is a scalar quantity m, which is invariant under
any coordinate transformation, while the Einsteinian mass (expressed as M  = ym,
where y is the Lorentz factor, i.e. 1 / V (1 -  v2/c2)) is a variable quantity which
increases with the velocity v of the body.
Feyerabend claims that the change in the concept of mass shows that there are 
enormous difficulties in relating the two successive scientific theories:
It is also impossible to define the exact classical concepts in relativistic terms or to relate 
them with the help of an empirical generalization. ... It is therefore again necessary to 
abandon completely the classical concepual scheme once the theory of relativity has been 
introduced ... Our argument against meaning invariance is simple and clear. It proceeds 
from the fact that usually some of the principles involved in the determination of the 
meanings of older theories or points of view are inconsistent with the new, and better, 
theories. (Feyerabend 1962, 80-2)
The concepts of classical and relativistic mass essentially belong in “different and
incommensurable frameworks.” (ibid., 81) In his recent book on concepts of mass,
Jammer describes the relationship between the concepts of invariant and relativistic
masses as “ultimately the disparity between two competing views of the
development of physical science.” (Jammer 1999, 61) Kuhn also sees this
conceptual change as a classic illustration of the incommensurability thesis: “the
normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only
incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone
before.” (Kuhn 1962, 103)
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This case, however, fails to provide legitimate evidence supporting the occurrence 
of a radical conceptual change. Einsteinian relativistic mass cannot in fact be 
considered as a physically significant concept that is the counterpart of the 
Newtonian mass. In fact the former is not a legitimate physical quantity that respects 
the principles of special relativity. Kuhn explicitly takes the ‘relativistic mass’ M  = 
ym, which increases with the velocity of the body. Yet this concept of mass does not 
properly fit within the framework of special relativity.
The special theory of relativity is essentially based on two fundamental postulates:
(1) all physical laws take the same form in all inertial frames, and (2) the speed of 
light is always the constant c in all such frames. From these two hypotheses,
Einstein derived the coordinate transformation which implements the principle of 
special relativity.2 As a result, these two hypotheses yield predictions about the 
kinematical effects of time dilation, length contraction, and the addition of velocities. 
On the basis of this kinematics, a dynamical framework can be developed by 
positing the concepts of mass and momentum. In this context, as the above 
expression suggests, one can employ the relativistic concept of mass Mret while 
maintaining the classical concept of velocity vda (dx/dt) in order to relativitize the 
concept of momentum, i.e. p reI = Mrelvcia. In other words, the Newtonian momentum 
( P c i a  = m c i a v c i a )  is modified into the relativisitic expression by adopting the
2 Accordingly, one of essences of the special theory of relativity is that “all natural laws must be 
so conditioned that they are covariant with respect to Lorentz transformations.” (Einstein 1940, 
p.329)
16
relativistic mass (rather than by changing labaratory time dt to proper time dr), i.e., 
ymdxldt. At this point, however, one is forced to adopt a primitive concept of 
improper 4-velocity, which is not Lorentz covariant. (Oas 2006, 4) “The improper 
velocity being a direct result of the imposition of RM [the relativistic mass] means 
that RM is at odds with the accepted kinematics of special relativity.” (ibid.)
In a similar spirit, Wheeler and Taylor claim that:
Any difference between [relativistic] formulae for momentum (for example, mdx/dz) and 
the corresponding Newtonian formula (mdx/dt) is therefore to be attributed to the difference 
between proper time and laboratory time, not to any difference in the value of m in the two 
descriptions of nature. (Wheeler and Taylor 1963, 108)
Given that the Lorentz factor 1/ V (1 -  v2/c2) measures the ratio between laboratory
time and proper time, modifying the kinematical concept of velocity dt to dr is more
natural than modifying the concept of mass. So, in order to be consistent with the
kinematics of special relativity, the Lorentz factor 1/ V (1 -  v2/c2) needs be
associated with velocity, rather than with mass. This is expressed by Resnik as
follows:
Indeed, it should be noted that, whether we identify the factor 1/ V (1 -  v2/c2) with mass or 
with velocity, the origin of this factor in collision measurements is kinematical; that is, it is 
caused by the relativity of time measurement. (Resnik 1968, 199)
Because of this, Einstein himself considered the rest mass m as the only physically 
significant concept, and substituted the energy-momentum 4-vector for the 
relativistic mass. Thus he wrote:
It is not good to introduce the concept of the mass M  = m H  (1 -  v2/c2) of a body for which 
no clear definition can be given. It is better to introduce no other mass than ‘the rest mass’
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m. Instead of introducing M, it is better to mention the expression for the momentum and 
energy of a body in motion.3 (Einstein 1948, a letter to Lincoln Barnett)
In the special theory, just as space and time are incorporated within the single entity
space-time whose components are (t, x), so energy and momentum are united to
form the energy-momentum 4-vector whose componets are (E, -p ) .  This quantity
satisfies a conservation law, which, given the equivalence of energy and mass,
incorporates the law of mass conservation, the law of energy conservation, and the
law of momentum conservation. The squared magnitude of this four-vector
represents the rest mass, m2 = E2 - p 2, which is invariant regardless of the choice of
inertial frames. In this context, ‘relativistic mass’ is only the temporal component of
the energy-momentum 4-vector of a given body. This single component is measured
as being larger in motion than when the body concerned is at rest. However, all four
components of the energy-momentum 4-vector are transformed in the proper way to
maintain the vector’s invariance under the change of the reference frame. So,
although the single component varies, there is no sense in saying that the mass also
varies. Along these lines, Wheeler and Taylor’s answer to the question “is the mass
of a moving object greater than the mass of the same object at rest?” is “no”:
The concept of ‘relativistic mass’ is subject to misunderstanding. That’s why we don’t use 
it. First, it applies the name mass ^ belonging to the magnitude of a four-vector -  to a very 
different concept, the time component of a four-vector. Second, it makes increase of energy 
of an object with velocity or momentum appear to be connected with some change in 
internal structure of the object. In reality, the increase of energy with velocity originates not
3 The relativistic mass, according to Adler, is employed only in the popular literatures, because it 
is intuitive and based upon simple mathematics. An example can be found in Hawking’s A Brief 
History of Time: “Because of the equivalence of energy and mass, the energy which an object has 
due to its motion will add to its mass.” (Hawking 1988, 20) And Feynman’s The Character of 
Physical Law is another: “The energy associated with motion appears as an extra mass, so things 
get heavier when they move.” (Feynman 1965, 76) But the concept does not appear in research 
. articles and advanced textbooks written by the same authors.
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in the object but in the [kinematical] properties of space-time itself. (Taylor and Wheeler 
1992, 250-1)
It seems that Kuhn’s reading o f the concept of mass is mistaken.
Defenders of Kuhn’s thesis that radical change is involved in this shift could 
respond that although Kuhn may have misunderstood the way in which the concept 
of mass is radically transformed, adopting the concept of energy-momentum still 
shows that the concept of ‘mass’ experiences radical change. But, this response is 
not tenable. When the relativistic mass is replaced by energy-momentum 4-vector, it 
is the commonality between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics that becomes 
manifest -  from the perspective of their group structure. The geometric properties of 
space-time consist o f a topological Lie group4, which involves the transformations 
of rotations, boosts and translation on R4. The concept o f energy and momentum, 
within this framework, arise as the generators of transformations on the group of 
translations. Whilst this group in the relativistic case is the Lorentz group, the 
corresponding group in the non-relativistic case is the Galilean group. In both cases, 
the concept of energy, which is used as total relativistic mass, appears as the 
generator of time translations. In this context, Saunders views the relationships 
between the concepts of the rest mass in both physics as involving the group 
structure:
The non-relativistic mass, in contrast, has a quite different interpretation . . . ,  bound up with 
more detailed properties of the respective Lie algebras: in the case of the [inhomogeneous
4 A Lie group is a topological group G whose group elements of some neighborhood N0 G can be 
mapped homeomorphically on to an open, bounded subset of the real Euclidean space E„ for 
some n.
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Galilean group], to the ‘neutral elements’ of the algebra (it therefore defines the momentum 
and the energy in conjunction with the velocity); in the relativistic case to the Casimir 
invariants (a function of elements of the Lie algebra, not a separate element). In both cases 
these quantities have vanishing Lie bracket with every element of the Lie algebra; they are 
therefore conserved. One has a quite reasonable understanding of their inter-relationships 
as provided by the theory of group contractions. (Saunders 1993, 304)
So, by introducing the concepts of the energy-momentum 4-vector and the rest mass, 
the relationships between the concepts of mass can be captured. The relativistic 
mass, is neither a proper counterpart of the Newtonian mass nor a legitimate 
physical quantity that respects the principle of special relativity. Accordingly,
Kuhn’s attempt to use the concept of mass to support the occurrence of a radical 
conceptual change does not succeed.
2) The Case of Incommensurable Space-Time Measurements
While the above case for the revolutionary conceptual change in the notion of mass 
is not supported by space-time geometry, Kuhn’s other case for the 
incommensurability thesis as applied to the Newton-Einstein shift is concerned with 
an alleged conceptual change in the notion of space-time itself. In the rest of this 
section, I will argue that this case also in fact fails to show that the development of 
Einsteinian physics was revolutionary.
According to Kuhn, given that the concept of space and time provides the 
foundation of both Newtonian and Einsteinian physics, the change of these concepts 
generates a revolution in the conceptual network. The transition from Newtonian to
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Einsteinian physics can be characterized as a holistic one in the sense that it 
involves changes in a range of other interrelated concepts:
To make the transition to Einstein’s universe, the whole conceptual web whose strands are 
space, time, matter, force, and so on, had to be shifted and laid down again on nature whole. 
(Kuhn 1962, 149)
Within Newtonian physics, simultaneities and temporal intervals between any two 
events are all absolute in that they are the same for all inertial observers. In other 
words, two events that are simultaneous for an inertial observer are simultaneous for 
any other inertial observer regardless of her relative motion, and the same holds for 
temporal intervals. Spatial intervals between two simultaneous events are also 
absolute. Within Einsteinian physics, on the other hand, simultaneity, and both 
temporal and spatial intervals between any two events are all relative to the motions 
of inertial observers.
Kuhn maintains that these differences between the two theoretical frameworks show 
that the conceptual change involved was revolutionary. Advocates of the competing 
paradigms, according to Kuhn, experienced a “transition of vision,” which meant 
that the two sets of scientists observed totally different worlds:
One [set of scientists] is embedded in a flat, the other in a curved, matrix of space.
Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they 
look from the same point in the same direction, (ibid., 150)5
5 This clearly separates Kuhn’s revolutionary view from any evolutionary view. The latter must 
maintains that the realtivistic modifications of kinematic and dynamic concepts conserve or 
quasi-conserve essential observational and theoretical components of Newtonian physics. An 
evolutionary view, for example, claims the continuity of relativistic kinematic and dynamic 
concepts in the classical limit.
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First of all, we need to ask what the occurence of this “transition of vision” exactly 
involves in this context. In the aforementioned first quotation, Kuhn suggests the 
occurrence of a change in the relationship between the fundamental conceptual 
elements, i.e. a structural change of the whole conceptual network. And the second 
quotation refers to a change of empirical substructures as a result of the conceptual 
change. So, given that measurements are essentially interwoven within different 
space-time concepts, they cannot provide a neutral basis from which to evaluate the 
relative empirical strengths of the two theories. Accordingly, the incommensurablity 
thesis involves the claim that no neutral observational basis exists due to theory 
ladenness.
Kuhn’s conclusion is based on two premises, (1) the revolutionary conceptual 
change in notions of space and time, and (2) theory-ladenness of the measurements 
highlightened by those conceptual changes. From these two premises, Kuhn 
concludes that no neutral observational grounds exist for comparisons between the 
measurements in Newtonian and Einsteinian physics.
Two strategies might be employed to undermine Kuhn’s argument. The first is to 
undermine one or both of the above premises. The second strategy is to argue that 
Kuhn’s conclusion cannot be guaranteed even if we accept both premises. We will 
choose the second strategy. In this section, we will not attempt to undermine either
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the claim of the revolutionary development of the concept of space and time, or that 
of the theory-ladenness of the measurements based on the two different space-time 
theories. The strategy is instead to employ the very weapons of Kuhn’s own 
argument. What will be argued is that even i f  we admit that radical conceptual 
changes occurred in the notions of space and time and we accept the theory- 
ladenness of the measurements at issue, there still exists a neutral observational 
basis from which to evaluate the relative evidential strengths of Newtonian and 
Einsteinian physics.
We need first to take a close look at the way Kuhn’s premises can be understood 
within the context of this theory-change. As for theory-ladenness, the measurements 
of length are, as both sides agree, made with rigid rulers. It seems that all that the 
measurements with the rulers show is that if their two arms were aligned, their ends 
would coincide. How, then, can they be “theory-laden”?
Yet, it can in fact be argued that measurements with these instruments are dependent 
on a specific space-time theory, given that the length and interval of a rigid ruler and 
a clock are interpreted differently with respect to the two possible embedding 
theories. This is because the embedding theories are concerned with the spatio- 
temporal intervals between events themselves. Given that the length of two different 
ends of the rigid rods represents the relationships between two different spatio- 
temporal events, it could be differently interpreted with respect to different space­
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time theories. The length of a rigid ruler and the interval measured by a clock, 
according to Newtonian physics, are interpreted as invariant irrespective of their 
state of motion. On the other hand, within Einsteinian physics, the same instruments 
are posited as possibly experiencing length contractions due to their state of motion.
If, on the contrary, the measurements of spatio-temporal intervals employ 
instruments such as a light pulse and a clock, then theory-ladenness of spatial 
measurements occurs in the opposite way. Geroch shows how the measurement of 
spatio-temporal intervals is possible with light pulses and clocks. (Geroch 1981, 69- 
72) Light pulses can be employed to probe space-time because “light, once emitted, 
moves within the environment of space-time, independently of what the emitter was 
doing.” (ibid., 72) And by employing mirrors, “one can arrange for the light to get 
back to us to tell us what space-time is like” (ibid.). Observers who carry a clock 
with them can evaluate the spatio-temporal intervals between the observer and a 
specific event by evaluating the time it takes for the light sent by them to be 
reflected back from the event. The clocks carried by moving observers are obviously 
neutral between Newtonian and Einsteinian theories. Within the latter framework, 
the temporal intervals of the clock are distorted only when an observer measures the 
clocks of the others which are in motion relative to the observer. In the case of 
measuring the observer’s own clock, its measurement results will be identical 
regardless of whichever theory it is based on. Yet, the light pulses are laden with a 
specific space-time theory here. According to the special theory of relativity, the
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speed of the light pulses is constant regardless of the motion of an observer relative 
to the light source. Yet, in Newtonian physics, the speed of light pulse is posited to 
change depending on the observer’s motion with respect to the light pulse. Given 
that the dimensions of the same instruments for the measurement of spatial intervals 
are differently interpreted in different theories, it seems that the instruments do not 
provide a neutral observational basis between the two theories.
Consider, for example, the Michelson-Morley experiment. This experiment was 
designed to measure the effect of the ether on the speed of light pulses. To detect 
this effect, the apparatus is equipped with an interferometer, which is posited as 
being at rest with respect to the earth moving through the ether. The idea of the 
experiment is to compare the speed of light pulses moving through the ether frame 
with the speed of light pulses perpendicular to the frame. By using half-silvered 
mirrors, light pulses are reflected to travel back and forth along two different 
directions, once along the direction of motion of earth and once at right angle to that 
motion. Although this experiment was originally designed to measure the speed of 
light with respect to the frame of ether, we can also employ this experiment in order 
to examine whether or not Lorentz contraction occurs. The occurrence of length 
differences for these two distinct round-trip journeys can be employed as an 
appraisal of Newtonian and relativity theories. In this experiment, the existence of a 
length contraction of the interferometer arms is a component that plays a crucial role 
in producing the length difference of the two round-trip journeys, which is the key
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to the appraisals of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. When this experiment is 
prepared, an ordinary ruler is employed to determine the lengths of the 
interferometer arms. We also could think of the case that the experimental design 
employs light pulses and clock in order to determine the lengths of the 
interferometer arms. In both cases, when one assumes that the ruler (or light pulses 
and clock) can be employed to determine the lengths of the arms, one assumes the 
very theory to be appraised. (Laymon 1988, 250) The former case employing the 
ruler assumes that there does not exist Lorentz contraction effect, while the latter 
using light pulses assumes the opposite. Then, do the difference of the concept of 
space-time and the theory-ladenness of space-time measurement guarantee the 
incommensurability Kuhn suggested?
My answer is ‘no.’ Although we admit that a component of the experiment is 
theory-laden as mentioned, this experiment still produces a neutral observational 
basis for the appraisal of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. Consider the lengths 
of round-trip journeys that are experienced by (1) the light pulses moving through 
the ether frame and (2) the light pulses moving perpendicular to the frame. In the 
original experimental setting, where c and v are the velocity of light and the earth in 
its orbit respectively and D is the distance of interferometer arm length, (1) is 
calculated as 2D/{\ + v2/c2), while (2) is 2D{\ + v2/c2)~m, which is 2D(l + (v2/2c2)) 
if terms higher than {vie)2 are neglected.6 As Michelson and Morley rotated the
6 Let T = time light occupies to pass from a to c, and Tj = time light occupies to
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whole apparatus through 90°, the predicted displacement of the interference fringe 
becomes 2Z)(v2/c2). (Michelson and Morley 1887, 336)
In order to consider the possibility of the Lorentz contraction of the interferometer
arms, we can consider a modified analysis of the result of the experiment, which
assumes that the interferometer arm lengths can vary. (Silverstein 1914) In other
words, the interferometer arm that is parallel to the motion through the ether frame
experiences Lorentz contraction. According to Laymon, whichever theory we
employ, the length of the two paths of the light travels in the two different
directions, is calculated as the same, if terms higher than (v/c)2 are neglected.
(Laymon 1988) The existence or non-existence of contraction of the moving ruler
by no means influences the anticipated effect of the difference of the lengths of the
two paths. This result stems from the fact that the final outcome is a function of the
sum of the lengths of the two interferometer arms, i.e., the lengths of arms initially
parallel and the lengths of arms orthogonal to the direction of motion. Let the length
of the former be Dh and the length of the latter be Dv. Given a 90° rotation of the
interferometer, the anticipated path length change is /?(Dh + Dv) where is v2/c2,
which is a function of the sum of the interferometer arm lengths. When we assume
the hypothesis of Lorentz contraction to decide the length of the rulers, the corrected
Dh, when an ordinary ruler yields a value of 11 meters for both Dh and DVi Dh is
pass from c to aj. Then, T is calculated as D/(c -  v), and Tj is calculated as D/(c + v).
And the whole time of the round-trip is T + 7) = 2D/(c2 -  v2). So, the lengths of 
round-trip journeys i.e. (1) is 2D/(c2 -  v2) = 2D/(l + v2/c2), neglecting terms of fourth 
order. The length of the round-trip of other path is 2Z)(1 + v2/c2)~m, which is 
2D{\ + (v 2/2c 2)) if terms higher than {v/cf is neglected.
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calculated as 11(1 + v2/c2) ~m. Ignoring higher order terms, Dh is obtained as 11(1 + 
v 2/ 2 c 2) ~x. Inserting this corrected value as an input value, the fringe shift becomes 
2[11 + 11(1 + v2/lc 2) -1] p2. This then yields 2(11 + 11)/?2 by expanding and ignoring 
terms of higher than second order. This is the same as the anticipated measurement 
in the case that no contraction of the ruler is assumed. So whether or not the length 
contraction is posited, the derived result of the fringe shift is the same. From this 
calculation, Laymon concludes:
All of this means that while it is true that the actual length of the interferometer arms is a 
varying function of the very theories to be tested, when measuring that length the 
computational effect of assuming different theories from among the set to be tested is 
inconsequential. Hence, the phenomena (of fringe shift in rotating equal-arm 
interferometers) can be determined with an accuracy sufficient for testing the relevant 
theories regardless of which of the competing theories is chosen to specify the 
measurement procedures to be used to determine the experimental initial condition of 
length (Laymon 1988, 252-3).
We can see that, although a component of the measurement depends on a specific 
space-time theory, the experiments, whichever theories we employ, still provide a 
neutral observational basis for the appraisal of Newtonian and Einstein’s physics. 
For the determination of the lengths of interferometer arms, despite being theory­
laden, does not play a role in producing the anticipated effect of fringe shift.
It has been argued that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is by no means supported 
by his own cases employing the concept of mass and space-time measurement in 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. Kuhn claims that the conceptual change in the 
notion of mass supports his incommensurability thesis. And also that this thesis is
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supported by the non-existence of a neutral observational basis for space-time 
measurements, stemming from the conceptual change in the notion of space-time.
However, as regards the first, it has been argued that the concept of “relativistic 
mass,” which Kuhn claims to be incommensurable with its classical counterpart 
(classical mass), is not in fact a physically meaningful concept. And in the second 
case, it has been argued that although such space-time measurements are in a sense 
theory-laden, a neutral observational basis between Newtonian and Einsteinian 
physics can nonetheless really be secured. Accordingly, these two cases fail to 
support Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. Given that Kuhn’s cases are used as 
crucial evidence for his claim that the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics 
was revolutionary, my arguments provide reasons to doubt Kuhn’s revolutionary 
account.7 (Of course my main reason to Kuhn will be to develop and defend -  later in 
this thesis -  an ‘evolutionary’ view of this theory change which I argue is altogether 
superior to his revolutionary story.)
3. Evolutionary Views That Emphasize Formal Aspects of the Theory-Change
7 Furthermore, we have seen that if one considers the group structure of various concepts of 
mass, the continuity between these concepts within this case of theory-change can be easily 
retrieved. And it will be argued in later section that the discontinuity of the concepts of space­
time within the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, can be marginalized. 
And I will also argue here that the continuity within the laws of motion of the two theories can 
be considered as a more fundamental than the discontinuity in their structures of space-time. 
Taking all these into account, we can conclude that Kuhn’s revolutionary account is by no 
means supported by his case from the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.
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Kuhn’s revolutionary view is, then, not supported by the case of theory-change from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. It will next be argued that that change also fails 
to support the evolutionary views suggested by some contemporary philosophers. 
This section will consider evolutionary views that attempt to capture the continuity 
of theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics via the formal aspects of 
these theories. This view seems to reflect well the accounts in physics textbooks, in 
which the formal heuristics, such as ‘the Newtonian limit’ and ‘the covariance 
principle,’ connect Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics. According to Rohrlich
(1988), for example, a newer theory is related with a older one in a way that “[t]he 
mathematical framework of [the latter] is rigorously derived from that of [the 
former] (a derivation which involves limiting procedures)”. (Rohrlich 1988, 303) 
Rohrlich emphasizes that physicists regards this formal aspect as the essential part 
of the relations between the two theories.
Physicists, however, typically deduce only the mathematical structure of S from that of T 
and pay little attention to whether the concepts resulting from the physical interpretations of 
the symbols involved in those structures permit such a functional relation. They work 
largely intuitively. The mathematical structure or framework of the theory is considered to 
be primary, and the central terms (the meaning of certain central symbols) are later derived 
from the applications of that framework to actual situations, (ibid., my italics)
Batterman (1995) basically reiterates Rohrlich’s view: “only the mathematical 
structures of the two theories can be related by this limiting derivational procedure” 
(Batterman 1995, 173), whereas “the interpretation and the ensuing ontologies [of 
the two theories] are in general not so related.” (Rohrlich 1988, 303) This view 
maintains that the essential aspect of the continuity between the two theories occurs
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in the formal aspect of the mathematical equations of the two theories. We will see 
that this attitude can be found within various accounts which emphasize the 
continuity between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics, such as that of Hempel 
(1960), Zahar (1973) and Friedman (1983).
In this section, I will attempt to clarify what is in fact involved in this formal 
continuity. We will see that although it cannot be denied that the formal aspects 
provide important information concerning this theory-change, these formal 
properties are not sufficient to capture the essential elements of any evolutionary 
account of the development of special and general relativity from Newtonian 
mechanics. And this will be identified even in some of the aforementioned authors’ 
writings. (Zahar 1973, 1989) There are four separate ways in which it has been 
claimed that formal relationships exist between the equations in Newtonian and in 
Einsteinian physics (i.e. “Newtonian limits” and “covariance principles” in special 
and general relativity). I will argue that none of these four ways succeeds.
1) The Correspondence Limit as A Formal Condition.
Logical positivists and their advocates emphasize the formal continuity that the 
correspondence relations exist between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics within 
the limit. Hempel writes his Philosophy o f Natural Science:
[The new] theory [in a scientific revolution] does not simply refute the earlier empirical 
generalizations in its field; rather, it shows that within a certain limited range defined by 
qualifying conditions, the generalizations hold true in fairly close approximation. (Hempel 
1960, 76)
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Despite his differences with the positivists on the generalization of theory-change, 
Zahar makes essentially the same claim (1973):
[A] new relativistic law should yield the corresponding classical theory as a limiting case.
In the most general case laws will involve the speed of light [c], the velocities vu vn of a 
finite number of particles or processes ... If R = 0 and K  = 0 are the relativistic and 
classical laws respectively, we require that:
R - + K as (vj/c, v2/c, . . . ,  vjc)  — (0, 0, . . . ,  0). (Zahar 1973, 244)
A successor theory is more comprehensive than the old one in that a limiting case of 
the former approximates the latter. The old theory is then, in this sense, a special 
case of the more comprehensive new theory. So, our case of theory-change seems to 
be an accumulative process.
According to Nickles too, the correspondence in the limit is the key aspect of “the 
reduction of the Einsteinian formula for momentum,/? = m0v / V (1 -  v2/c2), where 
m0 is the rest mass, to the classical formulap  = m0v in the limit as v —*• 0.” (Nickles 
1973, 182) We can see the relationship from the expression of the Lorentz factor, 
i.e. 1 /  V (1 -  v2/c2), in the Lorentz transformation. As a Taylor series, the Lorentz 
factor can be expanded as 1 / V (1 -  v2/c2) = 1 -  1/2 (v/c)2 -  1/8 (v/c)4 -  1/16 (v/c)6 
-  ... . From this mathematical framework, we can consider the key expressions of 
the special theory of relativity as “Newtonian or classical quantities plus an 
expansion of corrections in powers of (v/c)2.” (Batterman 1995, 173) Consequently, 
Rohrlich claims that the mathematical framework of Newtonian mechanics is
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“rigorously derived” from that of the special theory of relativity in a “derivation 
which involves limiting procedures.”8 (Rohrlich 1988, 303)
Recall, however, that the mathematical formalisms themselves do not carry any 
physical meaning. The conceptual schemes which underlie the formalisms are surely 
necessary to comprehend the way these formalisms work within a specific physical 
theory.9 A mathematical term such as the Lorentz factor is provided with empirical 
significance only within the theoretical framework of a specific theory. Lorentzian 
ether theory interprets the Lorentz factor as the effect of the contraction of matter 
moving through the ether, whereas special relativity interprets it as the modification 
of the spatio-temporal relations between events.
Furthermore, the limiting process imposes an empirical condition. The operation of 
neglecting higher powers of (v/c)2 is based on the empirical consideration that the 
speed v of moving bodies is generally small with respect to the speed of light c. In 
this way, the limiting operation refers to the physical situation of a moving body. 
Hence, it seems that the limiting process also is not devoid of empirical content.
8 This relationships between the two theories are characterized as a formal one in that “the 
mathematical framework M(T [the special theory]) implies M(5'[Newtonian mechanics]) when 
the domain D(T) is restricted to £>(£)” (Rohrlich 1988, 303) where “Z> is given by the 
characteristic parameter [p] which provides the error estimate; if  the error is negligable, one is 
within [D(S)].” (ibid., 305) This restriction then involves a limiting process: (p —► 0) lim M{T)
—► M{S).
9 We can read this in Duhem: “If a physicist is given only an equation, he is not taught anything. 
To this equation must be joined rules by which the letters that the equation bears upon are made 
to correspond to the physical magnitudes they represent. And that which allows us to know these 
rules is the set of hypotheses and reasonings by which one has arrived at the equations in question. 
[This set of rules] is the theory that the equations summarize in a symbolic form: in physics, an 
equation, detached from the theory that leads to it, has no meaning.” (Duhem 1902, 223)
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At this point, defenders of the formal continuity can claim:
The mathematical framework of [a older theory] is rigorously derived from that of [a newer 
theory] (a derivation which involves limiting procedures); but the interpretations and the 
ensuing ontologies [of two theories] are in general not so related. They involve qualitative 
differences and for this reason demand independent recognition. In this way, one comes 
close to Feyerabend’s theoretical pluralism and at the same time one ensures a well-defined 
logical-mathematical linkage between [two theories]. (Rohrlich 1988, 303)
This view maintains that although we can admit that the mathematical structure
involves more than the formal aspects, the essential aspect of the continuity between
the two theories occurs within the formal aspect of the mathematical equations,
whereas its conceptual aspects experience a radical shift.
But this view is not tenable. A central aim behind the limiting procedure is in fact to 
provide an empirical meaning for mathematical formalisms. Hence, the formal 
aspect is intricately interrelated with its empirical one. Before we examine this 
claim in the limiting process within the special theory, we first look at a similar case 
in the general thoery since the moral there is manifest. According to Renn and Sauer 
(1999), Einstein in fact useed the heuristics of the correspondence principle, i.e. the 
limiting procedure, to provide mathematical formalism with the empirical 
significance:10
10 In this sense, Renn and Sauer characterize the heuristics of the correspondence as “the physical 
strategy,” which starts from the well-known limiting case of the predecessor theory. “Along this 
strategy, Einstein sought to construct physically plausible generalizations whose specialization to 
the Newtonian limit was obvious.” (ibid., 101) On the other hand, “a ‘mathematical strategy’ 
started from the requirement of the generalized relativity principle. The ground for pursuing this 
strategy had to be prepared by scanning the mathematical literature for suitable differential 
expressions with a well-known covariance group.” (ibid.)
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Einstein ... required that the new theory would describe, under certain limiting conditions, 
the gravitational effects familiar from Newtonian physics. For this reason, he expected that 
the unknown gravitational field equation for the metric tensor would reduce to the Poisson 
equation for the scalar gravitational potential of the classical theory and that, under the 
same limiting conditions, the equation of motion of his new theory would yield Newton’s 
second law with the force derived from this classical potential. ... We subsume these 
various demands under what we call Einstein’s correspondence principle of general 
relativity. The realization of this principle was a crucial condition for conveying physical 
meaning to the various mathematical constructs he elaborated since only in this way could 
they be brought into contact with the empirical knowledge imbedded in Newtonian 
gravitation theory. (Renn and Sauer 1999, 99-100, my italics)
The empirical aspect involved in the correspondence principle can be shown 
through investigation of the so-called ‘Newtonian limit’ procedure within the 
general theory of relativity. Einstein’s general theory is related to Newtonian 
gravitation theory by the formal procedure limiting the physical quantities to the 
empirical region where the effects specific to general relativity are small. According 
to the latter theory, the field equation is the Poisson equation V2 <X> = 4 k  Gp, that 
represents the distribution of a gravitational potential O due to the distribution of 
mass, when mass, the source of the potential, is distributed in continuous manner. 
And the equation of motion, which describes the trajectory of a test body influenced 
by gravitational field, can be written as rrufxildt* = -  mdQ>/dt (1). In contrast, the 
field equations in the general theory are Einstein’s field equations GtJ = Rfj -  l/2gijR 
= 8Gn/c4Tip and the equation of motion is the geodesic equation efxi/di2 + rljk (dxj 
!df){dxkIdi) = 0 (2). In order to derive (1) from (2), we need the following physical
hypotheses: a) the body moves at a speed that is negligible compared to the speed of 
light; b) the gravitational field that effects the body is very weak; c) the gravitational 
field is stationary, that is, the metric field is not changing with respect to time.
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Under condition a), the equation of motion efxi Id t2 + r  ljk (dxjldf)(dxk/df) = 0 (2) 
can be approximated to cfxi/di2 + r 'jk (dt/di)2 = 0 (3), since dt/dz is small 
compared to dx/dr. Under the condition c), the connection r  ljk can be rewritten as 
r l00 = -1/2  g°dgoo !dxl (i) because the derivative of gy with respect to t can be 
neglected. In addition, given the condition b), we can choose the coordinate where 
the metric g0 is slightly different from the Minkowski metric rjy, that is, gy = rjy+ hy. 
Since only rjy contributes and hy can be neglected under the condition b)t (i) 
becomes r l00 = —1/2 rfjdr}00 !dxl (ii). By inserting (ii) into (3), the equation of 
motion then become cPxildl2 = -1/2  V h00 (5).
At this point, (5) is “brought into contact with empirical knowledge imbedded in 
Newtonian gravitation theory.” (ibid., 100) The comparison between (1) and (5) 
then gives h00 = -  20  + C, where C is an integration constant, and C = 0 in a 
boundary condition that both h00 and O approach 0 when r goes to infinity. In other 
words, (1) is approximated to (2) only when g00 is equal to -  (1 + 20). In this way, 
the unknown quantity g00 within the equation of general relativity obtains empirical 
meaning by referring to its classical counterpart, i.e. a variable specified by 
Newtonian gravity. So, in addition to the fact that each symbol has specific physical 
meaning11, an apparently formal limiting procedure is intended as relating the
11 It is apparent that the Newtonian limit procedure cannot be characterized as only a formal one. 
Instead we can see that various physical concepts and empirical conditions are also involved
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symbols with empirical quantities which are well-confirmed by Newtonian 
mechanics. Along these lines, Renn sees more continuity between the two theories 
than Rohrlich identifies in the formal aspect:
In fact, essential relations between fundamental concepts such as field and source largely 
persist, even though the concrete applications of these concepts may differ considerably, as 
in the case of a classical vs. relativistic field equation. This structural stability turned the 
concepts and principles o f classical and special relativistic physics into heuristic 
orientations when Einstein entered unknown terrain, for instance, when encountering a 
new expression generated by the elaboration of a mathematical formalism. None o f these 
expressions in themselves constituted a new theory of gravitation. Only by complementing 
them with additional information based on the experience accumulated, not only in 
classical and special relativistic physics, but also in the relevant branches of mathematics, 
could such expressions become candidates for a gravitational field equation embedded in a 
full-fledged theory of gravitation. (Renn 2005, 54, my italics)
The above account provides a clue to understanding the case of limiting procedures 
within the special theory. Just as the above procedures in the general theory provide 
mathematical formalism with empirical significance, so physics textbooks refer to 
the mathematical similarity between Newtonian mechanics and the special theory in 
order to show that mathematical terms, such as the Lorentz factor, are connected
along with the mathematical formulae. First of all, the mathematical quantities and frameworks 
are used in order to represent physical quantities and models. In the above case, the mathematical 
quantities x and t represent kinematical concepts, i.e. the spatial and the temporal coordinates. 
Then the combination of the quantities constitutes the'geodesic equation (2), which represents the 
equation of motion by means of the physical interpretation of the mathematical framework. 
Physical significance is given to the geodesic equation by interpreting the formula, that is, 
specifying which aspect of the world the formula represents. In this way, the mathematical 
formulae are employed in order to realize the physical concepts.
Secondly, the mathematical operations relate the mathematical frameworks to empirical 
conditions. In the above case, the limiting procedures that realize various physical hypotheses 
such as a), b), and c) provide the mathematical formulae with specific empirical conditions. The 
condition a) imposes an empirical condition justifies the neglect of the “relativistic effect” of the 
physical system, whereas the conditions b) and c) specify the empirical properties of the 
gravitational field which can be neglected in a non-relativistic system. Along these lines, the 
mathematical procedures implement empirical conditions by the physical hypotheses.
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with empirical consequences that are well confirmed and already entailed by the 
predecessor theory.
The Einsteinian formula for momentum p  = m0v / V (1 -  v2/c2) is developed from 
the two principles of the special theory. And the fact that this formula converges to 
its counterpart within Newtonian mechanics secures indirect empirical support from 
the empirical confirmation of Newtonian mechanics. In this way, the formal aspect 
is intricately related with the conceptual aspect of a given theory. Accordingly, the 
formal aspect in the correspondence principle cannot completely capture the 
continuity between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. Zahar captures the 
underlying reason as follows:
It might be felt that there is nothing sacrosant about the correspondence principle. ... When 
scientists speak of past empirical successes, they have in mind virtual as well as actually 
observed facts. They think of smooth domains consisting both of presumed and of 
ascertained facts. They set out to account, not only for known isolated observations, but 
also for allegedly observed regularities. Such regularities are regarded as being 
approximately captured by existing laws. ... [I]t is still the case that the only way of getting 
at these presumed regularities is through continuity ... with past theories . . . .  (Zahar 1989, 
20-21, original italics)
Accordingly:
In all these cases we have to do with a syntactic-mathematical type of continuity which, 
coupled with the semantic stability of our observational language, entails continuity at the 
empirical level, (ibid., 19, italic my own)
2) The Covariance Principle as a Formal Condition
A more convincing case emphasizing the formal aspect of the continuity between 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics seems to be the extension of the “covariance
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principle” involved in the theory-change. This principle has the formal feature that 
the equations expressing the laws of nature should be invariant under a given class 
of coordinate transformations. Friedman makes this clearly:
Covariance ... is really a property of formulations of space-time theories rather than space­
time theories themselves: it characterizes systems of differential equations ... representing 
the intrinsic laws of a space-time theory relative to some particular coordinatization in R4. 
(Friedman 1983, 213, my italics)
Along the same line, Zahar also claims:
The new [Lorentz covariant] laws were mathematically derived from assumptions like the 
Relativity Principle which seem so formal ’ and innocuous as to be devoid o f empirical 
content. (Zahar 1973, 249, my italics)
Einstein in his landmark 1905 paper “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”
viewed the extension of the covariance requirement as an essential heuristic:
Maxwell’s equations governing electro-magnetic phenomena are to be invariant in
their form under a group of coordinate transformations specified by the principle of
special relativity. Furthermore, Einstein considered the extension of the requirement
of covariance to all coordinate systems (i.e. not just to the inertial frames) to be
essential in the development of the general theory of relativity. It seems, then, that
the extensions of the requirement of covariance are a central characteristic of the
evolutionary development from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics:
Einstein decided to treat all coordinate systems on a par and to impose a-condition of 
general covariance on all physical laws. This condition, which is a strengthening of the 
requirement of Lorentz covariance (General Covariance of course implies Lorentz 
covariance), is an important element of continuity between the special and the general 
theories of Relativity. (Zahar 1973, 252)
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The aim of this section is the same as one of the previous section -  that is, to show 
that the formal aspect of covariance also falls short of giving an adequate 
characterization of the continuity involved in the theory-change. Janssen maintains 
that formal covariance by itself cannot distinguish Einstein’s special relativity from 
Lorentzian ether theory. And in the case of general relativity, Friedman claims that 
despite the fact that the formal covariance of the general theory is same as that of its 
counterparts in Newtonian and the special theory, their physical significances are 
different. Hence, it is difficult to defend the view that the extension of the 
covariance requirement as simply a formal condition captures the essential aspects 
of the evolution from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.
a. The Covariance Principle in Special Relativity: An emphasis on the formal 
property of covariance as the essential part of the development of the special and the 
general theory of relativity can be found in Einstein’s writings:
The content of the restricted relativity theory can accordingly be summarized in one
sentence: all natural laws must be so conditioned that they are covariant with respect to
Lorentz transformations. (Einstein 1940, p.329)
A specific principle of covariance requires the invariance of the laws of mechanics 
under coordinate transformations from one inertial coordinate system to another. In 
the case of Newtonian physics, the laws of mechanics hold with respect to a set of 
inertial coordinates, which are related through a group of Galilean transformations 
that implement the principle of Galilean relativity. But, Maxwell’s equations are not 
Galileo-invariant. So, assuming that Maxwell’s equations are correct, Einstein
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modified the coordinate transformations relating two inertial coordinate systems. 
With the introduction of the Lorentz transformations, the laws of electrodynamics 
take the same form with respect to all inertial coordinate systems, and hence the 
covariance of Maxwell’s equations is established. In this way, Einstein’s special 
theory re-establishes the principle of relativity in electrodynamics, and hence 
eliminates the preferred frame of reference, i.e. the absolute rest frame. In section 
two of “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies,” under the postulate that all 
physical laws take the same form under this coordinate transformation and the speed 
of light is always the constant c, Einstein derives the coordinate transformation 
implementing the principle of relativity of inertial motions. And sections six and 
nine of this paper show that the covariance of Maxwell’s equations holds under the 
group of Lorentz transformations. It seems, then, that the extension of covariance to 
Maxwell’s equations characterizes a sort of generalization from Newtonian 
mechanics to Einstein’s special relativity.
But, it can be argued that the covariance principle has in fact empirical contents. We 
have seen in the last section that the procedure of requiring the ‘Newtonian limit’ is 
intended to relate mathematical quatities in relativistic theories with empirical 
quantities well-confirmed in Newtonian mechanics. In a similar manner, the 
apparently formal procedure of imposing covariance in fact starts from the 
corresponding laws in Newtonian mechanics. Accordingly, the covariance principle
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by no means involves only formal properties, since it provides a constraint over the 
entities involved in a physical law. We can see this in Zahar:
Einstein based his heuristic on the requirement that all physical laws should be Lorentz- 
covariant; i.e. all theories should assume the same form, whether they are expressed in 
terms of x, y, z, t or in terms o i x \ y \  z ’, t ’. But it would be practically impossible to 
discover new laws simply by looking out for all the equations which are covariant under 
the Lorentz transformation. A good method is to start from well-tested laws whose past 
success would anyway have to be explained by any new theory. Thus the heuristic of 
Einstein’s programme is based on two distinctive requirements: (1) a new law should be 
Lorentz-covariant and (2) it should yield some classical law as a limiting case. (Zahar 1989, 
243, my italics)
Despite the aforementioned accounts of Friedman and Zahar emphasizing the formal 
aspect of covariance, it seems that both authors are well aware that the covariance 
principles in the development of the special and the general theory involves physical 
content. (We will see a paragraph where Friedman points out this in the next 
section.) Zahar writes:
[0]n the face of it, the most distinctive requirement of Einstein’s heuristic is empty ... . 
However, the requirement is trivialised only if one is allowed complete freedom in 
reformulating the law. If one is restricted to a given number of entities: ai, a2, . . . ,  a„, then 
the covariant requirement, far from being empty, becomes a very stringent condition. ...
[1]n each particular case in which the heuristic is applied, the entities occurring in the 
covariant law are precisely those involved in the corresponding [and empirically well- 
confirmed] classical law. (Zahar 1989, 110, my italics)
Based on Janssen’s recent work on Lorentzian ether theory, there is an additional 
argument that the evolutionary process from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics 
cannot be completely captured by means of the formal aspect of covariance alone. 
In fact, the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics is more than the 
formal extension of covariance requirement. This is because the formal aspect of
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covariance fails to capture the physical interpretation of Einstein’s theory, given that 
it may have many different physical realizations. A supporting case is provided by 
Janssen, who points out that Lorentzian ether theory employs an identical 
mathematical structure which, however, has an interpretation quite different from 
that of Einstein’s special relativity. (Janssen 1995, 2002b)
Lorentzian ether theory was proposed as an attempt to eliminate the inconsistency 
between the concept of a stationary ether and electrodynamics, both of which were 
then accepted physics. Electrodynamics predicts that light, as an electromagnetic 
wave, propagates at the constant speed of c. In the middle of the 19th century, it was 
widely assumed that light was propagated through a stationary medium known as 
the ether, with respect to which Maxwell’s equations were assumed to hold. Given 
this assumption together with Newtonian kinematics, it can be inferred that the 
speed of light is not constant in a frame at rest with respect to the Earth. The Earth is 
moving with respect to the ether, and so the velocity of light with respect to the 
Earth is the vector sum of the velocity of the light with respect to the ether and the 
velocity of the Earth with respect to the ether. But the null results of a whole series 
of optical experiments attempting to detect the change of velocity of light seems to 
establish the constancy of the speed of light regardless of the motion of the light 
source.
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Lorentzian ether theory attempted to resolve this inconsistency by assuming that the
laws governing matter are Lorentz-covariant. Janssen characterizes this attempt by 
Lorentz as a combination of Newtonian mechanics and electrodynamics 
summarized in “the theorem of the corresponding states”:
[Lorentz] replaced the real space-time coordinates of an arbitrary inertial frame in 
Newtonian space-time by cleverly chosen fictive space-time coordinates that depend on the 
frame’s velocity with respect to the ether. ... He likewise replaced the real electric and 
magnetic fields by fictive fields. In terms of these fictive fields as functions of the fictive 
space-time coordinates, Maxwell’s equations hold in every frame in which the ether is 
either at rest or in uniform motion. ... This configuration of fictive fields translates into a 
configuration of real fields in the moving frame that is different from the configuration in 
the initial frame at rest in the ether. Lorentz referred to two such configurations of real 
fields as corresponding states, and to the mathematical result that if one is allowed the other 
also is as the theorem of the corresponding states. (Janssen 2002b, 424)
Lorentzian ether theory maintains a Newtonian view of space-time, but assumes that
the laws governing matter are Lorentz-invariant. Furthermore, in order to eliminate
any difference of interference patterns associated with the corresponding states (the
so-called second-order effect), that might detect the Earth’s motions with respect to
the ether, Lorentzian ether theory interprets the theorem of the corresponding states
as amounting to the contraction hypothesis:
[A] matter configuration producing a certain field configuration in a frame at rest in the 
ether will, when the system is set in motion, change into the matter configuration producing 
the corresponding state of that field configuration in the frame moving with the system, 
(ibid., 425)
In other words, material bodies such as the interferometer arms employed in the 
Michelson-Morley experiment experience contractions by a factor of V (1 -  v2/c2) in 
the direction of their motion through the ether. As a consequence, this physical 
system modifies its shape and mass depending on the velocity of the system with
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respect to the ether. Lorentzian ether theory is thus able to explain by means of the 
contraction hypothesis why no effect of the ether can be detected.
According to Janssen, both Lorentzian ether theory and Einstein’s special relativity 
employ an identical mathematical formalism despite their essentially different 
physical interpretations. (Janssen 2002) What the theorem of the corresponding 
states involves is essentially the Lorentz invariance of the laws governing matter. In 
other words, the fictive space-time coordinates and the fictive fields are introduced 
in order that Maxwell equations remain invariant under the group of Lorentz 
transformations. Hence, if we capture the essence of special relativity as a theory all 
of whose laws are Lorentz-invariant, we cannot distinguish Einstein’s special 
relativity from Lorentzian ether theory.
These two theories are however importantly distinguished by their different 
interpretations of how the Lorentz invariance of laws is physically realized. Lorentz 
retained the kinematical properties of Newtonian space-time, and interpreted 
Lorentz invariance as stemming from the property of laws governing matter: the 
Lorentz-transformed quantities represent the modified configurations of matter in 
motion, which result in Lorentz invariance of the laws of nature. In other words, 
Lorentz viewed Maxwell’s equations as holding with respect to the ether frame, and 
the configuration of the fictive fields as representing the modified configurations of 
matter in motion, which are different from its configuration at rest in the ether.
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Einstein’s interpretation, as Janssen sees it, is completely different in that it is
founded on “a new concept of space-time.” Lorentzian ether theory was supposed to
reveal the motion of a body relative to the ether. Yet Einstein viewed the concept of
the ether, which provides a preferred frame, as at odds with his belief that all inertial
frames are equivalent. As a result, Einstein interpreted the very same formalism as a
result of the kinematical properties of a new space-time, which stem from the
principle of special relativity; the fictive fields in the theorem of the corresponding
states are interpreted as the fields measured by inertially moving observers. In
contrast with Lorentz’s interpretation, Einstein interpreted Lorentz transformations
as relating the space-time coordinates of one moving observer to those of another.12
Accordingly, Lorentz-transformed quantities reflect different space-time coordinates
measured by two observers in uniform relative motion. While Lorentzian ether
theory is based on Newtonian space-time and Lorentz invariant laws governing
matter, Einstein’s special theory views both as founded on the kinematical
properties of a new concept of space-time:
From a purely mathematical point o f view, Lorentz had thereby arrived at special relativity. 
To meet the demands of special relativity, all that needs to be done is to make sure that any 
proposed law is Lorentz invariant. Conceptually, however, Lorentz’s theory is very 
different from Einstein’s. In Einstein’s theory, the Lorentz invariance of all physical laws 
reflects a new space-time structure. [On the other hand,] Lorentz retained Newton’s 
conception of space and time, the structure of which is reflected in the invariance of the 
laws of Newtonian physics under what are now called Galilean transformations. (Janssen 
2006, 5)
12 It seems that Einstein wrote in this spirit as follows: “the new feature of [the 1905 relativity 
theory] was the realization of the fact that the bearing of the Lorentz transformation transcended 
its connection with Maxwell equations and was connected with the nature of space-time in 
general.” (Einstein 1955, a letter to C. Seeling)
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Accordingly, from the perspective of the formal aspect of Lorentz invariance, 
Lorentzian ether theory cannot be distinguished from special relativity. However, 
Lorentzian ether theory and special relativity are essentially different theories. 
Accordingly, Einstein’s special relativity amounts to more than just the theory that 
claims that all laws must satisfy Lorentz invariance. It follows that we cannot 
capture the essential feature of special relativity through the covariance principle 
alone. So, it can be concluded that the formal aspect of the covariance cannot 
completely substantiate any account of the development from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian physics as evolutionary.
b. The Covariance Principle in General Relativity: A similar moral can be drawn
in the case of the general theory of relativity. By means of a formal principle of
general covariance that requires the coordinate independence of the laws of physics,
Einstein aimed to generalize the principle of relativity to apply to arbitrary
coordinate systems including non-inertial flames. Einstein viewed the requirement
of general covariance as a way to construct a theory realizing the generalized
principle of relativity:
The general laws of nature are to be expressed by equations which hold good for all 
systems of co-ordinates, that is, are covariant with respect to any substitutions whatever 
(generally co-variant).
It is clear that a physical theory which satisfies this postulate will also be suitable for 
the general postulate of relativity. For the sum of all substitutions in any case includes those 
which correspond to all relative motions of three-dimensional systems of coordinates. 
(Einstein 1916, 117)
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Under the influence of Mach’s empricism, Einstein considered the concept of a 
preferred inertial frame (which enables us to define the concept of absolute motion) 
as epistemologically unsatisfactory, since such a frame could not be identified 
through any measurable observation. Accordingly, Einstein thought that a new 
theory of motion needed to be based on what was observable, i.e., relative motions. 
Given that both Newtonian mechanics and the special theory of relativity have this 
“epistemological defect” of admitting a set of preferred inertial frames, Einstein 
intended to develop a theory that did not refer to any preferred coordinate systems:
Of all imaginable spaces Ru R2, etc., in any kind of motion relatively to one another, there 
is none which we may look upon as privileged a priori. . . .  The laws ofphysics must be of 
such a nature that they apply to systems of reference in any kind of motion. Along this road 
we arrive at an extension of the postulate of relativity. (Einstein 1923, 113)
Just as the principle of special relativity eliminated the preferred inertial frames of
electrodynamics, Einstein, by means of general covariance, intended to eliminate
any preferred frame. Just as the relativity between inertial coordinate systems was
achieved through the special theory, Einstein intended to generalize relativity to be
applied to all arbitrary coordinate systems. In this way, acceleration could be viewed
as being an artifact of the choice of the coordinate system. According to this account,
it seems that the extension of covariance to non-inertial coordinates could be
identified as the generalization of the principle of relativity to all frames of
reference. The evolution from the special to the general theories can be
characterized as the generalization of a relativity principle through extending
covariance.
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The above account of the development of general relativity, however, was not in 
fact fully realized as Einstein originally intended. Given that acceleration is still a 
physically significant concept in the general theory, general covariance by no means 
implements the generalized principle of relativity. While the concept of velocity is 
relativitized through the principles of relativity in Newtonian mechanics and special 
relativity, accelerating motions in the general theory remain as absolute motions. 
With reference to the local inertial frames i.e. a privileged subclass of frames, the 
concept of acceleration of a given body can be defined as the deviation from a 
geodesic trajectory of a free-falling body. None of the geodesic trajectories can be 
transformed into non-geodesic trajectories by means of coordinate change, and the 
distinction between the former and the latter is absolute with respect to coordinate 
change;13
Furthermore, although the formal role of covariance within the general theory of 
relativity is the same as the corresponding one within Newtonian mechanics and 
special relativity, the physical significance of covariance is interpreted as being 
distinct within the contexts of the different theories. The status of covariance in the 
general theory of relativity is complicated because the space-time it postulates is 
curved. To appreciate this, we need to separate the concept of an 
‘indistinguishability group’ from a ‘covariance group.’ The latter characterizes the
13 In this spirit, DiSalle views the principle of general covariance as based on the idea that “the 
privileged states of motion should not be mere artifacts of our coordinates, i.e. that they should be 
coordinate-independent.” (DiSalle 2003)
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range of coordinate systems where the equations representing physical laws of a 
given space-time theory hold. On the other hand, the former selects those “reference 
frames (states of motion) [that] are distinguishable (by a “mechanical experiment”) 
relative to those laws.” (Friedman 1983, 213) Hence, the latter is concerned with the 
formulation of a given theory, and the former is about the laws of that theory. 
Friedman claims that:
“Sameness of form” (covariance) is much too weak to guarantee physical equivalence 
(indistinguishability) and therefore much too weak to express a relativity principle. The 
notions of “sameness of form” and covariance correspond to the notions of physical 
equivalence and relativity only in the context of flat space-time theories in which there 
exists a privileged class of inertial coordinate systems. ... But in non-flat space-time 
theories like general relativity these “nice” connections between indistinguishability and 
covariance break down. (Friedman 1983, 208)
While in Newtonian mechanics and special relativity, the covariance and the
indistinguishability groups coincide, this is not the case in general relativity. The
covariance group of the general theory is identical to the group of all coordinate
transformations, whereas the indistinguishability group is the restricted group of
transformations from one local inertial frame to another. The discrepancy between
the two groups shows that the same mathematical requirement of covariance turns
out to play different roles within the different theories. In the case of Newtonian
mechanics and special relativity, where the flat space-time formalisms are available,
their covariance implements the physical equivalence of inertial frames. Yet, in
general relativity, without the existence of a privileged reference frame defined
globally, covariance does not implement a relativity principle.
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We have, then, considered four ways in which formal aspects of the relationships 
between Newtonian and Einstein physics by themselves do not supply physical 
interpretations that give information about the way the formalism represents the 
world. Accordingly, we cannot rule out the possibility that in spite of the continuity 
of mathematical formalisms, their conceptual interpretations could experience 
radical changes. The identical mathematical framework can have radically different 
interpretations. So, it seems that the mathematical continuity in theory-change as 
characterized so far is not inconsistent with conceptual discontinuity within the 
process.
4. Ontological Aspects of the Theory-Change of Space-Time Theories
A physical interpretation is, so I have argued, necessary to capture which physical 
aspect the mathematical formalism such as Lorentz covariance reflects. The 
accounts of Einstein and his commentators emphasize that the formalism is closely 
related to the structure of space-time. As noted in the previous section, Einstein 
pointed out that “the new feature of [the 1905 relativity theory] was the realization 
that the bearing of the Lorentz transformation ... was connected with the nature of 
space-time in general.” (Einstein 1955) It was Herman Minkowski who first 
emphasized the importance of space-time within Einsteinian physics: “the 
Lorentzian contraction hypothesis is completely equivalent to the new conception of 
space and time.” (Minkowski 1909) Among modem commentators, Satchel in his
(1989) characterizes the essential feature of the development of special relativity as
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that of “the new kinematical foundation for all of physics inherent in Lorentz’s ether 
theory.” Thus, in order to comprehend the nature of the theory-change from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, we need to shift our focus squarely to the 
conception of space-time, which underlies the mathematical formalisms of 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics.
This section critically considers evolutionary and revolutionary views based on 
disputes over the ontological status of space-time.
The ontological status of space-time has been debated as a part of the “substance- 
relation controversy.” The dispute is basically over the mode of existence of space­
time.14 Substantivalism is the view that space-time has an existence analogous to 
that of material substance. In contrast, relationism denies that space-time has an 
independent existence, and instead maintains that space-time is simply a set of 
relations between material bodies or physical events.15
14 The concept of space has always been at the foundation of theoretical frameworks seeking to 
comprehend the physical world, so that the mode of existence of space was discussed even before 
scientific theories of mechanics were developed. Plato in the Timaeus considered space a part of 
the physical world in that it ‘exists always and cannot be destroyed’ (Plato, 52b), while Aristotle 
seemed to oppose Plato’s idea about the ontological status of space by insisting that place is not 
independent of matter (Aristotle, 208a 11-16). These metaphysical disputes, which appear 
repeatedly throughout the different contexts in the development of physical theories, can be 
understood as part of the debate between substantivalism and relationism.
15 The substance-relation controversy can be traced in the work of Newton and Leibniz.
According to Newton, space exists independently of material objects in the sense that place has its 
existence prior to its occupation by material objects: “we believe all those spaces to be spherical 
through which any sphere ever passes,... even though a sensible trace of the sphere no longer 
remains there. We firmly believe that the space was spherical before the sphere occupied it.” 
(Newton 1962, 133) Furthermore, space would still maintain its existence even if there were no
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The absolute-relational contrast represents a debate about the ontological status of space­
time structure: whether theories ostensibly about space-time structure are merely theories 
about the spatio-temporal relations between physical objects, or whether they describe 
independently existing entities -  space, time, or space-time -  in which physical objects are 
located. (Friedman 1989, 62)
The nature of the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics has often 
been discussed within this context. Substantivalism concerning both Newtonian and 
Einsteinian space-times entails that we can capture the continuity between them by 
means of the mode of existence of space-time as substance, which causes a given 
body to follow its trajectories according to laws of motion:
[T]he metric field gMV of General Relativity is properly viewed as the modem representor of 
substantival spacetime. ... It determines the spacelike-timelike distinction, determines the 
affine connection or inertial structure of spacetime (i.e. defines which motions are 
accelerated and which are not), and determines distances between points along all paths 
connecting them. In all these ways, the metric is perfectly analogous to Newton’s absolute 
space and time. (Hoefer 1998, 459)
On the contrary, the relationist interpretation of curved space-time in the general
theory argues for the occurrence of an essential change of the mode of existence of
material object in the physical world; “we can possibly imagine that there is nothing in space, yet 
we cannot think that space does not exist...” (ibid., 137) Hence, given that space, as Newton 
pointed out, is akin to ‘the nature of substance’ rather than being exactly substantial like material 
objects, we may at least admit substantivalism as a claim that space is something as real as 
matter. The point is that although one cannot comprehend the specific mode of the existence of 
space, substantivalists still maintain the reality of space, i.e. existence itself, as a core of their 
agenda.
Leibniz can also be read as having his own different agenda concerning the reality of space. By 
criticizing Newton’s idea of reality of space as a ‘conceit of imagination’, he claimed that “there 
is no real space out of material universe.” (Alexander, 29) Instead, Leibniz provided an 
alternative understanding of the relational conception of space; space can be replaced as 
“something merely relative,” which is “an order of the existence of things.” For “space denotes in 
terms of possibility, and an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing 
together; without inquiring into their manner of existing.” (ibid., 25) In modem terms, relationism 
asserts that there is no such thing as absolute reference frames and all that exists are relative 
reference frames defined with respect to material objects. Hence, we can read Leibniz not only as 
avoiding the need to be concerned with the mode of existence of space, but also as rejecting the 
reality of space itself.
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space-time as compared to the classical theory. While space-time and matter in 
Newtonian mechanics and special relativity have independent existence, they do not 
have independent existence in the interpretation of space-time in general relativity, 
which “describes the world as a set of interacting fields including gMV” (Rovelli 
2001, 107)
In this section, it will be argued that these ontological interpretations concerning the 
mode of space-time fail to deliver an adequate account of the theory-change from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.
1) Space-Time Substantivalism and An Evolutionary View of Theory Change
There are two different ways for substantivalists to attempt to underpin an 
evolutionary account of the theory-change. Firstly, space-time as the substantival 
entity “ether” might be alleged to provide the evolutionary element. (Einstein 1922) 
Secondly, the metric field g  of the general theory might be alleged to be the 
successor of Newtonian space-time. (Hoefer 1996, 1998) This section will argue 
that the first alternative is an interpretation that has no physical foundation; while 
although the second one supports an evolutionary view, it does so only when the 
metric field g is viewed from the perspective of what space-time does (i.e., the 
codification of the behaviours of a body), rather than what space-time is (i.e., its 
mode of existence).
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Although Einstein considered the ether as superfluous within the special theory, the 
existence of the ether became an issue when he attempted to capture the physical 
interpretation of the metric field g. (Einstein 1922) In this context, the development 
of the concept of space-time is related to the mode of existence of the alleged 
substantial entity “ether”:
According to [the general theory] the metrical qualities of the continuum of space-time 
differ in the environment of different points of space-time, and are partly conditioned by 
the matter existing outside of the territory under consideration. This space-time variability 
of the reciprocal relations of the standards of space and time, or, perhaps, the recognition of 
the fact that “empty space” in its physical relation is neither homogeneous nor isotropic, 
compelling us to describe its state by ten functions (the gravitational potentials gMV), has, I 
think, finally disposed of the view that space-time is physically empty. But therewith the 
conception of the ether has again acquired an intelligible content, although this content 
differs widely from that of the ether of the mechanical undulatory theory of light... 
(Einstein 1922, 18)
Lorentz’s ether theory assumes an ether pervading space, through which electrically 
charged particles move. The physical interactions between the ether and matter are 
governed by Lorentz’s theory of electrons; the electrically charged particles 
generate excited states of the ether, corresponding to the electromagnetic fields. In 
comparison with mechanical theories that are interested in the mechanical properties 
of the ether, Lorentz’s theory is based on the electromagnetic worldview, and all 
mechanical properties of the ether except its immobility are eliminated. Yet the 
electromagnetic ether can be interpreted as a substantival entity due to its interaction 
with matter.
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Given that the ether is transparent to uncharged matter and is not influenced by the 
existence of matter, Lorentz’s contemporaries identified the ether with empty space. 
In a similar spirit, Einstein stressed the roles of the ether in the development of 
relativity in “Ether and the Theory of Relativity.” Here the evolution of both 
theories of relativity is described as the modification of the physical properties of 
the ether, which Einstein identified with the properties of space-time. First of all, 
Einstein viewed the ether as possessing the physical properties of Newton’s absolute 
space. Accordingly, “Newton might no less well have called his absolute space 
‘Ether.’” (Einstein 1922, 17) Einstein indeed continued to discuss the development 
of the theories of relativity from the perspective of the change of the properties of 
the ether:
[T]he special theory of relativity does not compel us to deny ether. We may assume the 
existence of an ether; only we must give up ascribing a definite state of motion to it, ... the 
ether of the general theory of relativity is a medium which is itself devoid of all mechanical 
and kinematical qualities, but helps to determine mechanical (and electromagnetic) events. 
... the ether of the general theory of relativity is the outcome of the Lorentzian ether, 
through relativ[iz]ation. (ibid., 18-20)
The special theory of relativity is considered as removing “the last mechanical
characteristic” of Lorentzian ether, “the ether velocity,” without denying the
existence of the ether itself. Given that in the general theory of relativity, Einstein
attempted to relativitize all kinematical concepts, it seems, then, that the gradual
modification of the concept of the substantival ether provides an evolutionary
account of this theory-change.
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Given that Lorentzian ether is identified with space-time, it is necessary to clarify in 
what sense the two entities are identified. In the history of the development of 
mechanics, two different properties of the ether have been identified with properties 
of absolute space. First, Lorentzean ether has been identified with absolute space 
since these entities have the property of absolute rest. According to Lorentz, 
absolute rest implies that the order of parts of the ether is unchanged with respect to 
its other parts:
If for brevity’s sake I say that the Aether is at rest, it is thereby meant only that one part of 
this medium is not displaced with respect to another and that all observable motions of the 
heavenly bodies are relative motions with respect to the Aether. (Lorentz 1895, 4, quoted 
from Rynasiewicz 1996)
The concept of absolute rest of the ether does not mean complete rest, which is
vulnerable to the argument of infinite regress. As Rynasiewicz points out, “to speak
of the absolute rest or motion of X  would be to speak of T s  motion with respect to a
tertium quid 7, and so on.” (Rynasiewicz 1996, 289) In fact, this property is what
Newton in De Gravitatione attributed to space. According to Newton, the order of
the parts of space, which does not change, characterizes absolute space:
It is only through their reciprocal order and position that the parts o f ... space are 
understood to be the very ones that they truly are; and they do not have any other principle 
of individuation beside this order and position, which consequently cannot be altered. (Hall 
and Hall 1962, p. 103, trans. by Torretti)
This property of the ether, that of being at absolute rest, can be considered as
providing a privileged frame of reference, with respect to which the spatial distance
between two events can be determined.
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The second property that allegedly allows the ether to be identified with absolute 
space is as follows: absolute space can be identified with the ether because of its 
causal property of generating inertial structure. In other words, absolute space is a 
causally efficient entity -  it causes material bodies to follow their trajectories in 
accordance with the laws of inertia and acceleration. From their reading of 
Einstein’s works, Brown (2005) and Rynasiewicz (1996) claim that what Einstein 
had in mind when he claimed the identity of absolute space with the ether was the 
causal sense of absoluteness, rather than the existence of the privileged frame.
The inertia-producing property of this ether [absolute space], in accordance with classical 
mechanics, is precisely not to be influenced, either by the configuration of matter, or by 
anything else. For this reason, one may call it ‘absolute.’ That something real has to be 
conceived as the cause for the preference of an inertial system over a non-inertial system is 
a fact that physicists have only come to understand in recent years. (Einstein 1924, 
Saunders and Brown eds. 1991, 15-16)
The causal property of the ether was characterized by Einstein as being causally
absolute, i.e. as “having a physical effect, but not itself influenced by physical
conditions.” (Einstein 1921) And casual absoluteness is one of the elements that
made Einstein modify the concept of space-time. For, “it is contrary to the mode of
thinking in science to conceive a thing (the space-time continuum) ... which acts
itself, but which cannot be acted upon.” (ibid., 55-6)
Also, following the special theory of relativity, the ether was absolute, because its influence 
on inertia and light propagation was thought to be independent of physical influences of 
any kind. ... The ether of the general theory of relativity ... differs from that of classical 
mechanics or the special theory of relativity respectively, in so far as it is not ‘absolute,’ but 
is determined in its locally variable properties by ponderable matter. (Einstein 1924, 
Saunders and Brown eds. 1991, 17-8)
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It can be argued, then, that these causal properties of this inertia-producing entity 
illuminate “the gradual modifications of our idea of space resulting from the 
influence of the relativistic view point.” (Einstein 1961, 161) This aspect seems to 
capture at least one important continuity in the theory-change from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian physics:
The general theory of relativity formed the last step in the development of the program of 
the field-theory ... Space and time were thereby divested not of their reality but of their 
causal absoluteness -  i.e., affecting but not affected -  which Newton had been compelled to 
ascribe to them in order to formulate the laws then known ... [Thus] the elements of 
Newtonian theory passed over into the general theory of relativity, (idid., 254)
To the extent that the concept of ether experiences a modification of its central
causal property in order to satisfy the action-reaction principle in the general theory,
we can see the evolutionary development in the theory-change.
The above account of the conceptual development can also be further clarified from 
the viewpoint of the modem geometric formulation of space-time. Given that what 
was at issue concerning the physical properties of the ether is “the cause for the 
preference of an inertial system over a non-inertial system” 16, what Einstein referred 
to as the ether in classical dynamics was not the entire absolute space. Rather it is 
inertial structure within absolute space. In the modem geometric formulation of 
space-time theories, inertial structures are implemented by geometric entities, i.e., 
the four-dimensional affine connection in Newtonian space-time, and the connection 
and the conformal structure in Minkowskian space-time. The connections determine
16 Einstein’s expression that “the cause for the preference of an inertial system over a non-inertial 
system” implies that the ether generates a causal power to direct a given body to move in 
accordance to the laws of motion, such as the law of inertia and the law of acceleration.
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the inertial trajectories of particles, and the conformal structure determines the 
propagation of light. So, it seems that the ether is viewed as substantial space, 
because both geometric entities can be seen as “inertia-producing entities.”
Furthermore, the above causal account of space-time seems to reflect well the 
evolution of the general theory of relativity. The space-time metric field g, which is 
interpreted as the ether, determines the connection V. A non-singular metric g 
uniquely determines the (torsion free) connection V, through the condition of metric 
compatibility Wg = 0, which requires that the parallel transport of a vector should 
preserve its length. In other words, the metric compatibility condition, with the 
assumption of vanishing torsion, completely determines the inertial structure in the 
general theory. Accordingly, given that the inertial structure is determined by the 
metric field, which in turn is determined by material processes, it seems that the 
ether can be identified as substantial space-time, which realizes the action-reaction 
principle:
I admit that the general theory of relativity is closer to the ether hypothesis than the special 
theory. This new theory, however, would not violate the principle of relativity, because the 
state of this g„v = ether would not be that of a rigid body in an independent state of motion, 
but every state of motion would be a function of position, determined through the material 
processes. (Einstein 1922, quoted from Rynasiewicz 1996, 295)
However, the problem with the above evolutionary view is that the causal element 
of space-time does not provide any physical foundation for the laws of motion. 
Despite the prevailing belief among the physics community of the time, the history
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of science seems to attest that the ether has not yet provided any physical 
mechanism whatsoever, which explicates the law of inertia. (Sklar 1972 and Hoefer 
1998) Although it was widely believed that inertia could be explained by 
acceleration with respect to the ether, this turns out to be a merely “wishful 
thinking.” (Sklar 1972, 289) Instead, the explanation of laws of motion is related to 
the kinematical properties of Newtonian space-time.
How does the introduction of absolute space provide Newton with the wherewithal to 
explain the dynamical effects? Since the parts of absolute space endure through time, they 
provide a reference frame by which distance relations can be defined not only between 
bodies at a time but also between bodies at different times. ... [But] Newton’s ability to 
account for inertial effects does not immediately depend on the postulation of space as a 
substance. Substantival absolute space serves only as a means of extending the domain of 
the distance relation to include pairs of nonsimultaneous events. (Maudlin 1993, 186-7)
In a similar vein, Brown claims that regarding absolute space as a substance is by no
means essential in comprehending the workings of Newtonian physics:
For Newton, the existence of absolute space and time has to do with providing a structure, 
necessarily distinct from ponderable bodies and their relations, with respect to which it is 
possible systemically to define the basic kinematical properties of the motion of such 
bodies. For Newton, space and time are not substances in the sense that they can act, but 
are real things nonetheless.17 (Brown 2005, 142)
17 The attempt to capture the substantiality of space is not completely supported by Newton’s own 
characterization of the mode of existence of space. Substantival space is intended to provide a 
framework to capture the properties of space, but Newton claimed “it has its own manner of 
existence which fits neither substance nor accident.” (Huggett, 110) It is argued that space is not 
substance in that it fails to pass the classical sense, since its existence depends on something else, 
which is God. And space is different from typical substances, such as mind and body, in that 
space is not active. At this point, we may at least admit that Newton thought of space as substance 
metaphorically or analogically, rather than literally, considering his remark that “[space] 
approaches more nearly to the nature of substance.” (ibid., I l l )
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Along the same lines, DiSalle offers an argument that substantivalism fails to 
capture the way space-time explains the laws of motion.18 The confusion underlying 
substantivalism, according to DiSalle, stems from the view that space-time is a 
substantial entity that causes a body to move in accordance with the laws of motion. 
He provides an analogy between space-time and Euclidean geometries to 
illustrate this point:
To claim that space is Euclidean only means that measurements agree with the Euclidean 
metric; Euclidean geometry, if true, can’t causally explain those measurements, because it 
only expresses the constraints to which those measurements will conform. (DiSalle 1995, 
324)
And:
Because the physical foundations of spatial geometry have been relatively clear, only a 
confused person would ask whether Euclidean geometry is really the cause of differences in 
length; that the differences can be measured, and that the measured results agree with the 
Euclidean metric, is all that anyone ever meant by the claim that space is Euclidean. ... [I]t 
is equally confused to ask whether spacetime is the cause of the distinctions between states 
of motion that its theory entails. (DiSalle 1992, 187)
In the case of Euclidean geometry, its geometric structure by no means causally
explains its “laws” such as the Pythagorean theorem. Instead, the axioms of Euclidean
geometry encode “the constraints to which those measurements will conform”
(DiSalle 1995, 324). Accordingly, theories that assumes that physical space is
Euclidean by no means imply that Euclidean space exists as a separate entity.
18 It seems that the interpretation of absolute space as a causally efficient entity does not respect 
Newton’s own intention: “[space is] not in the least mobile, nor capable of inducing change of 
motion in bodies.” (Newton 1962, 145) Newton certainly aimed to analyse the true motions by 
means of cause and effect, and made a distinction between absolute and relational motions with 
reference to absolute space. But it is not evident that an effect influencing bodies to follow inertial 
or non-inertial trajectories is actually caused by absolute space. What Newton mentioned is the 
fact that the true motion of bodies can be distinguished from relative ones by a certain effect, 
rather than that the effect of bodies is caused by a specific substantival entity: “the true and 
absolute circular motion of the water ... becomes known, and may be measured by this 
endeavour.” It can be said then that the relationship between absolute space and the motions of 
body is one of supervenience, rather than one of cause and effect.
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Instead, the success of Euclidean geometry stems from the fact that its laws codify
physical measurements and processes. DiSalle then claims that the same thing can
be said in the case of space-time theories:
[T]he nature of spacetime is a question, not of whether a theoretical entity provides a causal 
explanation for appearances, but of whether the physical processes of measurement 
conform to geometric laws ... Spatial measurement has been defined by coordination with a 
basic physical process (motion of rigid bodies). (DiSalle 1995, 323-324)
No casual property of space-time then, according to DiSalle, elucidates the 
connection between the laws of motion and space-time. In the same vein, Brown 
points out that the causal property of space-time is superfluous19, and even 
problematic in the general theory:
In 1924, Einstein thought that the inertial property of matter ... requires explanation in 
terms of the action of a real entity on the particles. It is the space-time connection that plays 
this role: the affine geodesics form ruts or grooves in space-time that guide the free 
particles along their way. In GR, on the other hand, this view is at best redundant, at worst 
problematic ... For it follows from the form of Einstein’s field equations that the covariant 
divergence of the stress-energy tensor field TMV vanishes, that object which incorporates the 
‘matter’ degrees of freedom, vanishes. (Brown 2005, 141)
This line of thought can also be found in Hoefer’s view, which holds that the 
continuity between Newtonian and Einsteinian space-time can be found within the 
metric field g  of the general theory. When Hoefer claims that “the metric field gMV of 
General Relativity is properly viewed as the modem representor of substantival
19 Along these lines, Brown and Pooley point out that the way that “all the free particles in the 
world behave in a mutually coordinated way” is a “prima facie mystery” in Newtonian mechanics 
(Brown and Pooley 2004, 4). They also claim that “to appeal to the action of a background space­
time connection in which particles are immersed -  to what Weyl called the guiding field -  is 
arguably to enhance the mystery, not to remove it. For the particles do not have space-time feeler 
either.” (ibid.)
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spacetime” (Hoefer 1998, 459), it seems that he might advocate the traditional 
category of space-time substantivalism. Yet his argument shows that this is not in 
fact the case:
[W]hy is it proper to view gMV as the representor of substantival spacetime? The metric’s 
role is explicitly to give us the details of the structure of 4-D, curved spacetime. It 
determines the spacelike-timelike distinction, determines the affine connection or inertia 
structure of spacetime (i.e. defines which motions are accelerated and which are not), and 
determines distances between points along all paths connecting them. In all these ways, the 
metric is perfectly analogous to Newton’s absolute space and time, (ibid.)
So, the metric g  is by no means interpreted as “the representor of substantival space­
time” because of the mode of existence of the entity. It is instead the commonality 
of function of the metric g  which determines the space-timelike distinction and the 
affine connection of space-time. Hoefer admits that the general theory of relativity 
is “an awkward theory to comprehend using traditional [substantivalist] concepts of 
space-time.” (Callendar and Hoefer 2002, 178)
Hoefer thus expresses his sympathy for DiSalle’s view as “a realist about space (or 
space-time)’s structure, without making the mistake of inappropriate reification.” 
(Callender and Hoefer 2002, 179) In fact, it is not difficult to find similarities 
between Hoefer’s view and DiSalle’s.
Einstein believed in the reality of space-time, as ascribed in GTR by the metric field g , 
because of its apparently ineliminable role in the description and prediction of metrical, 
inertial, and gravitational phenomena. (Hoefer 1996, 27, my italics)
The metric ... serves to define absolute accleration and rotation, a function that Descartes’s 
relationism could not allow any material thing, no matter how pervasive, to perform. 
(Hoefer 1998, 460, my italics)
Absolute space ... is the theory that rest and motion can be distinguished; if we could 
define rest and motion physically so that they could be distinguished unambiguously, we 
would have a perfectly good reason to claim that physical events exhibit the structure of
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absolute space. We would not thereby be explaining that distinction, as Einstein thought. 
Instead we would only be using some physical distinction to define the difference between 
motion and rest. (DiSalle 1992, 187, my italics)
So, space-time exists not because of what it is, but because “space-time is [what]
space-time does.” (Hoefer 1996, 26)
From the above accounts, we can see that the affine connection, in opposition to 
Einstein’s claim, is not in fact an inertia-generating entity in either Newtonian or 
Einsteinian physics. In other words, it is not a causally efficient entity whose 
geometric features causes material bodies to move in accordance with the laws of 
motion. Alternative accounts of the workings of space-time theory, which Brown 
and DiSalle suggest, will be left to the next chapter. In this context, it is enough to 
point out that it is not the mode of existence of space-time that explains the laws of 
motion. So, the causal assertions about space-time, in Kitcher’s terms, are by no 
means “working parts,” which “occur in problem solving-schemata.” Rather they 
are at best “presuppositional posits” -  “entities that apparently exist if the instances 
of the schemata are to be true.” (Kitcher 1995, 149) Accordingly, we cannot expect 
that the causal properties of space-times provide an adequate evolutionary account 
of theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.
2) Space-Time Relationism and A Revolutionary View of Theory Change
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Another way in which a revolutionary account of this theory-change might be 
underwritten is by interpreting general relativity from the perspective of relationism. 
In this section, I argue that there are problems with this perspective too.20
Space-time relationists regarding the general theory, such as Smolin and Rovelli, 
draw our attention to an allegedly revolutionary change of the concept of space-time. 
While both Newtonian and Minkowskian space-times are considered as absolute in 
the sense that their existence is independent of the existence of matter, space-time in 
the general theory is interpreted as co-existing with matter. The ontological 
difference between the two space-times stems from two different theoretical 
perspectives. Rovelli summarizes the first perspective in a following way: space­
time can be identified with the gravitational field since we can see the direct
20 There is also a well-known failed argument for relationism, which argues that Einstein’s 
general theory of relativity realizes Mach’s principle that embodies relationists’ agenda. It is now 
well-known that Einstein himself admitted that Mach’s principle is not necessary and even 
inconsistent with general relativity. (Hoefer 1994) If Mach’s principle were correct, in Newton 
bucket the effect of the shape of water surface would be identical whether the bucket or the shell 
is set rotating: the shape of water surface become concave in both cases. On the other hand, 
Newton’s theory predicts that the rotating shell will have not any effect on the shape of the water 
surface. When Einstein attempted to determine the metric field of a rotating shell at its center, he 
calculated a shell which is rotating in Minkowski space-time. Although a tiny deviation from the 
metric field of Minkowski space-time is generated by the rotation of the shell, it was not enough 
to change the shape of water surface into concave one. (Janssen 2004)
Another problem occurs in a boundary condition. When Einstein calculated the metric field 
generated by the rotating shell around its center, he employed Minkowski space-time as a 
boundary condition of the situation. But at this point, he brought the assumption of absolute 
space-time back. For the boundary condition states that as the values of the metric field as we go 
to spatial infinity, space-time becomes flat. In this way, Mach’s view is undermined by the fact 
that rotation is considered with respect to absolute space-time rather than other matter. (Sklar 
1976).
We can also see the problem of Mach’s principle from the fact that there exist non-flat 
solutions of EFE even when the energy momentum tensor is zero; that is, when there is no matter 
in the universe. (Earman 1986) What I am concerned with in this section is the attempts of more 
recent physicists as Rovelli and Smolin, who interpret the general theory as a relational theory.
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influence of the latter on the former in physical equations. “Newton’s background 
spacetime was nothing but the gravitational field! The stage is promoted to one of 
the actors.21 ... [A]ny measurement of length, area or volume is, in reality, a 
measurement of features of the gravitational field.” (Rovelli 2001, 107) 
Furthermore, the gravitational field has the same theoretical role as the
21 This claim stems from the interpretation of the principle of equivalence. This is well reflected 
within Einstein’s thought experiment concerning a freeiy falling person in an elevator, who 
cannot decide whether she is uniformly accelerating downward, or she is experiencing a 
gravitational field. The equivalence principle states that acceleration in Minkowski space-time is 
equivalent to experiencing the gravitational field, such that “in a sufficiently small area, inertia 
and gravitational forces cancel to any accuracy in a freefalling reference frame.” (Rovelli 2004, 
60) At this point, Rovelli provides two alternative interpretations of the principle:
1. as the discovery that the gravitational field is nothing but a local distortion of space-time
geometry; or
2. as the discovery that spacetime geometry is nothing but a manifestation of a particular
physical field, the gravitational field. (Rovelli 1997,194, my italics)
Rovelli prefers the latter interpretation. So it seems that he considers the principle as implying 
space-time structure can be reduced to the property of gravitational interaction:
“Physical reality is now described as a complex interacting ensemble of entities (fields), the 
location of which is only meaningful with respect to one another. The relation among dynamical 
entities of being contiguous ... is the foundation o f the spacetime structure. Among these various 
entities, there is one, gravitational field, which interacts with every other one and thus determines 
the relative motion of the individual components of every object we want to use as rod and clock. 
Because of that, it admits a metrical interpretation.” (Rovelli 1997, 194, my italics)
However, we need to keep in mind that the above account is based on Rovelli’s idiosyncratic 
reading of the equivalence principle, which replaces the traditional reading of the principle with a 
view to motivating his own approach of the quantum theory of gravity. Even Rovelli’s first 
interpretation of the equivalence principle (the gravitational field is nothing but a local distortion 
of space-time geometry) is different from Einstein’s equivalence principle. Rovelli’s reading of 
the equivalence principle involves the reduction of space-time to the property of gravitational 
interaction. Yet, Einstein’s own version of the principle does not necessarily imply that the 
former is reduced to the latter or the other way around. (Norton 1985, Janssen 2001) Einstein’s 
own principle of equivalence relativitizes inertia (a space-time property), and gravity, rather than 
reducing one into the other. Einstein claimed that just as special relativity implies that the electric 
and the magnetic fields are special aspects of one entity called the electromagnetic field, so 
general relativity implies that the inertial structure of space-time and the gravitational field are 
both special aspects of the inertio-gravitational field.
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electromagnetic field; “the gravitational field is represented by a field on spacetime, 
g^v, just like the electromagnetic field AM. They are both concrete entities: a strong 
electromagnetic wave can hit you and knock you down; and so can a strong 
gravitational wave.” (ibid.) In other words, space-time is relational in that general 
relativity “describes the world as a set of interacting fields including g^, and 
possibly other objects, and motion can be defined only by positions and 
displacements of these dynamical objects relative to each other.” (ibid.)
The second perspective, through which the revolutionary feature within the theory- 
change is claimed, is the background-independent formulation of the general theory; 
if space-time in general relativity has no prior geometry, then this seems to make a 
radical difference from Newtonian space-time, whose geometry is absolute in that 
its spatio-temporal structure has fixed as being Euclidean22:
The background arena in GTR is just M  [the 4-dimensional differentiable manifold], which 
can have any of a huge variety of topologies, and whose only “absolute” features are 4- 
dimensionality and continuity. The rest of the spatio-temporal properties, geometric and 
inertial and temporal, are all encoded by g , which is not fixed or prior but rather variable 
under the EFE. This looks extraordinarily promising from a relationist viewpoint: absolute 
space has finally been banished! (Callendar and Hoefer 2002, 174-5)
22 The most often mentioned revolutionary feature in the general theory in contrast to its 
predecessors is its background-independence.
[W]e motivated our discussion of manifolds by introducing the Einstein Equivalence 
Principle, or EEP: “In small enough regions of spacetime, the laws of physics reduce to 
those of special relativity; it is impossible to detect the existence of a gravitational field by 
means of local experiments.” The EEP arises from the idea that gravity is universal: it 
affects all particles (and indeed all forms of energy-momentum) in the same way. This 
feature of universality led Einstein to propose that what we experience as gravity is a 
manifestation of the curvature of spacetime. The idea is simply that something so universal 
as gravitation could be most easily described as a fundamental feature of the background 
on which matter fields propagate, as opposed to as conventional force. (Carroll 2004, 151, 
my italics)
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This section will criticize the above two relationist views, which claim to show that 
the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian concept of space-time was a 
‘revolutionary’ one.
(1) Does the gravitational field (space-time) play the same theoretical role as the 
matter field  like the electromagnetic field?: Rovelli interprets the space-time metric 
as having an identical ontological status to that of matter fields. This is questionable 
because it neglects the unique role of the gravitational field. In this context, what is 
at issue is the commonality between the mode of existence of gravitational waves 
and matter. Rovelli interprets the commonality as one of ontological identity:
A strong burst of gravitational waves could come from the sky and knock down the rock of 
Gibraltar, precisely as a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation could. Why is the first 
“matter” and the second “space”? Why should we regard the first burst as ontologically 
different from the second? (Rovelli 1997, 193)
It seems that gravitational waves and the matter field have ontological commonality
in that they carry both energy and momentum, which are conserved through time.
Given that the gravitational field represented by gMV is carrying gravitational energy-
momentum just like the electromagnetic field AMV does, both fields are interpreted as
concrete entities.
Although this view is widely held among current theoretical physicists, the potential 
destruction of the rock of Gibraltar by electromagnetic and gravitational radiation 
can be given different theoretical accounts. (Pooley 2002) The electromagnetic force
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maintains the rigidity of the rock by accelerating the pieces that constitute the rock 
away from their natural motion towards the common centre:
When the rock is hit by a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation, the natural motions of 
the parts of the rock do not (significantly) change. Rather the parts of the rock are 
differently accelerated by forces that overcome the contracting forces between the parts of 
the rock. When the rock is hit by gravitational radiation, however, no additional 
accelerative forces are applied. Rather the natural motions are no longer towards the rock’s 
centre but are radically divergent. So divergent, in fact, that the electromagnetic binding 
forces of the rock are no longer sufficient to accelerate the parts of the rock away from their 
natural trajectories, (ibid.)
While the electromagnetic force accelerates the pieces of the rock in different
directions, the explanation employing the gravitational wave depends only on
natural motions that follow the geodesic trajectories of the pieces of the rock.
Another difference between the electromagnetic and the gravitational cases can be 
identified in the mathematical formalism of the gravitational energy-momentum and 
the non-gravitational energy-momentum. The latter quantity is a tensor, while the 
former is not. Any physically meaningful quantities are supposed to be tensors that 
are invariant under the change of coordinate systems, with respect to which the 
physics of the system is described. In other words, physical quantities should be 
invariant irrespective of the choice of coordinate systems. Yet the gravitational 
energy-momentum does not pass this test since it is a pseudo-tensor, which is 
variable (and may even vanish) dependent on the choice of coordinate system.
A response to this difficulty might be that gravitational energy-momentum can be 
well defined in the case of local matter distributions in asymptotically flat space­
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time. In this case, the metric field can be decomposed into the Minkowski metric tjMV 
and the metric perturbation hHV> i.e., g ^  = rjMV + hHV. Given that the latter is written as 
a spin two field, the perturbation h^  is interpreted as the gravitational field that 
carries well defined energy-momentum. (Norton 2000)
There is [a] circumstance in which the total energy of gravitational system such as a galaxy 
can be defined, even if there is considerable internal change in the galaxy. That arises when 
we presume that the galaxy sits within a spacetime that becomes asymptotically flat as we 
travel to spatial infinity. That is, .if we are far enough away from the galaxy in all directions 
of space, we find ourselves in spacetime that comes arbitrarily close to the Minkowski 
spacetime of special relativity. In such a spacetime, we are able to define the energy of a 
system. We can use those abilities to define the energy of a distant galaxy, since we can 
treat that distant galaxy in largely the same way we would a distant object in special 
relativity. (Norton 2000, chapter 3)
Yet, this response cannot save Rovelli’s interpretation. For given his account that
“spacetime geometry is nothing but a manifestation of a particular physical field, the
gravitational field” (Rovelli 1997, 194), Rovelli interprets the entire metric as
‘material,’ rather than only the local metric. (Pooley 2002)
Einstein also distinguishes the metric from the other matter fields due to their 
different theoretical roles. (Einstein 1923, Hoefer 1998) On the one hand, the matter 
fields exist in space and time. On the other hand, the metric is itself space-time. So, 
while the former, for example the electromagnetic field, can be removed from 
space-time, space-time does not exist if the metric field is eliminated. Hoefer cites a 
passage of Einstein’s that make this point:
[I]f we consider the gravitational field and the electromagnetic field from the standpoint of 
the ether hypothesis, we find a remarkable difference between the two. There can be no 
space nor any part of space without gravitational potentials [the g^]; for these confer upon 
space its metrical qualities, without which it cannot be imagined at all. The existence of the 
gravitational field is inseparably bound up with the existence of space. On the other hand a
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part of space may very well be imagined without an electromagnetic field ... (Einstein 
1923, 21-3, quoted from Hoefer 1998, 459)
We cannot then justifiably base any claim of the ontological commonality between
the metric and the electromagnetic field solely on the basis of the fact that both
theoretical entities employ the field.
(2) Does the background-independent formulation o f space-time within the general 
theory show that the change from Newtonian theory to it was ‘revolutionary’? \ 
Although Rovelli’s claim is problematic, it seems that the background-independent 
formulation of space-time in general relativity provides a view that still provides a 
revolutionary account of theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. 
Within Newtonian mechanics (and the special theory), space-time is absolute in that 
its spatio-temporal structure satisfying the laws of Euclidean geometry is fixed 
independently of the distribution of matter. In this framework, it is possible to 
determine the inertial trajectory of a given body with the construction of a preferred 
inertial frame that singles out an inertial observer who is unaffected by any force 
field. Inertial trajectories can be defined as straight lines with respect to the flat 
background geometry of space-time, whereas accelerated ones are defined as curved 
lines. Yet, this is not possible in the general theory. For the equivalence principle 
obliterates any preferred inertial frame, since the principle maintains that all bodies 
might experience acceleration due to the gravitational field. Accordingly, in the 
general theory, one cannot determine a background free from all force fields, with
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respect to which inertial trajectories can be identified. In this sense, the general 
theory is characterized as a background-independent theory.
The background-independent formalism of space-time within the general theory of 
relativity, however, needs not be viewed as a revolutionary development with 
respect to its predecessors. For we can trace the continuity of the concepts of space­
time between the general theory and its predecessors in three related ways. Firstly, 
the background-independent formalism of space-time is not implemented only in the 
general theory. Its predecessors, such as the Newtonian theory of gravity, can also 
accommodate their local space-time formalisms that are background-independent. 
Within the Newtonian theory of gravity, the non-inertial motion of a given body is 
described as a trajectory deviating from a geodesic, whose curvature measures the 
total force relative to its mass. Here immutable space-time plays a role of 
background with respect to which the straight or non-straight trajectories are 
determined. Furthermore, the background space-time is posited independently of its 
dynamical structure, i.e. the gravitational potential, and the mass-density function. 
However, by considering Einstein’s principle of equivalence, one can also construct 
a background-independent formulation of the Newtonian theory of gravity. The 
result is “the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity,” which avoids the conventional 
decomposition into the flat space-time background and the gravitational potential.
By absorbing the gravitational potential into the space-time connection, the flat 
background loses its meaning. As a result, the inertial and non-inertial motions
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within this framework are defined with respect to curved space-time, which is in 
turn dependent on the gravitational potential and mass density function.
Defenders of a revolutionary view might still claim that background-independence 
is essential in the general theory, while it is merely contingent in its predecessors. 
However, although it can be admitted that unlike its predecessors, the general theory 
is essentially background-independent, the continuity with its predecessor theories 
cannot be. neglected. For the space-time of the general theory is also based on the 
metric field g , which is locally Minkowskian. Accordingly, the motions in the 
general theory are not completely relative in the sense that motion is defined with 
respect to the metric g , which is the successor of absolute space.
A revolutionary view could follow if the background-independence within the 
general theory were viewed as being concerned with the causal connections between 
space-time and the dynamical fields. Yet, as pointed out in the previous sections, 
this view is groundless. Whether or not the metric g is background-independent, its 
function in determining the spacelike-timelike distinction and the affine connection 
of space-time remains the same in the course of the theory-change. So, it is not by 
any means clear that the background-independence within the general theory 
provides a valid reason for thinking of the theory-change as ‘revolutionary.’23
23 At this point, it is enough to raise a reasonable doubt against a revolutionary view based on the 
background independece of the general theory. More detailed discussions will come in the chap. 4.
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5. Concluding Remark: Lessons from This Chapter
We have seen, then, that Kuhn’s revolutionary view is by no means supported by his 
own case for the incommensurability of the concept of mass and the space-time 
measurements based on Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. As Toulmin pointed out, 
although the conceptual changes in the development of new theories did indeed 
occur, Kuhn’s interpretation seems to be exaggerated (Toulmin 1970,45). Hence, 
Toulmin maintains that the historical processes of theory changes are not punctuated 
with such dramatic events as Kuhn suggests.24 They are instead the results of “a 
sequence of greater and lesser conceptual modifications differing from one another 
in degree.” (ibid.) This evolutionary account is also consistent with Einstein’s own 
characterization of the development of the special and the general theories as ‘a 
systemic development of electrodynamics’ and ‘a slight modification of 
Newtonian theory’.25
24 Kuhn also attempted to moderate his holistic picture of theory change in order to avoid the 
criticism that even totally incommensurable theories can be compared: “Most of the terms 
common to the two theories function the same way in both; their meanings, whatever those may 
be, are preserved ... Only for a small subgroup of (usually interdefined) terms and for sentences 
containing them do problems of translatability arise. The claim that two theories are 
incommensurable is more modest than many of its critics have supposed.” (Kuhn 1983, 670-1)
Kuhn calls this modest position ‘local incommensurability,’ which provides the common ground 
of the comparison throughout theory change: “The terms that preserve their meanings across a 
theory change provide sufficient basis for the dicussion of difference and for comparisons 
relevant to theory choice.” (ibid., 671) In spite of offering this moderate position, Kuhn does not 
provide any specific case supporting his claim.
25 In a similar spirit, Bell states, “I would emphasize the continuity with earlier ideas. Usually it is 
the discontinuity which is stressed, the radical break with more primitive notions of space and 
time. Often the result is to destroy completely the confidence of the student in perfectly sound and 
useful concepts already acquired.” (Bell 1987, p.67)
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However, the evolutionary views introduced in this chapter are also not free from 
deficiency. Two evolutionary views, formal and ontological, fall short of fully 
clarifying the aspects in which the theory-change can be characterized as being 
accumulative or quasi-accumulative. The mathematical formulae constituting 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics do not carry physical interpretations that make 
sense of the way the formalism works, whereas the ontological interpretations of 
space-times overlook the main aim of space-time theories -  that of clarifying the 
relationship between space-time and the laws of motion.26 Hence, the essential 
problem of the two evolutionary views is that these views cannot clarify how the 
laws of motion are physically realized and are connected with the concept of space­
26 The problems facing these two evolutionary views can be viewed from the semantic 
perspective of theory. Given that one theory can be considered from three different aspects i.e. 
formal, semantic, and ontological, it is important to comprehend their connections. So we need to 
approach our case of theory change by considering the relationships among these three distinct 
but related elements: (1) mathematical and formal structures constituted by meaningless symbols,
(2) theoretical models whose mathematical structure acquires its physical meaning within a 
theoretical framework, (3) ontological schemes that elucidate the mode of existence of the 
elements which constitute the model.
What is deficient in formal and ontological schemes is the relationship between space-time and 
the laws of motion. And with respect to mathematical formalisms, it is necessary to retrieve 
information about the way the laws of motion are implemented. Given that these three elements, 
while influencing each other, have their own independent status and function within space-time 
theories, we need to assemble these missing elements to comprehend theory change from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.
This approach can also be clarified if we distinguish various levels of the interpretations of a 
given space-time theory. An interpretation can be carried out not only (1) to clarify the true 
nature of space-times, but also (2) to elucidate the structure of certain classes of models 
satisfying a given mathematical structure of space-time. The latter is concerned with the relational 
structure of models that satisfy the mathematical structure of space-time, whereas the former is 
about the mode of existence of space-time. In our context, the problem of ontological 
interpretations can be described as the discrepancy of these two different levels of interpretation. 
In other words, the mode of existence of space-time becomes irrelevant to the contexts of space­
time theory that shows the connection between the laws of motion and space-time geometry.
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time. To sum up, the problems of views that emphasizes mathematical formalisms 
stem from their disregard of what the formalisms are about. On the other hand, 
ontological interpretations of space-time fail to capture what these formalisms are 
about. That is, these interpretations do not succeed in clarifying the relationships 
between the laws of motion and space-time.
In this context, it is worthwhile to note where the problems of the aforementioned
ontological discussions lead us. As pointed out in the last section, the discussion
about substantivalism is concerned with the function of the geometrical structure of
space-time, rather than with the mode of existence of space-time. Also notice that
the background-independent formulation of space-time in the general theory is
concerned more with the geometric structure that enables us to define metrical and
affine concepts, rather than with the issue of whether or not space-time has causal
powers to produce dynamical effects. Along these lines, recent modified relationists,
who emphasize geometrical relations rather than ontological features, claim that
there is a structural commonality between substantivalism and relationsim. Paul
Teller (1991), who suggests a “liberalized relationism,” claims:
[Relationalists can express themselves with the same language as substantivalists by 
describing space-time relations in terms of an arbitrarily established coordinate system. ... 
[T]he liberalized relationists’ appeal to the common theoretical vocabulary is committed to 
the same inertial structure to which substantivalists feel committed. But since the 
coordinate systems are now taken to describe actual and possible relations to actually 
existing objects, instead of objectively existing space-time points, we are free from 
concluding that the structure in question must be structure of something substantial. (Teller 
1991 380-1)
Gordon Belot also takes a similar view focusing on the geometry of space-time:
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[Contemporary substantivalists and relationalists [can] agree about the structure of 
geometry of spacetime but disagree about the way in which geometry is instantiated. The 
substantivalist will think of it as describing the structure of the set of spatiotemporal 
relations between spacetime points, . . . .  The relationalist will think of the geometry of 
spacetime as describing the network of geometric possibilities for spatiotemporal relations 
between material events. (Belot 1999, 46)
Interpreted this way, the substance-relation controversy shifts its focus from 
traditional ontological accounts that emphasize the mechanical origin of the metric g 
to ones that emphasize the geometric relations provided by the metric. In a similar 
spirit, Hoefer summarizes the above modified relationism from the structural 
perspective of space-time, rather than from the perspective of its ontological 
underpinning. These relationists see the metric field g (i.e. space-time) as providing 
“the structure of actual and possible spatio-temporal relations between material 
things,” rather than “a Machian reduction of metrical structure to material relations 
(Callender and Hoefer 2000).” Accordingly,
g  is not a thing or substance. Where matter is present, it is crucial to the definition of local 
standards of acceleration and non-acceleration; the EFE record just this relationship. In 
many ways, the desires of traditional relationists (esp. Leibniz, Huygens, Mach) are -  
arguably -  met by GTR when interpreted this way (ibid.)
We have seen that when Hoefer characterizes the metric g as “a representor of 
substantival space-time,” his claim is also concerned with the geometric features of 
space-time (which determines the space-timelike distinction and the affine 
connection of space-time). In a similar spirit, modified relationism is concerned 
with which spatio-temporal relations between events are codified within the metric g
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that is specified by Einstein’s field equations, rather than with the mode of the 
existence of space-time.
This direction is explicitly captured under the heading of structural space-time 
realism, which attempts to “capture the best assumptions up to now separately 
associated with substantivalism and relationism, that is, those assumptions ... [that] 
substantivalists and relativists must share (Dorato 2000, 1612). According to 
Dorato:
[Structural space-time realism] sides with the relationists in defending the relational nature 
of spacetime structure, but joins the substantivalists in arguing that spacetime exists, at 
least in part, independently of particular physical objects and events, the degree of 
“independence” being given by the extent to which geometrical laws exist “over and 
above” physical events exemplifying them (ibid., 1605).
This view essentially claims that the relational features of spacetime structure” are
the essential elements of space-time theories in both Newtonian and Einsteinian
physics. Accordingly, space-time structuralism attempts to capture what the
formalism has essentially latched on. This view claims that it deals with the
essential elements of the two physics, and accordingly, if true, can provide crucial
information in order to appreciate in which aspect, if any, the theory-change was
evolutionary. The next chapter will consider this possibility by examining the
strengths and weaknesses of Dorato’s space-time structuralism.
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Chapter 2
Space-Time Structuralism from the Dynamical 
Perspective of Space-Time Theories
1. Introduction
The main lesson of the previous chapter is that in order to analyse our case of 
theory-change properly, it is necessary to clarify the relations between space-time 
and the laws of motion. This chapter attempts to develop a version of space-time 
structuralism that accomplishes this aim. It will provide a framework that will be 
employed to elucidate the sense in which there is indeed a continuity between 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics in subsequent chapters.
I begin by analysing the strengths and shortcomings of Dorato’s version of space­
time structuralism. Dorato’s account attempts to capture and combine the best 
features of both space-time substantivalism and relationism. One premise that 
Dorato sees as common to the two views concerning the mode of existence of space­
time is the one that states that it is the nature of space-time that explains dynamical 
laws. However, we have seen in the last chapter that this idea about explanation is 
one of the major problems of substantivalism and relationism, as it fails to capture 
adequately the relationship between space-time structure and dynamical laws. Given 
that Dorato’s strategy of developing his version of space-time structuralism retains
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this explanatory scheme, it still is afflicted by the major problem that faces the 
ontological perspectives. Addressing this problem will lead us eventually to a new 
approach to understanding the way that space-time is related to dynamical laws.
A modified version of space-time structuralism will be suggested based on the 
dynamical perspective of space-time developed by Harvey Brown, Robert DiSalle, 
and Nick Huggett. In contrast with the ontological perspective that develops the 
foundations of dynamical laws on the basis of the nature of space-time, the 
dynamical perspective bases the physical foundation of space-time on dynamical 
laws. By overturning the traditional understanding of the structure of space-time 
theories, the dynamical perspective provides a much clearer connection between 
space-time geometry and dynamical laws. The main aim of this chapter is to 
develop a new version of space-time structuralism by considering the weaknesses of 
Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism and the strengths of the dynamical 
perspective of space-time. We will see that the dynamical perspective of space-time 
and space-time structuralism can be natural allies, because both perspectives are 
sceptical of the “deep-down” ontology and the formalism-alone geometric 
perspectives. Accordingly, these two intuitions can be integrated in order to develop 
a new version of space-time structuralism. We will see that as a result, space-time 
structuralism can be modified into a view claiming that the structural properties of 
dynamical laws, which specify the relations of regularity between events, constitute 
the essential elements in Newtonian and Einsteinian physics.
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The following section introduces structural realism suggested by Pierre Duhem and 
Henri Poincare, and recently resuscitated by John Worrall, which provides a core 
intuition behind Dorato’s space-time structuralism. The third and fourth sections 
move to a summary and a critique of Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism. 
The fifth section then develops a modified version of space-time structuralism by 
considering the weaknesses of Dorato’s view and the strengths of the dynamical 
perspective of space-time. The sixth section examines Newtonian dynamics as a 
supporting case for my modified version of space-time structuralism.
2. Scientific Change According to Structural Realism
The aim of this chapter is to develop an account that captures the relationship 
between postulated space-time structures and the dynamical laws, which constitute 
the essential parts of Newtonian and of Einsteinian physics. Dorato’s version of 
space-time structuralism, which is the application of structural realism elaborated by 
Duhem, Poincare and Worrall to the context of space-time theories, claims to 
provide just such an account. Dorato asserts that the spatio-temporal relations, 
which exist over and above physical events, integrate the best assumptions of the 
two competing ontological interpretations of space-time, i.e. substantivalism and 
relationism. This idea originates from the structuralist idea that the relations 
involved in mathematical structures play an essential role in the workings of a given
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theory.1 Before we discuss Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism, this section 
will consider a central argument and motivation for structural realism.
1) Duhem: As a result of his historical studies of mechanics, the physicist and 
philosopher Pierre Duhem suggested an evolutionary view of theory-change in 
science. In the preface of his Origin o f Statics (1905), Duhem acknowledged that his 
historical studies had led him to a view that the development of physical theories is 
an evolutionary process, rather than a revolutionary one: “the alleged intellectual 
revolutions have most often been only evolutions which have been slow and 
prepared over history.” (1905, /: p. iv) Moreover, “the sciences of mechanics and of 
physics have developed by an uninterrupted sequence of scarcely perceptible 
improvements of the doctrine taught in the medieval schools.” Duhem’s 
evolutionary thesis is also clearly stated in the conclusion of his Evolution o f
1 The emphasis on structure in a given theory is also prevalent in constructing theories outside of 
physics. For example, structuralism in political science is one of standard positions in 
understanding the behaviours of states. According to Waltz (1979), the structure of a system (the 
structure of the relationships between individual states is what Waltz is interested in) leaves aside, 
or abstracts from the characteristics of the elements constituting the system, and their attributes, 
and their interactions. They are left out, since
[W]e can distinguish between variables at the level of the units and variables at the level of 
the system.... To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate to one another (how 
they react) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they arranged 
or positioned). Interactions, as I have insisted, take place at the level of units. How units stand 
in relation to One another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the 
units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system. (Waltz 1979, 79-80)
Accordingly, it is necessary to discern structure existing between the concrete reality of events 
“only by virtue of having first established structure by abstraction from ‘concrete reality.’” (ibid.) 
Given that structure is abstraction, it cannot be defined by enumerating material characteristics of 
the system: “it must instead be defined by the arrangement of the system’s parts and by the 
principle of that arrangement.” (ibid.) By developing a specific concept of structure, it is possible 
to establish “theoretically useful concepts to replace the vague and varying systemic notion that 
are customarily employed -  notion such as environment, situation.” (ibid.)
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Mechanics'. “The development of mechanics is, therefore, properly speaking, an 
evolution; each of the stages of this evolution is the natural corollary of the stages 
that have preceded it; it is the chief part of stages which will follow it.” (Duhem 
1908, 188) For Duhem, an essential condition of scientific progress is the “respect 
for tradition.”
Although Duhem considers the development of a theory as constituting a “one step
at a time” progress, this view does not apply to every part of a given theory.
Continuity in the development of a physical theory, according to Duhem, occurs
only in the representative parts of a theory, which “classify experimental laws.” On
the other hand, the explanatory parts of a theory, which aim to capture “the reality
underlying the phenomena,” are often replaced during the course of scientific
change. This dichotomy is clearly related to Duhem’s sceptical attitude towards
metaphysics. He maintained that the aim of science is not to establish “judgements
about the nature of things,” but rather to specify “consequences conforming to
experimental laws.” The explanatory parts of a theory, Duhem claims, are parasitic
on the representative parts which do the real work in a theory:
It is not to this explanatory part that theory owes its power and fertility; far from it. 
Everything good in the theory, by virtue of which it appears as a natural classification and 
confers on it the power to anticipate experience, is found in the representative part. 
(Duhem 1914, 31)
Duhem’s characterization of a ‘natural classification’ provides a clear account of 
structuralism. According to Duhem, a natural classification is analogous to a
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classification in zoology or botany: “those ideal connections established by his 
reason among abstract conceptions [in classification in biology] correspond to real 
relations among the associated [biological] creatures brought together and embodied 
in his abstractions.” (ibid., 25) In a similar way, within a successful physical theory, 
“the relations it establishes among the data of observation correspond to relations 
among things” (ibid., 27). In this spirit, Psillos claims that “the Duhemian 
distinction between the representative and the explanatory parts of a theory may be 
seen as co-existensive with Worrall’s structure and content distinction.” (Psillos 
1999, 309 n. 3)
Duhem understands ‘natural classifications’ as revealing real relations among unobservable 
entities. But it can be argued that Duhem’s realism reaches up only to the structural level, 
so to speak. A natural classification is such that it gets right the relations among 
unobservable entities, but not necessarily the unobservable entities themselves. This line of 
thought can be developed into a prima facie sustainable realist position, that of so-called 
structural realism. (Psillos 1999, 38, original italics)
In the course of scientific change, natural classifications representing relations 
between observable or unobservable entities undergo an evolutionary development. 
In contrast, the explanatory parts, which are intended to capture the reality 
underlying the phenomena, have experienced the occurrence of “constant breaking 
of explanations which arises to be quelled.”
An illustrative example is provided by Duhem’s critique of Maxwell’s attempt to 
develop a mechanical understanding for his electromagnetic theory. The founders of 
electromagnetic theory, such as Coulomb, Poisson, and Ampere, according to
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Duhem, emphasized empirical laws in constructing their theories.2 Maxwell, on the 
contrary, looked for a mechanical model that was founded on an elastic ether that 
consists of layers of small particles. The motions of these mechanical elements 
generate electric currents and vortices which represents magnetic fields. According 
to Duhem, such explanations are “not built for the satisfying of reason but for the 
pleasure of the imagination.” (Duhem 1954, 81) Such attempted explanatory parts of 
Maxwell’s theory, Duhem claimed, are “irreconcilable with traditional doctrines” 
(Duhem 1902, 11). On the other hand, Duhem claimed that “what is essential in 
Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s equations” (ibid., 221-2), which “symbolize 
physical magnitudes which must be either measurable experimentally or formed 
from other measurable magnitudes” (ibid., 223). In the development of 
electromagnetic theory, these equations that represent the relationships between the 
electric and the magnetic fields are true and continuous elements, which are 
bequeathed from the work of Coulomb, Poisson, and Ampere.3
2 The emphasis of empirical laws in the development of electromagnetic theories can be found in 
Duhem’s writing:
[W]hen his experiment have allow him to formulate new laws that the theory had not 
foreseen, he must first tiy with the greatest care to represent these laws, to the required degree 
of approximation,... as consequences of admitted hypothesis. Only after ... received 
hypothesis cannot flow from the established laws, is he authorized to enrich physics with a 
new magnitude, to complicate it with a new hypothesis. (Duhem 1902, 7, quoted from Ariew 
and Barker 1986)
3 The explanatory parts of a theory, such as the ether model, are not based on ‘properly observed 
phenomenon’. The explanatory parts, which aim to capture the nature of the world are likely to be 
subordinate to metaphysics. In contrast, experiments have allowed physicists to formulate the 
representative parts that aim to classify experimental laws. From this, we can notice that the 
representative-explanatory distinction is founded on whether or not a specific part of a given 
theory is empirically based. And this insight can be extended in our understanding of theory 
change, given that the fate in theory change differs in the representative and explanatory parts.
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2) Poincare and Worrall: The same line of thought can be found in Poincare.
Following a Kantian line, Poincare claimed that unobservable entities and
mechanisms are comparable to Kant’s things-in-themselves, which we cannot fully
capture. Yet, he believed that the success of science indicates that we can
legitimately claim to have knowledge of the relations between things-in-themselves.
“Still things themselves are not what [science] can reach as the naive dogmatists
think, but only relations between things. Outside of these relations there is no
knowable reality.” (Poincare 1902, 25) Poincare’s view is therefore an epistemic
one -  concerning what kind of knowledge of the world is possible, rather than
concerning reality itself: “The true relations between these objects are the only
reality we can obtain.” (Poincare 1905, 161) According to Poincare, these
relationships between unobservable entities and mechanisms are captured by the
mathematical equations of empirically successful theories. In contrast, having
knowledge of unobservable entities and mechanisms is beyond our capability:
[T]hese equations express relations, and if the equations remain true, it is because the 
relations preserve their reality. They teach us, now as then, that there is such and such a 
relation between this thing and some other thing ... But these appellations were only 
images substituted for the objects which Nature will eternally hide from us. (Poincar6 1902, 
174)
A motivation behind Poincare’s structural realism is that of providing an appropriate 
account of theory-change. According to Poincare, although abandoned theoretical
Based on its empirical grounds, we can distinguish the continuous parts in theory change from 
non-continuous one. The retention of a specific part basically depends on whether or not its 
empirical grounds are sound.
entities of once successful scientific theories might seem to show “the bankruptcy of 
science,” this is based on a misunderstanding of the aim or the role of scientific 
theories:
The man of the world is struck to see how ephemeral scientific theories are. After some 
years of prosperity, he sees them successively abandoned; he sees ruins accumulated on 
ruins; he predicts that the theories in vogue today will in a short time succumb in their turn, 
and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. ... [However] his scepticism is 
superficial; he does not understand either the aim or the role of scientific theories.
(Poincare 1902, 173)
This sceptical attitude is superficial, because the relations between unobservable
entities and mechanisms survive (or perhaps ‘quasi-survive’) in the course of
theory-change. Although theoretical entities and mechanisms of past successful
theories have later been rejected, the history of science shows that the relations
between theoretical entities are maintained in the succeeding theories. And the
relations, from the vantage point of those later theories, can be seen to have
contributed to the success of the earlier one:
[W]hat thus succumb are the theories properly so called, those which pretend to teach us 
what things are. But there is in them something which usually survives. If one of them 
taught us a true relation, this relation is definitely acquired, and it will be found again under 
a new guise in the other theories which will successively come to reign in place of the old. 
(Poincare 1905, 182)
An example cited by Poincare is the development of theories concerning optical 
phenomena from Fresnel’s elastic ether theory to Maxwell’s electromagnetic field 
theory. In this development, the mechanical ether constituting the former is replaced 
by a completely different entity in the latter -  namely a electromagnetic field. In 
spite of this difference, there are strong similarities in their mathematical structure.
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Worrall, who recently revived Poincare’s structural realism, points out that 
“Fresnel’s equations [for the relative intensities of light reflected and refracted in 
partial reflection] are taken over completely intact into the superseding [Maxwell’s] 
theory -  reappearing there newly interpreted but, as mathematical equations, 
entirely unchanged.” (Worrall 1996, 160) Just as Duhem considered that “what is 
essential in Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s equations,” structural realism as 
advocated by Poincare and Worrall claims that the mathematical structure of 
Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories, rather than their entities and mechanism, are the 
essential part of those theories.
A central motivation of Worrall’s employment of Poincare’s idea is to cope with a 
recent argument against the evolutionary and accumulative development of science. 
Worrall attempts to embrace two apparently conflicting arguments concerning 
scientific realism: the ‘no miracle argument’ and the ‘pessimistic induction.’ 
(Worrall 1989) The former suggests that the success of science (especially its 
success in predicting new types of phenomena) would be a miracle if its successful 
theories were not (at least approximately) true. The strategy of the argument is 
basically to regard the success of scientific practice as evidence of the reality of 
theoretical claims. According to Laudan, the pessimistic induction, on the contrary, 
provides a stumbling block for realism, since even the most successful theories in 
the past have been discarded because they turned out be false theories -  it therefore 
seems reasonable to infer that current theories too will later turn out to be false.
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In order to support his claim, Laudan offers a list of theories that were “once 
successful and well confirmed, but which contained central terms which (we now 
believe) were non-referring.” (Laudan 1981, 33) These counter-examples against the 
no miracle argument include the crystalline sphere of ancient and medieval 
astronomy, the phlogiston theory of chemistry, the caloric theory of heat, the 
vibratory theory of heat, the theory of circular inertia, and the electromagnetic and 
optical ether theories. Given these counter-examples, Laudan claims that
Because [most past theories] have been based on what we now believe to be fundamentally 
mistaken theoretical models and structures, the realists cannot possibly hope to explain the 
empirical success such theories enjoyed in terms of the truth-likeness of their constituent 
theoretical claims. (Laudan 1984, 91-2)
Psillos reconstructs the pessimistic induction as follows.
(1) Assume that the success of a theory is a reliable test for its truth.
(2) So most current scientific theories are true.
(3) Then most past scientific theories are false, since they differ from current theories in 
significant ways.
(4) Many of these false past theories were successful.
(5) So the success of a theory is not a reliable test for its truth. (Psillos 2001, 373)
Premises (1) and (2) are the realist’s claims that Laudan aims to undermine. And 
premise (3) is based on the claim that earlier theories involve theoretical terms that 
are now regarded as non-referential: “Past theories are deemed not to be truthlike 
because the entities they posited are no longer believed to exist and/or because the 
laws and mechanisms they postulated are not part of our current theoretical 
description of world.” (Psillos 1996, S307) Laudan’s list provides historical 
evidence that supports premise (4). The history of science -  (3) and (4) -  then leads
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us to a reductio ad absurdum of (1). From the pessimistic induction from the history 
of science that is full of the past successful but false theories, Laudan argues the 
weak connection between truth and explanatory success.
Structural realism attempts to have the best of both arguments: “the only hopeful 
way of both underwriting the no miracles argument and accepting an accurate 
account of the extent of theory change in science.” (Worrall 1989, 117) This view 
claims that, although the contents of a given theory are discarded, its underlying 
mathematical structures are invariant (or structurally invariant) in the course of 
theory change: “There was a continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the 
continuity is one of form  or structure, not of content.” (ibid.) If these well-supported 
mathematical structures are maintained under theory change, then it is highly 
probable that they represent the true underlying structures of nature, which are the 
elements contributing to the success of theories.4
4 A set of similar strategies entitled the “divide et impera” strategy have been suggested in order 
to undermine Laudan’s argument by Kitcher (1995), Hardin and Rosenberg (1982) and Psillos 
(1999). According to this line of thought, one can learn a different lesson from Laudan’s lists, 
which does not necessitate Laudan’s conclusion. What we can learn from the pessimistic meta­
induction, according to Psillos, is that realists need the ‘right kind’ of the explanatory connection 
between success and truth of theories.
This strategy is employed in Kitcher’s distinction between ‘working posits’ and ‘presuppositional 
posits’ (Kitcher 1995). The former is “the putative referents of terms that occur in problem 
solving schemata” while the latter is “those entities that apparently exist if the instances of the 
schemata are to be true.” (ibid., 149) This distinction is based basically on the fact whether a 
theoretical term is referring or non-referring. Kitcher identifies the referring parts as being 
responsible for the success of theories. In contrast, the non-referent ones, which can be eliminable, 
have a fate to be discarded.
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For example, Fresnel's theory of diffraction, which explains the propagation of light 
as vibrations through the ether, appears false from the vantage point of Maxwell's 
theory of optics, in which the medium is the electromagnetic field rather than the 
ether (ibid. p. 120). In accord, it seems, with the pessimistic induction, the ether in 
Fresnel’s theory, in spite of its success in explaining optical phenomena, is a non­
entity that was rejected in favour of the electromagnetic field. (Laudan 1981, p.231) 
Yet Worrall claims that there exists a better way to make sense of the success of 
Fresnel’s ether theory in spite of the non-existence of central entity it postulates:
[TJhere is easy explanation of the success of Fresnel’s elastic-ether theory of light... 
Fresnel clearly misidentified the natur.e of light, but his theory nonetheless accurately 
described not just light’s observable effects but also its structure. There is no elastic-solid 
ether of the kind Fresnel’s theory ... involved; but there is an electromagnetic field. The 
field is not underpinned by a mechanical ether and in no clear sense “approximates” it. 
Similarly there are “no light waves” in Fresnel’s sense, since there were supposed to consist 
of motions of material ether-particles. Nonetheless disturbances in Maxwell’s field do obey 
formally similar (in fact, and unusually, mathematically identical) laws to some of those 
obeyed by the “materially” entirely different elastic disturbances in a mechanical medium. 
(Worrall 1994, 340)
Hardin and Rosenberg claim that although we can admit that central theoretical entities in the past 
theories do not refer to the intended objects, we can still talk about approximate truth due to the 
commonality of its same causal or explanatory role between past and present theories.
But these two suggestions fail to provide a clear cut criterion capturing the continuity in the 
course of theory change. As for Kitcher’s suggestion, Psillos asserts that the identification of a 
‘presuppositional part’ is based on a retroactive consideration: “This suggestion is retroactive and 
open to the charge that it is ad hoc: the eliminable posits are those that get abandoned.” (Psillos 
1999,112) This is the same for a ‘working posit’ which contributes the success of a given theory: 
“with the benefit of hindsight, one can rather easily work it out so that the theoretical constituents 
that supposedly contributed to the success of past theories turn out to be those which were, as it 
happens, retained in subsequent theories.” (ibid.)
Hardin and Rosenberg’s strategy is criticized to provide too liberal criterion in order to 
distinguish the essential contents of theories. Laudan criticizes their criterion as being too tolerant 
to be a rigorous one. If realists accepted Hardin and Rosenberg’s criterion, they would be in an 
undesirable position as realists, in which they would have to admit the referential success of 
Aristotle’s ‘natural place’ orDescarte’s ‘vortex.’ (Laudan 1984, p. 161)
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Although Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories are based on significantly different
ontological underpinnings, the two theories exhibit structural continuity because of
the commonality of their mathematical equations:
Both Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories make the passage of light consist of wave forms 
transmitted from place to place, forms obeying the same mathematics. Hence, although the 
periodic changes which the two theories postulate are ontologically of radically different 
sorts -  in one material particles change position, in the other field strengths change -  there 
is nonetheless a structural, mathematical continuity between the two theories, (ibid.)
Structural realism thus claims that mathematical structure is the invariant (or in
more representative cases “quasi-invariant”) element that makes theories successful,
while the supposed nature of entities is only conjectural and may well later be
radically revised. In this way, structural realism attempts to dissolve the conflict
between the no miracle argument and the pessimistic induction.
3. Dorato’s Spacetime Structuralism
In suggesting his version of space-time structuralism, Dorato follows a similar 
approach to Worrall’s. Just as structural realism attempts to resolve the conflict 
between the no miracle argument and the pessimistic induction, Dorato attempts to 
resolve the controversy between substantivalism and relationism by synthesizing the 
two views:
As I see it, such a position (structural space-time realism) allows us to capture the best 
assumptions up to now separately associated with substantivalism and relationism, that is, 
those assumptions that, at least within the general theory of relativity, substantivalists 
and relativists must share. (Dorato 2000, 1612, my italics)
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As shown in the last chapter, the ontological status of space-time has been debated 
as a part of the substance-relation controversy. Dorato sees the dispute between the 
two parties as being basically concerned with the mode of existence of space-time. 
Substantivalism maintains the view that space-time has an existence independent of 
matter. Relationism denies that space-time has an independent existence, and 
instead claims that space-time is a set of relations of material bodies or physical 
events.5 To resolve this debate, Dorato’s space-time structuralism emphasizes the 
commonality of mathematical relations in spite of their different ontological 
interpretations.6
This view is basically an application of structural realism to the context of the 
interpretation of space-time. Just as different theories of light suggested by Fresnel 
and Maxwell share mathematical structure, Dorato claims that although
5 A physical event, on my account, is a thing that happens. Following Quine (1960), I do not 
ontologically distinguish physical events from material bodies in that they are the same genus of 
“material inhabitant of space-time.” In fact, material bodies are main actors in events, and 
physical events without material bodies are difficult to think of. Yet, what distinguishes these two 
concepts is that an event has not extension in either space or time. A physical event is an idealized 
concept referring to the occurrence in the infinitesimal place and time, while physical bodies 
persist by having different parts at different times. This idealization is necessary for physical 
events to be represented as a set of points in space-time. Substantivalists consider a physical 
events occurring at substantial space-time points. On the other hand, relationists by no means 
admit existing space-time points in order to capture the occurrence of events.
6 The emphasis of geometry in space-time theories can be read in the work of main participants of 
substance-relation controversies. In the first paragraph of Scholium, Newton states that his 
definitions of time, space, place and motion are intended to remove common people’s prejudice 
by distinguishing ‘absolute’, ‘true’, and ‘mathematical’ concepts from ‘relative’, ‘apparent’, and 
‘common’ ones. (Newton 1729, 6) Descartes, a classic relationist, also maintains that motions of 
bodies should be analysed by geometiy; “As for me, I conceive of [motion] none except which is 
easier to conceive of than the line of mathematics: the motion by which bodies pass from one 
place to another.” (Descartes 1979, 63)
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substantivalism and relationism involve different views o f  the mode o f  existence o f
space-time, the underlying reality is captured by spatio-temporal relations
represented by the common mathematical structure. In other words, space-time
structuralism views the spatio-temporal relations between events as the essential
elements of space-time theories:
[W]e need a third option, which I refer to as “structural spacetime realism.” Such a tertium 
quid sides with the relationists in defending the relational nature of the spacetime structure, 
but joins the substantivalists in arguing that spacetime exists,7 at least in part, independently 
of particular physical objects and events, the degree of “independence” being given by the 
extent to which geometrical laws exist “over and above” physical events exemplifying 
them, (ibid., 1605)
One of the main motivations for space-time structuralism is that of reflecting the 
ambiguity of the mode of existence of the metric field g , which represents space­
time in general relativity. Yet we can also find an analogous attempt regarding a 
similar problem within Newtonian space-time. In an attempt to moderate the
7 Leibnizean relationism can be interpreted as endorsing the reality of space although it rejects the 
reality of absolute space. By criticizing Newton’s idea of reality of space as a ‘conceit of 
imagination’, Leibniz claimed that “there is no real space out of material universe” (Alexander 
1956, 29). However, Earman (1989) and DiSalle (1994) claim that Leibniz’s relational theory 
does not reject the physically objective reality of space-time. Earman, by a quotation of Leibniz’s 
assertion that “whatever exists is either simultaneous with other experiences or prior or 
posterior,” maintains that Leibniz also agreed about the absolute simultaneity. In the same spirit, 
Di Salle points out that
[Leibniz’s] relational theory of motion therefore presupposes absolute simultaneity and 
Euclidean Geometry on space at each moment of time. ... The spacetime structure that 
Leibniz thus takes for granted is only that required by prerelativistic kinematics, without the 
added affine structure required in order to speak of dynamical quantities like ‘absolute 
rotation’ and ‘absolute acceleration’. ... Leibniz, like Newton, attributes physically objective 
characteristics to space and time that do not depend on time (DiSalle 1994, 266-67).
In this way, Leibniz’s relationism can be interpreted as conceding the reality o f certain geometric 
structures; that is, the reality of a temporal geometric structure supporting absolute simultaneity 
and spatial geometric structure embracing Euclidean geometry on each simultaneous time.
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differences between substantivalism and relationism, Maudlin (1993) and Teller
(1991) suggested a modified version of relationism regarding Newtonian space-time, 
the purpose of which is analogous to that of Dorato’s space-time structuralism (i.e. 
“capture the best assumptions up to now separately associated with substantivalism 
and relationism”). Just as Leibniz claims that space is “order or relation; and nothing 
at all without bodies but the possibility of placing them” (Alexander 1956, 26), the 
modified relationism is grounded on the constraints over the possibility of placing 
material bodies. Yet, what is unique about the view is the adoption of all the spatio- 
temporal structures that substantivalism embraces. Teller calls it “liberalized 
relationism”:
[R]elationalists can express themselves with the same language as substantivalists by 
describing space-time relations in terms of an arbitrarily established coordinate system. ... 
[T]he liberalized relationists’ appeal to the common theoretical vocabulary is committed to 
the same inertial structure to which substantivalists feel committed. But since the 
coordinate systems are now taken to describe actual and possible relations to actually 
existing objects, instead of objectively existing space-time points, we are free from 
concluding that the structure in question must be [the] structure of something substantial. 
(Teller 1991, 380-1)
Adopting the richer set of spatio-temporal relations, which are instantiated by 
material bodies, relationism can accommodate any spatio-temporal structure (such 
as affine structure) explicating the dynamical behaviours of material bodies. This 
intuition can also be found in Maudlin:
The most direct way for a relationist to overcome Newton’s argument is simple: Accept his 
ontology of relations while rejecting substantival absolute space as its supporting 
framework. Such a Newtonian relationist could still maintain that all spatiotemporal facts 
are facts about the relations between material bodies or, speaking four-dimensionally, 
material events. But for the Newtonian relationist those relations include a distance relation 
between noncontemporaneous events.
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The Newtonian relationist inherits almost all the power to make ontological 
distinctions that the Newtonian substantivalist has. For example, the Newtonian relationist 
can accommodate absolute motion and rest. (Maudlin 1993, 187)
The dynamical laws of Newtonian physics require geometrical structures, such as
manifolds of events, time metric, and spatial metric between any two events.
According to Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism, the working part8 of the
theory is the invariant spatio-temporal relations between any two events e x and e2
which, in case of Newtonian physics, includes (1) whether e x and e2 are
simultaneous events; (2) what is the temporal interval between e x and e2\ (3) what is
the spatial interval between e x and e2, whether they are simultaneous or not; (4)
whether two events are located at the same place.
The above version of relationism then seems to accommodate the best assumptions 
of both space-time substantivalism and relationism. It underwrites the spatio- 
temporal structure of substantivalism, which is implemented by the actual and 
possible spatio-temporal relations between material bodies or events. Accordingly, 
this view can respond to the criticism that relationism does not have enough 
structures to explain the dynamical behaviours of bodies, i.e., affine structure.9 In
8 My expression of “working parts” is referring to theoretical elements contributing the empirical 
success of a given theory. This expression should not be confused with Kitcher’s one “working 
posits,” which refers to “the putative referents of terms that occur in problem solving schemata.” 
(Kitcher 1995, 149)
9 Barry Dainton in his Time and Space (2001:197-198) provides a possible way that affine 
structure can be defined within the world that consists of two rotating bodies from neo-Newtonian 
relationists’ perspective. By defining the concepts of intrinsic direction and instantaneous 
intrinsic world-line curvature, Dainton claims that “[a] neo-Newtonian relationist has the 
resources to accommodate all the dynamically relevant feature to be found in both relational and 
substantival Newtonian worlds. Of course, there is no need for the [neo-Newtonian] relationist to
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this way, the spatio-temporal relations can in fact be considered as the essential 
elements in explaining the laws of motion. So modified relationism can assert that 
what is essential in explicating the dynamical behaviours of a given body are the 
spatio-temporal relations instantiated by material bodies or events, which do not, 
however, supervene on substantial space.
Although the story becomes more complex in the context of the general theory of 
relativity, Dorato’s space-time structuralism developed in the context of that theory 
has basically the same motivation. In the context of Newtonian mechanics and 
special relativity, substantivalism presupposes an unambiguous distinction between 
“matter” and “space,” or “content” and “container.” Yet, it has been argued that this 
distinction within the general theory is arbitrary, because the metric field g can be 
viewed either as empty space or matter (Rynasiewicz 1996). The metric field g  in 
the general theory, on the one hand, can be interpreted as absolute space since the 
length, the inertial structure, and spacelike-timelike distinction of spacetime are all 
determined by g. On the other hand, g can also be interpreted as the matter field 
responsible for the gravitational interaction. Rynasiewicz points out this conceptual 
ambiguity by tracking down the conceptual continuity from Descartes’ subtle matter 
and the ether to g:
In so far as Newton’s absolute space can be seen in retrospect as a field, first qua grounds 
of the inertial ether of classical mechanics, and subsequently qua the ether of 
electrodynamics, his substantivalism is vindicated in general relativity. But by the same 
token, insofar as the heritage of the field concept can be traced back continuously from
recognize every embedding of a given system into full Newtonian substantival space as 
physically distinct.” (ibid., 198).
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Leibniz to the mechanical luminiferous ether, and in turn to the .effluvia and subtle forms of 
matter of the preceding centuries, so is the relationism of these earlier figures. How one 
projects the ‘space-matter’ distinction familiar to the original disputants onto a framework 
they would not have recognized is a matter of whim. (Rynasiewicz 1996, 299)
Given the conceptual continuity that is traced backward from Einstein to either
Newton or Descartes, the metric field g could be considered as the successor of
either Newton’s absolute space or Descartes’ subtle matter. Similarly, Dorato
claims:
[T]he metric field, by carrying energy and momentum, and by being capable of both 
“acting” and “being acted upon,” should be regarded, on the one hand, as material. On the 
other, by providing a distinction between the spatial and the temporal directions of all the 
other material fields, it performs the typical individuating functions of classical space and 
time regarded as principia individuationis, and is therefore not a matter field like any 
others. (Dorato 2000, 1611, original italics)
In order to dissolve this ontological ambiguity of the metric field g , Dorato suggests
space-time structuralism in order to moderate the substance-relation debates in the
context of the general theory of relativity. Space-time structuralism is developed as
a ‘third way’ between substantivalism and relationism:
Structural spacetime realism is a synthesis between these two traditional positions in 
exactly the same sense in which the metric field is both matter and spacetime, since it 
defends at the same time the relational character of space and time (by defending a 
structural-role identity for spacetime points), while claiming that geometrical structure used 
to represent them is “really,” mind-independently exemplified by the physical world, (ibid. 
1612)
Basically, Dorato’s space-time structuralism adopts a similar strategy of liberalized 
relationism. This view underwrites all spatio-temporal structures adopted by 
substantivalism, but considers them as actual and possible relations instantiated by
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the fields. While substantivalism holds that the fields occupy space-time points, 
relationism sees space-time points as being instantiated by the fields:
According to the [plenist] substantivalist the world is at base a manifold of spacetime 
points which support fields, in which the fields inhere. According to the plenist relationist 
the world is a field or set of fields (and perhaps particles) which instantiate spatio- 
temporal relations, in which the relations inhere. (Maudlin 1993, 201)
Space-time structuralism basically adopts the latter view. Thus the metric field g , i.e.
space-time in the general theory, is interpreted as representing the actual and
possible spatio-temporal relations between material things. Callender and Hoefer
(2002) summarizes this as follows:
g  [space-time] is not a thing or substance. Where matter is present, it is crucial to the 
definition of local standards of acceleration and non-acceleration; the EFE [Einstein Field 
Equations] record just this relationship. In many ways, the desires of traditional relationists 
(esp. Leibniz, Huygens, Mach) are -  arguably -  met by GTR when interpreted this way. 
(Callender and Hoefer 2002, 178, my italics)
Space-time structuralism maintains that the mode of existence of space-time in the
special and the general theories can be characterized from the ontological
perspective as consisting of “a bundle of universals or a web of relations.” (Dorato
2001, 1615) According to this view, space-time is essentially characterized as the
spatio-temporal relations such as “later than,” “simultaneous with,” “to the future
of,” “being spacelike separated from,” and “being a certain invariant spatio-
temporal distance from” etc. (ibid.)
In the case of the special theory of relativity, the spatio-temporal relations are 
codified in a Lorentzian metric. This involves the non-existence of absolute 
simultaneity relations between two events, but the spatio-temporal relations between
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two events are completely encoded within the invariant geometric intervals between 
events, i.e., in Cartesian coordinates ds2 = -  c2dt2 + dx2 + dy2 + dz2. In the case of 
the general theory, the metric field g  codifies the spatio-temporal structures 
ds2 = gy dx1 dd (i,j  = 1,2,3, and 4) which are inter-related with the distribution of 
matter-energy through the constraints specified by Einstein’s field equations. The 
parts of the field maintain spatio-temporal relations to one another while having 
properties that satisfy Einstein’s field equations. In this way, space-time 
structuralism interprets space-time structure as having a relational existence, 
without viewing it as a substantival entity.
So far, we have seen that Dorato’s suggestion of space-time structuralism is along 
the similar line with liberalized relationism. On the other hand, Slowik highlights 
the other side of space-time structuralism, which originates from the metric 
substantivalism suggested as a response to the Einstein-Earman-Norton Hole 
argument. (Slowik 2006, 2007)
The Hole argument attacks substantivalists regarding the general theory. The 
general theory of relativity is characterized as a model constituted by <M, g, T >; 
where M is a four dimensional Riemannian manifold representing a set of events, g 
is the metric tensor that specifies the spatio-temporal relations between events, and 
T is the stress energy tensor representing the distribution of matter. Earman and 
Norton (1987) view the manifold of space-time points as representing space-time:
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The advent of general relativity has made most compelling the identification of the bare 
manifold with spacetime. For in that theory geometric structures, such as the metric tensor, 
are clearly physical fields in spacetime. The metric tensor now incorporates the 
gravitational field and thus, like other physical fields, carries energy and momentum, ... 
Consider, for example, a gravitational wave propagating through space. ... If we do not 
classify such energy bearing structures as the wave as contained within spacetime, then we 
do not see how we can consistently divide between container [space-time] and contained 
[matter]. (Earman and Norton 1987, 519)
The claim then is that there is a problem with the view that the metric field 
represents space-time. Given that the metric field carries energy and momentum that 
can be interchanged with any other form of energy (for instance with mechanical 
energy), Earman and Norton maintain that the difference of the mode of existence 
between space-time and the metric field is manifest. We are then left with no 
alternative but to interpret the manifold of space-time points as representing space­
time.
Earman and Norton then argue that manifold substantivalism which interprets the 
manifold of events as independently existing substantival entities leads to an 
unacceptable form of indeterminism. Given the general covariance of the Einstein’s 
field equations, which requires that the equations hold in any coordinate systems, if 
a model <M, g, T > is a physically acceptable one, < M, d*g, d*T > is also a 
physically acceptable one, where d  is a diffeomorphism relating all points of M  with 
different value of g  and T. If the mapping is interpreted in an active sense that 
generates a physically different state, <M,g,  T> and < M, d*g, d*T > can be
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considered to be genuinely different physical affairs.10 Since, given that these two 
models have different distributions of the metric and matter fields over the same 
space-time points M, they represent two different physical systems.
The Hole argument alleges a radical form of indeterminism. Suppose <M, g, T> 
and < M, d*g, d*T > are related by the identity mapping before certain time /, but by 
a non-identity mapping after t. These two different developments after t cannot be 
physically distinguishable, since both models satisfy the same laws of the theory. In 
order to highlight the problem, Earman and Norton assign different mappings inside 
and outside of a hole in a local space-time region. These mappings change the 
assignment of space-time points inside the hole region with the metric and matter 
fields, whilst leaving the assignment of the points outside the hole with the metric 
and matter field unchanged. As a consequence,
[T]he physical theory of relativistic cosmology is unable to pick between the two cases. 
This is manifested as an indeterminism of the theory. We can specify the distribution of 
metric and matter fields throughout the manifold of events, excepting within the region 
designated as The Hole. Then the theory is unable to tell us how the fields will develop into 
The Hall. Both the original and the transformed distribution are legitimate extensions of the 
metric and matter fields outside The Hole into The Hole, since each satisfies all the laws of 
the theory of relativistic cosmology. The theory has no resources which allow us to insist 
that only one is admissible. (Norton 1999)
10 There exist two different interpretations concerning the coordinate transformations. In the 
Cartesian coordinates system, a coordinate transformation maps the old point whose coordinate is 
(x, t) to the new point whose coordinate in the same system is (x’, /*). A passive interpretation is 
concerned with the way the physical situation is described in that the transformation maps a 
specific point (x, t) in one reference frame to the same point labeled (x’, f )  in the different 
reference frame. On the other hand, when the transformation is interpreted in an active sense, it 
generates a physically different state while the physical state is described in terms of the same 
coordinate system.
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Various criticisms have been suggested to undermine the argument. But here I want
to concentrate on Hoefer’s metrical substantivalism, as being the most relevant to
space-time structuralism. Slowik (2005) reads Hoefer’s view as showing that “the
evolution of [ideas about] space-time demonstrates how conflicting spacetime
commitment may ... incorporate the same necessary structures.” (Slowik 2005, 151)
Hoefer criticizes the hole argument by targeting Earman and Norton’s premise that
the substantial points of space-time are represented by a manifold of events M
among three elements of the model <M, g, T>. Then, the mapping d  relates
different values of g, T  with a manifold of events, which brings about an
unacceptable form of indeterminism. This specific interpretation of space-time •
consists of an essential premise for the Hole argument to work. At this point, Hoefer
points out that this understanding of space-time yields the wrong conclusion.
According to Hoefer, what represents space-time is in fact the metric, rather than a
manifold of events. Whilst Earman and Norton identify the metric field with a
physical field in a sense that it can carry both energy and momentum, Hoefer
emphasizes their difference:
[T]o talk of the metric field as though it were a physical field -  something of a cousin to the 
electromagnetic field, say -  is awkward and unnatural. ... Whereas the classical concept of 
a [matter] field is that of something in space and time, whose properties vary with location 
in a space and time that could just as well exist without the field, the metric is not in 
spacetime, and spacetime cannot be imagined to exist if it were ‘removed.’ (Hoefer 1998, 
459, original italics)
In addition to denying the identify of the metric field with matter, Hoefer provides a 
reason why the metric field should be viewed as space-time:
Why is it proper to view gMV as the representor of substantival space-time? The metric’s role 
is exactly to give us the details of the structure of 4-D, curved spacetime. It determines the
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spacelike-timelike distinction, determines the affine connection or inertial structure of 
spacetime (i.e. defines which motions are accelerated and which are not), and determines 
distances between points along all paths connecting them. In all these ways, the metric is 
perfectly analogous to Newton’s absolute space and time, (ibid.)
Hoefer finds the origins of this view in the writings of Einstein:
If we imagine the gravitational field, i.e. the functions gik, to be removed, there does not 
remain a space ... but absolutely nothing ... There is no such thing as an empty space, i.e. a 
space without field. Space-time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a structural 
quality of the field. (Einstein 1920, 155)
If the metric field is identified with space-time, the Hole argument does not hold. 
Whilst the argument is based on a premise that the physically permitted models < M 
g, T> and < M, d*g, d*T > have two different distributions of metric and matter 
fields over the same space-time points, this is not the case in Hoefer’s metric 
substantivalism. If space-time is to be identified with the metric field, we cannot say 
that the same space-time points have different metric fields. That is, given that the 
metric field fixes the identity of space-time points of M, the mapping of d*g does 
not result in the same points of M  possessing different g  and T  values. Instead, d*g 
represents the same space-time points. (Stachel 1993) So without empirically 
equivalent alternatives that are generated by the mapping d, the failure of 
determinism is avoided.
Slowik (2006) points out that although Hoefer’s view is suggested as a version of 
substantivalism, it is very close to relationism in the sense that it is based on the 
relational property of the metric field g  in characterizing space-time. The essence of 
relationism lies in its identifications of a set of empirically equivalent alternative
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models with a single state-of-affairs. Belot and Earman describe the advocates of 
the view identifying diffeomorphically related models as the ‘sophisticated’ 
substantivalists, who “are helping themselves to a position most naturally associated 
with relationism”. (Belot 2000, 588-9) Given this commonality of emphasis on the 
metric within substantivalism and relationism, Slowik advocates space-time 
structuralism:
SR [structural realism] can also be helpful in explicating our evolving understanding of the 
importance of structure in spacetime theories considered historically. ... Likewise, the 
striking resemblance of many post-hole argument substantivalists and current [modified] 
relationist hypotheses can be seen as a further manifestation of this structuralist 
evolutionary tendency. As the analysis of spacetime theories progresses (the insufficiency 
of [traditional] relationism [in explicating inertial motions], the hole argument, etc.), the 
structures put forward by the competing ontologies draw ever more closer, and may have 
reached a point where there is no longer any significant difference. It is this capacity of SR 
to reduce the seemingly irresolvable ontological conflicts, and focus on the crucial role of 
structure, that marks its true advantage in the spacetime debates. (Slowik 2006, 150-151)
4. A Critique of Dorato’s Structural Space-time Realism
The space-time structuralism developed by Dorato and Slowik seems to capture, 
then, the important elements of the workings of space-time theories. It identifies “a 
common structure” i.e. the relational properties of the metric field g, shared by 
“sophisticated substantivalism” and “liberal relationism.” But the emphasis on “a 
common structure” shared by the two competing views, is, surely, at best a weak 
explanation of the success of space-time theories. Dorato and Slowik follow a 
strategy similar as Poincare and Worrall’s emphasis on the common structure shared 
by Fresnel and Maxwell’s theories. Yet the intention of structural realism is 
ultimately to find the essential elements contributing to the success of those theories,
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rather than simply finding any common structure. That is, what structural realism 
aims to capture are the “working parts” of theories. We have seen this in Duhem’s 
account that the parts to which “theory owes its power and fertility” are the relations 
between observable or unobservable entities. And Poincare and Worrall’s structural 
realism explains the empirical success of a theory in terms of its structure. In this 
sense, the structures shared by Fresnel and Maxwell’s theories are not only common 
structures, but also working parts that make these theories successful.
Accordingly, within the context of space-time structuralism, we need to ask whether 
or not the common structure shared by substantivalism and relationism (the 
relational properties of space-time) is the theoretical part that makes the success of 
space-time theories possible. This section will argue that the relational properties of 
space-time are not enough to capture the essential parts of space-time theories, i.e. 
the spatio-temporal relations between events are not the elements that make 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics empirically successful. In fact, dynamical laws 
are by no means explained by the relational properties of space-time shared by 
substantivalism and relationism.
As Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism captures the best assumptions from 
both substantivalism and relationism, the view retains a premise common to both 
ontological positions. This is that the dynamical effects of a given body are to be 
explained by the geometries of space-time, which represents the spatio-temporal
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relations. Within the general theory of relativity, Dorato considers that the law of 
inertia, e.g., is explained by the geometric structure of space-time:
[T]he question of the independent existence of spatiotemporal structure calls into play the 
status of natural laws and their existence as being partially non-supervenient upon physical 
state of affairs and events. (Dorato 2000, 1614)
And:
[A] structural spacetime realist must admit that geometrical laws [of space-time] exist 
independently of our minds, to the extent that such laws partially constitute the structure (or 
relations) that phenomena exemplify.11 The laws I am referring to are relational constraints 
making it the case that, say, “free particles travel on geodesics of the spacetime.” (ibid., 
1617)
According to Dorato, the independent existence of spatio-temporal structure also 
explains trajectories in the case of gravitating motions. He also does not exclude the 
possibility that the relational properties of space-time have a causal power that 
explains the trajectory of the motion of a body in that the curvature of space-time 
deflects the orbits of massive bodies:
By using the spatiotemporal structure as an explanatory tool, and declaring it to be a mind- 
independent property of certain physical systems, structural realists about spacetime may 
rely on the fact that properties (spatiotemporal ones included) simply are, in any 
respectable metaphysical theories, the causal powers o f the entities haying them. ... What 
causes the deflection of the orbit of the massive body is the gravitational field, a thoroughly 
physical field, via its geometrical, causally active relational properties, (ibid., 1616)
11 The independent existence of space-time geometry that represents a specific entity, whether it 
is based on substance or relation, has been a major intuition behind the reality of space-time. 
Alexander in his preface of Leibniz-Clark correspondence states that “one might interpret the 
Scholium as saying that space-time are ideal entities which it is helpful to consider in theory, ... 
identifying the set of frames of reference with respect to which the laws of dynamics would take 
the simplest forms (Alexander 1984).” Toulmin also sees the mode of existence of space as a 
geometric entity in that
[0]ne need no more assert that Newton was committed by his theory of dynamics to the 
objective existence of a cosmic substratum called ‘absolute space’ than one need to say that a 
geometer ... is committed to the quasi-material existence of an invisible network of 
geometrical entities ... (quoted from Stein 1967)
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According to Brown (2005), the above scheme, which Dorato’s version of space­
time structuralism follows, represents a widespread opinion among the philosophers 
of space-time (held by, e.g., Friedman 1983, Nerlich 1976, Balashov and Janssen 
2003). Brown cites Nerlich as an example:
[W]ithout the affine structure there is nothing to determine how the [free] particle trajectory 
should lie. It has no antennae to tell it where other objects are, even if there were other 
objects. ... It is because space-time has a certain shape that world lines lie as they do. 
(Nerlich 1976, 264, original italics)
According to such accounts, the geometric feature of the spatio-temporal structure
explicates the behaviours of material bodies moving in accordance with the laws of
motion. Brown and Pooley (2006) also interpret Balashov and Janssen’s account of
Lorentz contraction as following the same explanatory scheme that the geometrical
structure of space-time makes sense of Lorentz invariance:
[D]oes the Minkowskian nature of space-time explain why the forces holding a rod together 
are Lorentz invariant or the other way around? Our intuition is that the geometrical 
structure of space(-time) is the explanans here and the invariance of the forces the 
explanandum. To switch things around, our intuition tells us, is putting the cart before the 
horse (Balashov and Janssen 2003, 340-1).
And:
[L]ength contraction is explained by showing that two observers who are in relative motion 
to one another and therefore use different sets of space-time axes disagree about which 
cross-sections of the ‘world-tube’ of a physical system give the length of the system, (ibid., 
331)
The above accounts, along with Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism, share 
the explanatory scheme that the geometric feature of space-time as an independent 
existence is what explains the dynamical laws of material bodies. Here, what is 
worth emphasizing is that its geometric feature stems from the mode of existence of
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space-time. It seems that although substantivalism and relationism suggest different
modes of existence for space-time, they share the common explanatory scheme that
space-time geometry is supposed to explain the dynamical effects of a given body.
Liberalized relationism makes this clear:
How does the introduction of absolute space provide Newton with the wherewithal to 
explain the dynamical effects? Since the parts of absolute space endure through time, they 
provide a reference frame by which distance relations can be defined not only between 
bodies at a time but also between bodies at different times. ... Newton’s ability to account 
for inertial effects does not immediately depend on the postulation of space as a substance. 
Substantival absolute space serves only as a means of extending the domain of the distance 
relation to include pairs of nonsimultaneous events... [On the other hand] a [liberalized] 
relationist could still maintain that all spatiotemporal facts are facts about the relations 
between material bodies or, speaking four-dimensionally, material events. But for the 
[liberalized] relationist those relations include a distance relation between 
noncontemporaneous events. (Maudlin 1993, 186-7)
In this way, liberalized relationism sees the geometry of space-time as providing an
explanation for the dynamical effects of a given body. Hence, given that both
traditional substantivalism and relationism follow this scheme of explanation, it is
no surprise that Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism, which attempts to
capture the common aspect of these two views, follows this line.
However, from the perspective of liberalized relationism, it in fact seems doubtful 
that the geometric nature of space-time provides an explanation of the dynamical 
effects of a body. In the previous chapter, we have seen that the mode of existence 
of space-time by no means cause the dynamical effects of a body. According to 
Maudlin’s account, what the spatio-temporal relations do, instead, is to “provide a 
reference frame by which distance relations can be defined not only between bodies
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at a time but also between bodes at different times.” (ibid.)12 By means of these 
spatio-temporal relations between simultaneous and non-simultaneous events, it is 
possible to define a reference frame relative to which the laws of motion have their 
simplest forms. In other words, with respect to the reference frame, a given body not 
subject to external forces follows rectilinear and uniform trajectories, whereas if 
subjected to external forces, a body accelerates in proportion to, and the direction of, 
the exerting force. Accordingly, what the spatio-temporal relations between events 
provide is kinematical properties by which we can build concepts constituting 
dynamical laws, rather than space-time providing an explanation of dynamical laws.
12 It seems that this lack of kinematical property capturing the dynamical effects of a body is what 
is at stake in Newton vs. Descartes in De Gravitatione. Newton criticized Descartes’ physics, 
since the analyses of space and motion based on a relationist's perspective cannot capture 
dynamical effects. In Principles of Philosophy, Descartes claimed that “the terms ‘place’ and 
‘space’, then do not signify anything different from the body which is said to be in a place; they 
merely refer to ... position relative to other bodies” (Descartes 1967, II. 13).
Newton at this point attempts to show that Descartes’ relational space does not have the 
appropriate kinematical structures to make sense of inertial trajectories of moving bodies. In De 
Gravitatione, Newton argued the absurdity of Descartes’ position; “a moving body has no 
determinate velocity and no definite line in which it moves” (Hall & Hall 1962, 129). The main 
line of reasoning comes from pointing out weak kinematical properties of Descartes’ relational 
theory of space. The place of a given body can be said to be both changing and not changing 
depending on different reference bodies. In this sense, ‘places’ do not exist in nature: “there is no 
basis from which we can at present pick out a place which was in the past, or say that such a place 
is any longer discoverable in nature ... (since) there are no bodies in the world whose relative 
positions remain unchanged with the passage of time” (ibid., 130). This is the problem of 
Cartesian kinematics:
[I]t is impossible to pick out the place in which a motion begins, for this place no longer 
exists after motion is completed, so the space passed over, having no beginning, can have no 
length; and hence, since velocity depends upon the distance passed over in a given time, it 
follows that a moving body can have no velocity, just as I wished to prove at first, (ibid., 130)
In other words, what Newton wanted to prove is that Descartes’ relational space does not have the 
appropriate kinematical structure to define the positions (consequently the velocities) of bodies 
over time.
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We can also find an argument that space-time geometry by no means explains 
dynamical laws in Teller’s account concerning the relationships between space-time 
and the law of inertia. In the context of neo-Newtonian space-time, Teller criticizes 
the traditional view that considers space-time as explaining the law of inertia. 
Newtonian space-time needs to be modified since it does not satisfy the principle of 
Galilean relativity.13 According to the principle, the dynamical laws cannot be 
distinguished when they refer to any uniformly moving frame. Accordingly, the 
identification of spatial points over time and the distance relations between non- 
simultaneous events is not dynamically meaningful.14 Neo-Newtonian space-time
13 Newtonian space-time consists of three plus one dimensional affine manifolds, in which the 
affine structure, by identifying individual points of space at different times, enables us to define 
straight lines that represent inertial motions of bodies. The construction of space-time structures 
begins with geometric objects, a collection of points representing a set of events, i.e. a 
topologically R4 differentiable manifold M  without any additional structure. A class of 
simultaneous relations between events are then introduced by the partitioning M  into a family of 
hypersurface, which represents the simultaneous planes. In order to define the spatial distance 
between two simultaneous events and the temporal distance between two non-simultaneous 
events, the spatial and temporal metrics satisfying the laws of Euclidean geometry are introduced. 
In addition, the identification of individual points on non-simultaneous spaces provides 
Newtonian space-time with a structure of ‘occurring-at-same-place’ at different times. This 
rigging of points across different simultaneous spaces enables us to specify straight lines 
representing the inertial trajectories of bodies. And the identification of the second time derivative 
of separation from these straight lines with forces affecting them corresponds to Newton’s second 
law of motion. In this way, the trans-temporal identity of individual points of space provides a 
foundation that supports the absolute motions of a body, such as uniform and accelerated motions. 
For, absolute motion is defined as “the translation of a body from one absolute place into 
another.” (Newton 1726, 17)
14 In Newtonian space-time, the identification of spatial points over time and the distance 
relations between non-simultaneous events enables us to select privileged trajectories. But a 
problem is that this posit accepts a theoretically superfluous structure of absolute position and 
velocity. This contradicts with the Galilean relativity principle, the most cherished principle in 
classical mechanics. In his Corollary V to the laws of motion, Newton himself, recognizing this 
problem of positing a redundant element in space, presented the belief in the relativity of motion; 
“When bodies are enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation to one another are the same
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can then be constructed by eliminating these concepts from Newtonian space-time 
while leaving all other structures unchanged.15 Without the identification of spatial 
points over time and the distance relations between non-simultaneous events, neo- 
Newtonian space-time needs a geometric-structure i.e., “connection” that identifies 
straight trajectories corresponding to inertial motions of a given body. Notice that 
the inertial effects of a body specify straight trajectories, rather than the other way 
around:
Which trajectories are the ones to be called straight? That is, Which represent unaccelerated 
[inertial] motion? Or again, Which, if followed by an object, would describe the object as 
unaccelerated? There is nothing in the collection of bare space-time points and their “next 
to” relations to answer this question. ... Why should one balk at the introduction of the 
connection -  the description of the pattern of straight and curved trajectories -  simply as a 
theoretical construct needed for giving a good theory of the subject matter? The problem is 
that so far we have not given any non-trivial theoretical interrelations. We have not yet 
been given any handle on saying which trajectories to count as curved except the one which 
works by saying which trajectories, when followed by an object, exhibit inertial effects. 
(Teller 1991, 373-4)
Teller’s view then is that space-time geometry does not underpin the law of inertia. 
Instead, the law of inertia underpins space-time geometry.
whether that space is at rest or whether it is moving uniformly straight forward without any 
circular motion” (Newton 1729, 423). This suggests that a class of equivalent inertial trajectories 
of a moving body underdetermine at which point of space the body is located.
15 As a modification of Newtonian space-time, Neo-Newtonian space-time restricts the spatial 
relation between events. Newtonian space provides a kinematical basis to decide whether or not 
any two events are at the same place, and how much spatial interval two events, simultaneous or 
not, are separated. To be consistent with the Galilean relativity principle, Neo-Newtonian space­
time modifies its kinematical properties. The two events can be said to happen at the same 
location only after a specific Galilean coordinate, which allows the Galilean boosts, has been 
chosen. Neo-Newtonian space-time can then be represented as a stack of Euclidean planes, of 
which the affine structure is isomorphic to the one of Newtonian space-time. Accordingly, the 
invariant distance between two points is well defined only if the two events occur simultaneously. 
In this framework, the trans-temporal identity of parts of space has no physical significance any 
longer.
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In the context of the general theory of relativity, the reversal of the direction of 
explanation within space-time theory is also manifest. In his recent Physical 
Relativity (2005), Brown emphasizes that the geodesic principle in the general 
theory, which corresponds with the law of inertia, can be derived from the 
dynamical content of general relativity, rather than from its space-time geometry. 
More specifically, the geodesic motion of a test particle can be derived from a form 
of Einstein’s field equations, which is a vanishing of the covariant divergence of the 
stress-energy tensor associated with the body.
Accordingly, an alternative understanding of the workings of space-time theories is 
suggested, entitled “the dynamical perspective of space-time” (Brown 2005, and 
DiSalle 2006). According to this view, it is dynamical laws, rather than the mode of 
existence of space-time, that provide the foundation of space-time geometry.16 The 
advocates of this view criticize the traditional understanding of the relation between 
space-times and dynamical laws. Brown views the influence of the structure of 
space-time on dynamical laws as “mysterious.” The traditional view sees space-time 
geometry as providing an explanation of “brute facts” that all physical bodies in the 
universe satisfy the law of motion. Yet, Brown claims that without an understanding
16 According to Poincar£, “from among all possible groups, we must choose one that will be the 
standard, so to speak, to which we shall refer natural phenomena” (Poincar£ 1905, 70). Newton in 
the preface of Principia emphasized the coordination between geometry and mechanics: “the 
description of straight lines and circle, which is foundation of geometry, appertains to mechanics” 
(Newton 1729, 1). Although space-time geometry stems from our intuition of spatio-temporal 
relations between events, its aim is to provide a theory which makes sense of the laws of motion.
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of how “the coupling between the particles and the postulated geometrical space­
time structure” works, the traditional view is not yet a legitimate one:
[Fjorce-ffee particles have no antennae, that they are unaware of the existence of other 
particles. That is the prima facie mystery of inertia in pre-GR theories: how do all the free 
particles in the world know how to behave in a mutually coordinated way such that their 
motion appears extremely simple from the point of view of a family of privileged frames? 
But to appeal to the action of a background space-time connection in which the particles are 
immersed -  to what Weyl called the “guiding field” -  is arguably to enhance the mystery, 
not to remove it. For the particles do not have space-time feelers either. In what sense is the 
postulation of the 4-connection doing more explanatory work than Moliere’s famous 
dormitive virtue in opium? (Brown and Pooley 2006, 72)
DiSalle also argues that the traditional explanatory scheme fails to account for the
workings of space-time.17 The problem of the traditional view, according to DiSalle,
originates from the misunderstanding of space-time as an existent that causes a body
to move in accordance with the laws of motion. An analogy contrasting Euclidean
geometry and space-time geometry elucidates this point:
In the case of Euclidean geometry, the laws of nature ... supported the view that we could 
objectively determine differences in length because they presented no problem for the 
underlying physical hypotheses about the comparison of rigid bodies. Because the physical 
foundations of spatial geometry have been relatively clear, only a confused person would 
ask whether Euclidean geometry is really the cause of differences in length; that the 
differences can be measured, and that the measured results agree with the Euclidean metric, 
is all that anyone ever meant by the claim that space is Euclidean. ... [I]t is equally 
confused to ask whether spacetime is the cause of the distinctions between states of motion 
that its theory entails. In both cases, the distinctions are postulated through the definitions, 
not explained, and the appropriate critical question to ask about them is whether the laws of 
nature allow us to make these distinctions empirically. (DiSalle 1992, 187)
17 DiSalle (1988) finds the historical roots of the dynamical perspective of space-time from Lange 
and Thomson’ accounts of inertial frame, which is a set of frames of reference with respect to 
which the laws of motion, such as the law of inertia and acceleration, takes the simplest form. 
And this line of thought can also be found in Stein (1967): “what matters for Newton’s dynamics 
is that his theory -  which includes, of course, the distinction between inertial frames and others -  
should have a physical application.” In other words, what space-time does is to distinguish the 
inertial frames in which the laws of motion satisfy. In this way, the laws of motion determine 
space-time, not the other way around
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The success of Euclidean geometry does not come from the fact that its geometric 
features causally explain spatial measurements, but from the fact that the laws of 
Euclidean geometry encode “the constraints to which those measurements will 
conform” (DiSalle 1995, 324). In other words, the measurements of physical space 
are systematically encoded by means of the definitions of geometry constituting its 
laws such as the Pythagorean theorem. Accordingly, it is untenable to say that 
Euclidean space can be viewed as an existing entity. Instead, the success of 
Euclidean geometry stems from the fact that its laws codify physical measurements 
and processes. The same thing can be said in the case of space-time theories. The 
traditional explanatory scheme claiming that the mode of its existence explicates the 
laws of motion, in Brown’s expression, is ‘putting the cart before the horse.’
Instead, the secret of the success of space-time theory is the fact that the definitions 
in terms of space-time geometry are appropriately coordinated with the laws of 
motion. For example, DiSalle takes Newton’s account that “the true and absolute 
circular motion ... may be measured by this endeavour” (Newton 1729, 21) as 
showing the relationship between dynamical effects and absolute motions.18
18 This relationship between dynamical effects and absolute motions can be found in Newton’s 
famous thought experiment with the bucket and the globe. This experiment is performed with a 
bucket of water that is suspended by a long cord. The bucket is turned in one direction until the 
cord is tightly twisted, and the cord is left to untwist in the opposite direction. As the bucket 
rotates while the cord untwists, the surface of the water in the initial stage is flat, as before the 
bucket began to move. After a short while, the water recedes from the axis of circular motion 
because of the friction of the rotating bucket. Forming itself into a concave shape, the water at 
this moment climbs up the sides of the bucket. Newton claims that the phenomena cannot be 
systemically explained by relational theory. For when the relational motion of water with respect 
to the bucket is maximum (as the water rests and the bucket spins), there is no dynamical effect
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According to this account, an absolute rotation of a given body is not responsible for
the dynamical effect (a force) exerted on the body, but instead the dynamical effect
provides a measure of absolute motion:
I emphasize the role of dynamical laws in order to make it clear that, in asserting that 
Newton was proposing definitions required by his theory, ... the distinction [between 
rotation and non-rotation] can be made is an empirical claim that rests on the validity of 
Newtonian mechanics. ... [T]he fundamental question of Newtonian Scholium was not... 
whether absolute space and time really exist. Instead, the question was how the geometrical 
distinctions implicit in the structure of absolute space could be coordinated with the 
dynamical distinctions implicit in the accepted laws of dynamics. (DiSalle 1995, 330)
In a similar spirit, Brown and Pooley claim that space-time geometry encodes the
essential feature of the motions of a given body:
For Newton, the existence of absolute space and time has to do with providing a structure, 
necessarily distinct from ponderable bodies and their relations, with respect to which it is 
possible systemically to define the basic kinematical properties of the motion of such 
bodies. ... [ W]hat is at issue is the arrow of explanation. In our view it is simply more
on the water. And the ascent of the water is greatest while there is no relational motion of the 
water with respect to the bucket (as the water and the bucket are spinning together at the same 
speed).
The point is that the kinematics in relational theory is not consistent with its dynamical effects. In 
this context, Newton emphasizes kinematics of absolute circular motion with respect to absolute 
space, which is consistent with dynamical effects: “the ascent of the water shows its endeavour to 
recede from the axis of motion; and true and absolute circular motion of the water, which is here 
directly contrary to the relative, becomes known, and may by measured by this endeavour” 
(Newton 1729, 21).
Another thought experiment, Newton’s globe, demonstrates this point more clearly. Newton 
considered two globes joined together by a cord, which revolve around the common center of 
gravity in an empty universe. This idealized situation is considered in order to prevent a 
relationists’ possible response by eliminating any bodies to which we can refer to their motions. 
Even in this case, “we might, from the tension of the cord, discover the endeavour of the globes to 
recede from the axis of their motion, and from thence we might compute the quantity of their 
circular motion” (ibid., 22). In other words, the true rotation of a body is not only relative to the 
contiguous body, but also relative to any bodies in the empty universe. From this two thought 
experiments, Newton tried to show that the relationists’ kinematics is not appropriate because it is 
inconsistent with dynamical effects: “Therefore this endeavour does not depend on any 
translation of the water in respect of ambient bodies, nor can true circular motion be defined by 
such translation” (ibid., 21).
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economical to consider the 4-connection as a codification of certain key aspects of the 
behaviour of particles and fields. (Brown and Pooley 2006, 73)
When Brown and Pooley consider space-time geometry as codifying certain key
aspect of motions of bodies, they refer to the fact that “all the [force-]free particles
in the world know how to behave in a mutually coordinated way such that their
motion appears extremely simple from the point of view of a family of privileged
frames.” (ibid.) That is, it refers to dynamical laws, such as the law of inertia and
the law of acceleration. Accordingly, the ‘connection’ identifying straight
trajectories of a given body is posited in order to encode its inertial and non-inertial
trajectories.
In this way, the dynamical perspective of space-time suggested by Brown and
DiSalle considers space-time geometry as being founded on its dynamical laws, not
the other way around as traditionally viewed:
[T]o propose a spacetime theory, at least in the manner of Newton and Einstein, is not to try 
to explain the observable (the behaviours of a body) by the unobservable (space-time 
geometry). Rather, it is to define a particular observable process as fundamental, and to use 
it as the basis for a geometrical picture that makes other observable processes physically 
intelligible. (DiSalle 1992, 187)
Accordingly, the arrow of explanation in Brown and DiSalle’s view is the opposite
of the traditional explanatory scheme of space-time.
Although both Brown and DiSalle emphasize dynamical laws as the foundation of 
space-time geometry, their views differ concerning the substance-relation debate 
and what constitutes dynamical laws. For the former aspect, Brown, it seems, does
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not reject the possibility of both substantivalism and relationism within the
dynamical perspective of space-time19:
[E]ven when one’s ontology includes substantival space-time structure, the symmetries of 
the laws governing material systems are still crucial in such structures gaining operational 
chronogeometric significance. (Brown and Pooley 2006, 86)
On the other hand, DiSalle explicitly claims that the controversies are misleading
attempts to understanding the workings of space-time theories:
[T]he important question about a spacetime theory is not about how it squares with the 
ontological categories of substance and relation, but about the correspondence of the 
theory’s fundamental definitions with law-like aspects of our experience. (DiSalle 1992, 
188)
These two advocates of the dynamical perspective of space-time also differ over 
what constitutes the dynamical laws, which underpin the structure of space-time. 
Brown views the structure of space-time as stemming from the dynamics 
constrained by the micro-structures of matter (“the laws governing material 
systems”). On the other hand, DiSalle views dynamical laws as phenomenological 
laws constraining spatio-temporal measurements (“law-like aspects of our 
experience”). Although Brown and DiSalle have a different view concerning what 
constitutes this basic physical process, the common denominator is their emphasis
19 Given a clear intuition under the concept of space as void places, it is difficult to get rid of 
substantivalism, which Newton called “the primary places of things.” (Newton 1729) In de 
Gravitatione, Newton characterized the parts of space from our “exceptionally clear idea of 
extension,” by means of “abstracting the dispositions and properties of a body so that there 
remains only the uniform and unlimited stretching out of space in length, breadth and depth ... 
space can be distinguished into parts whose common limits we usually call surfaces” (Newton 
1962, p. 132). And even Newton admits the intuition underlying space-time relationism: “It is only 
through their reciprocal order and position that the parts of duration and space are understood to 
be very ones that they truly are; and they do not have any other principle of individuation beside 
this order and position, which consequently cannot be altered.” (ibid., p. 103) But the point of 
dynamical perspective is that the characteristics of space-time are only available by means of 
dynamical information. So it seems that these two perspectives are not necessarily incompatible.
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on dynamical laws which underpin space-time geometry. The structure of space­
time has its foundation in dynamical laws:
[I]t is appropriate to appeal to the Euclidean symmetries of the forces at work to explain the 
same behaviour [of particles and fields]. And we simply deny that the Euclidean nature of 
space can ever be cited as a genuine explanation of these symmetries; this would be to put 
the cart before the horse. (Brown and Pooley 2006, 85)
Again:
[T]he existence of spacetime is not some additional inference from those [dynamical] laws 
-  any more than the existence of Euclidean space would be a further inference from the 
claim that spatial measurements are in accord with Euclid’s postulates. That is, evidence 
that supports dynamical laws is not a kind of indirect evidence for the existence of the 
associated spacetime structure ... [T]o believe that spacetime is real is precisely to believe 
that the physical laws that define its geometrical distinctions are real aspects of the 
physical world. (DiSalle 1992, 188)
It seems clear that the dynamical perspective on space-time has the advantage of
explicating the relationship between space-time geometry and the laws of motion.
Given that this view considers that space-time geometry stems from the laws of
motion, there is no mystery about a claim that the behaviours of a given body
exhibit the geometric structure of space-time. In the last chapter and this section, we
have seen that the traditional explanatory scheme has a difficulty in clarifying the
relationship between these two main elements of space-time theories. Although
space-time geometry is traditionally viewed as providing the foundation of the laws
of motion, what is not clear is the connection between these two structures.
Talk of Lorentz covariance “reflecting the structure of space-time posited by the theory” 
and of “tracing the invariance to a common origin [of the invariance of space-time]” needs 
to be fleshed out if  we are to be given a genuine explanation here ... Unless this question is 
answered, space-time’s Minkowskian structure cannot be taken to explain the Lorentz 
covariance of the dynamical laws. (Brown and Pooley 2006, 84)
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Yet, by placing the foundation of space-time geometry within dynamical laws, the 
workings of space-time theories can be easily explained.
From the dynamical perspective of space-time theories, we can figure out what 
Dorato’s space-time structuralism misses in understanding the workings of space­
time theories. Given that the dynamical laws play a foundational role in space-time 
theories, neglecting their importance in constructing space-time structuralism will 
provide incomplete accounts of the development of space-time theories. Although 
Dorato does not completely neglect the dynamical contents of space-time theories, 
his account basically emphasizes spatio-temporal structure. By following the 
traditional explanatory scheme, Dorato’s version of structural space-time realism 
falls short of capturing the physical foundation of space-time theories. In the last 
section, it was pointed out that the mathematical structures and the ontological 
scheme of both Newtonian and Einsteinian physics fall short of capturing the 
workings of these theories. This problem remains in Dorato’s account of space-time 
structuralism.
5. A Modified Version of Space-Time Structuralism
A more plausible version of space-time structuralism than Dorato’s needs to clarify 
the relationships between spatio-temporal relations (which Dorato emphasizes) and 
the dynamical contents of a theory (which the dynamical perspective emphasizes 
while Dorato largely neglects). Brown views space-time geometry as codifying
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“certain key aspects of the behaviour of particles and fields,” while DiSalle 
expresses this relationship as follows:
[Particular physical processes, governed by established physical laws, can be represented 
by aspects of geometrical structure in the universe. And this claim provides the only 
physically meaningful sense in which the universe can be said to have a geometrical 
structure. More precisely, a claim ... that the structure determined by a particular set of 
physical laws is the structure of a particular four-dimensional space, expresses the only 
physically meaningful sense in which the universe can be said to have a space-time 
structure. (DiSalle 1995, 333)
The issue here is how space-time geometry codifies the laws of motion. My claim is
that the structural constraints between events, which specify the relationships
between events, exhibit the space-time geometry. These structural constraints
between events are characterized along the line of structural realism in the sense that
structural constraints between events involve the dispositional properties represented
as the geometric relation between events without specifying micro-physical
foundations underlying the relationships between events as “Nature will eternally
hide from us.” (Poincare 1905, 161)
This modified version of space-time structuralism can be elucidated by comparing it 
with Huggetf s relational account of space-time. Huggett’s view also tries to clarify 
the relationship between laws of motion and space-time concepts by means of the 
relations of the regularity between events:
A specification o f the totality o f relations, masses, and charges o f bodies at a time I will 
call the 'relational state, ’ or more loosely the 'relations. ’ Although it involves facts about 
non-spatiotemporal properties, it deserves that title because it excludes any non-relational 
... spatiotemporal properties; I take it that an honest relationist can endorse relational states 
as unproblematic relational objects.20 (Huggett 2006, 47, my italics)
20 A similar account can be found in Friedman (1983), who characterizes the trajectories of the 
particles as relational entities: “Suppose we are given the trajectories of the particles whose
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Huggett views spatio-temporal properties as stemming from the laws of motion, 
which are supervenient on the relational regularities between events. According to 
him, the relational regularities are characterized along Humean lines: “when we 
attribute lawfulness to a statement we attribute no more to it than being a theorem of 
the ‘strongest’ (that is, most informative) and ‘simplest’ axiomatization of the 
totality of events in the history of the world, past, present and future.”21 (ibid., 43)
Given the relations of regularities between events specified by the laws of inertia or 
of acceleration, an inertial frame of reference can be constructed by designating a 
certain rest reference body (such as a fixed star) as the origin of coordinates whose 
orthogonal axes measures the distance from the reference body: “a frame is 
‘adopted’ to some reference body if it is at rest at the origin of the frame, the axes 
are orthogonal and distances along the axes equal to the distances from the body.” 
(ibid., 46) We can see, then, that inertial frames are supervenient on the relations of 
regularities between events. Although the above accounts assume the existence of a
world-lines T attempts to specify in its laws of motion (including, perhaps, the trajectories of light 
rays) and the matter fields or source variables (mass density, charge density, and so on) giving 
rise to the interactions described by T. These entities are relatively observable, and they are 
precisely the entities that the traditional relationist is willing to admit.” (Friedman 1983, 152) 
Huggett’s characterization of laws is based on the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis best system (MRL) 
approach. According to this view, the laws of nature are “a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true 
deductive systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength.” Ramsey also 
claims that the uniformities of laws of nature are “consequences of those propositions which we 
should take as axioms if we knew everything and organised it as simply as possible in a deductive 
system.” The laws of motion seem to come as the best -  simplest, most informative, and the true 
-  summary of information about the phenomena of motions.
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moving body in order to characterize inertial frames, Huggett generalizes this 
perspective to the case where no inertially moving body exists:
Consider then the class of all frames related by arbitrary continuous spatially rigid 
transformations of the co-ordinates of adopted frames; this class contains frames in 
arbitrary states of motion with respect to any reference body, including all the inertial 
frames. (Huggett 2006, 46)
In contrast to the traditional account of the concepts of inertial frames and of 
acceleration as spatio-temporal properties, Huggett maintains that these concepts are 
founded on the regularity relations between events comprising the “relational 
history”:
[S]ince these laws supervene on the relational history and since they pick out the inertial 
frames, I claim that the inertial frames (and hence absolute accelerations) supervene on the 
history of relations: inertial frames are the frames in which the laws that supervene on the 
history of relations hold; absolute acceleration is acceleration in the frames in which the 
laws that supervene on the history of relations hold. Thus nothing but relations are needed 
to give an account of the absolute quantities, and hence dynamical state, of Newtonian 
mechanics, (ibid., 48)
Taking off from this, my version of space-time structuralism considers the relations 
of regularity between events as the essential elements that explain the success of 
Newtonian physics. But, there is a major difference between my view and Huggett’s. 
Although I agree of course that inertial frames are determined by the law of inertia, 
it is difficult to accept that these laws of motion are nothing but “theorem[s] of the 
strongest and simplest axiomatization of the totality of events in this history.” (ibid., 
43) Heggett follows Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (MRL)’s approach in holding that laws 
only summarize our observations. Therefore, his view faces the same problem as
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MRL’s own approach -  the inability to distinguish accidental generalizations from
genuine laws. According to Dorato:
Is this [summarizing observations, which best combine simplicity and strength] the only 
reason that accidental generalizations would be excluded from axiomatic systems? I do not 
believe so, because the concept of strength is unfailingly dependent on our cognitive 
purposes.22 The selectivity that we are attempting to clarify is in fact not only tied to the 
“compressibility of information” permitted by a scientific law, ... but also to the 
fundamental, although too often overlooked assertion that the truths to which we aspire, 
whether in science or in daily life, must he interesting. (Dorato 2005, 91)
Hence, it seems that regularities between events -  merely based on epistemic 
foundation -  are too weak to characterize the law of inertia.
This weakness can be seen more clearly if we consider Newton’s own account of the
law of inertia, which is easily seen to be inconsistent with Huggett’s account.
According to Newton, the law of inertia attributes “the power of resisting by which
every body ... perseveres in its state either of resisting or of moving uniformly
straight forward.” (Newton 1726, 404) Here, the law of inertia postulates a tendency
or an observable disposition of inertia -  a disposition that resists acceleration
inertial mass and arises from a body’s inertial mass. Although the mechanism of
inertia is not further analysable in terms of the body’s atomic structure, its
dispositional property can be clarified. According to Dainton:
What do inertial effects consist of? Typically, they consist of internal stresses between the 
component parts of a body. Objects follow inertial paths unless acted on by a force (which 
is created by gravity, magnetism, or an expenditure of energy). When objects are forced off 
their inertial path, this is typically achieved by applying force to one part of the object only, 
which sets up tensions within the object: that is, some parts of the object start exerting
22 Given that both standards to be genuine laws, simplicity and strength, characterize “the 
axiomatization of the totality of events” essentially relative to our knowledge, rather than to the 
real physical world, it seems that Huggett’s approach depends essentially on epistemic 
foundation.
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forces on other parts. In the rotating globes case, the tension is registered in the cord, which 
exerts a force on the globes (whose inertial motions are tangential to their circular motion). 
(Dainton 2001, 191-2)
This dispositional property is what distinguishes genuine laws of nature from
accidental generalizations. As Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse (1992) put it:
We claim that among the essential properties of a property there is the propensity or 
disposition of anything having it to show a certain kind of behaviour in a particular context. 
What science studies and codifies are the manifestations of these dispositions. (Bigelow, 
Ellis and Lierse 1992, 378)
This claim that genuine laws involve dispositional properties, then, overcomes 
problems that defeat MRL approach. And given that the law of inertia involves this 
dispositional property, which is over and above regularities between events, I reject 
Humean approach to dynamical laws advocated by Huggett.
I should emphasize that just as Huggett sees that the regularity relations between 
events as characterized by a “relational history,” these dispositional properties are 
also characterized by “the relational structure of the world of experience and of 
science.” (Dorato 2005, 111) Because of Newton’s weak principle of equivalence -  
“the accelerative gravity, or the force that produces gravity is the same in all bodies 
universally.” (Newton 1729), the micro-structure of the inertia of a given body is 
irrelevant in the context of law of inertia. Yet, the relational histories of events 
• specified by the law of inertia, as Newton implied, stem from the dispositional 
property of inertia, which makes succeeding events occur. The law of inertia stems 
from this property manifested by geometric relations between events:
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Suppose we are given the trajectories of the particles whose world-lines T attempts to specify 
in its laws of motion (including, perhaps, the trajectories of light rays) and the matter fields or 
source variables (mass density, charge density, and so on) giving rise to the interactions 
described by T. These entities are relatively observable, and they are precisely the entities that 
the traditional relationist is willing to admit. (Friedman 1983, 152)
So, I suggest that this relational history of events, which is manifested by a
dispositional property involved within the laws of motion, captures the essence of
dynamical laws. I call this the structural constraints between events.
The manifestation o f dispositions codified by scientific laws essentially involves a 
relationship between different properties, in accordance with the fact that the kind of 
knowledge permitted by science is essentially relational and structural. This affirmation is 
justified not only inasmuch as the meaning of theoretical terms is implicitly defined by the 
context of the theory in which they appear, but also because ... the mathematical language 
we use to refer to theoretical entities furnishes essential information on the network of 
relationships that these entities exemplifies. (Dorato 2005, 115, my italics)
Along these lines, my modified space-time structuralism claims that what dynamical 
laws involve are the relational and structural constraints between events, rather than 
the relation of regularity between events. By viewing these structural constraints 
between events23 as the essential elements of the laws of motion, a modified space­
time structuralism is produced that is along the lines of structural realism, rather 
than one that like Huggett’s emphasizes epistemic constraints over events. Hence,
23 The notion of “events in space-time” in my modified space-time structuralism requires 
clarification. On my account, as pointed out in note 5 in this chapter, events are things occurring 
in the infinitesimal place and time. My account shares with substantivalism and relationism -  a 
view of an event as an idealized concept being pointlike rather than having any spatio-temporal 
extension. But the account differs from those given by traditional substantivalism and relationism. 
From the perspective of substantivalism, events are occurring at given space-time points. And the 
spatio-temporal relations between events, according to Earman (1989:12), are “relations among 
substratum o f ... spacetime points that underlie events.” On the other hand, for relationism, the 
relations between events are direct without depending on space-time points that underlies events. 
Yet, these traditional views by no means consider these relations between events as being 
constrained by dynamical laws. In my view, laws play an essential role in that events stands in 
spatio-temporal relations in accordance with dynamical laws.
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the difference between Huggett’s and my view can be found in the difference that 
what involves dynamical laws. Huggett views dynamical laws as involving the 
relations of regularity, while I consider the laws as involving the structural constrains 
between events. The relations of regularity mean that the relations between events are 
specified by means of empirical regularity of Humean line. On the other hand, the 
structural constraint between events involves the dispositional properties represented 
as the geometric relation between events without specifying underlying micro­
physical foundations.
Another example supporting my account, rather than Huggett’s, can be found in the 
dynamical perspective of space-time. Brown maintains that the laws of motion stem 
from the dynamical properties of the micro-physical structure of matter 
configurations. In the case of general theory, the inertial trajectory of a body can be 
derived from the conservation principle, i.e. the vanishing of covariant divergence 
of the stress energy tensor field 7^v. Given that the conservation principle does not 
apply only to particular kinds of physical events but to all kinds of physical events 
occurring in the universe, the principle is universal in the sense that “the antecedent 
or referent class is a broad ontological category.” (Bigelow, Ellis, and Lierse 1992, 
385) In this way, Brown’s account can also be interpreted as being odds with 
Humean approach of dynamical laws endorsed by Huggett. Given that the relational 
history specified by inertial motion within the general theory are derived by an 
universal principle, it seems to be difficult to advocate Humean approach of
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dynamical laws. Instead, the law of inertia in the general theory can be viewed as the 
structural constraint between events, which stems from the micro-physical structures 
of material bodies. In other words, the law of inertia provides a dispositional property 
of movement of a body, which is represented as the geometric relations between 
events without specifying underlying micro-physical foundations.
Given that the laws of inertia by no means refer to the material constitution of a 
body in a motion, what underlies the relations of regularity between events is 
debatable. There have been attempts to explain the law of inertia by means of 
quantum field theories and string theories. However, these attempts remain 
theoretical speculations without empirical support. Some critiques such as Smolin 
(2006) and Woit (2006) claim that these attempts are comparable to “epicycle on 
epicycle.” Given this lack of empirical support, it is not unreasonable to doubt that 
these super-microscopic theories can be regarded as legitimate empirical science. 
Although it cannot be denied that inertia supervenes on a specific microscopic 
structure, it seems that what we can know are the relationships between events, 
which are specified by the laws of motion. Furthermore, given the fact that inertia is 
universal, i.e. does not depend on the material constitution of particles, the law of 
inertia needs no microscopic structure that plays a role in explaining the behaviour 
of a given body. In the case of classical theories, the advocates of the dynamical 
perspective, on the contrary, views that the structural constraint provided by the
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laws of motion is the essential part of space-time theories -  the part which makes its 
empirical success possible:
Like all physical geometry, spacetime theory explains phenomena of motion just to the 
extent that it exhibits the structural constraints to which the phenomena conform. (DiSalle 
1995, 332)
[A] claim such as Minkowski’s (1908), that the structure determined by a particular set of 
physical laws is the structure of a particular four-dimensional space, expresses the only 
physically meaningful sense in which the universe can be said to have a space-time 
structure, (ibid.)
In the same spirit, Brown and Pooley claim:
[I]t will be instructive to acknowledge that in many contexts, perhaps in most contexts, one 
should not appeal to the details of the dynamics governing the microstructure of bodies 
exemplifying relativistic effects when one is giving a constructive explanation24 of them. 
Granted that there are stable bodies, it is sufficient for those bodies to undergo Lorentz 
contraction that the laws (whatever they are) that govern the behaviour of their 
microphysical constituents are Lorentz covariant. (Brown and Pooley 2006, 82)
This structural characterization of the laws of motion can also be found in Eugene
Wigner, who wrote that “the laws of nature provide a structure and coherence to the
\
set of events.” (Wigner 1967, 17) And also:
It is good to emphasize at this point the fact that the laws of nature, that is, the correlations 
between events, are the entities to which the symmetry laws apply, not the events 
themselves. Naturally, the events vary from place to place. However, if one observes the 
positions of a thrown rock at three different times, one will find a relation between those 
positions, and this relation will be the same at all points of the Earth, (ibid., 19)
24 “A constructive explanation” is based on a “constructive theory,” which Einstein characterized 
as an attempt to build up “a picture of the more complex phenomena out of materials of the more 
simple scheme.” (Einstein 1919) The kinetic theory of gases that seeks to reduce thermal process 
to movements of molecules is a typical example. The aim of constructive theories is to achieve 
the underlying physical reality by understanding a group of natural process. In contrast, prjnciple 
theories start from some general empirical regularities, which are elevated to the status of 
postulates. Special relativity and thermodynamics are typical examples. The elements which form 
their basis are not posited to show natural processes. Such a theory aims to explain phenomena by 
showing that they necessarily occur in accordance with the postulate. Since principle theories are 
concerned with a certain level of generalization of phenomena, their elements themselves do not 
necessarily correspond to underlying physical reality. Yet, it has been pointed out that this 
distinction is matter of degree, rather than absolute.
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This characteristic of the laws of motion has been exhibited by Weinert as captured
by under the structuralist view of laws25:
We have spoken of laws of nature and laws of science without invoking classes of objects. 
Laws have merely been characterized in terms of structural features of physical systems. 
But material objects move within physical systems and are subject to their laws. We can 
redescribe what has been said about laws of nature from the perspective of individual 
objects. From the perspective of an object within the framework of a physical system 
(being accelerated from rest to a velocity v, . . .),  a law of nature can be seen as imposing 
structural constraints on the physical behaviour it is permitted to display. (Weinert 1993, 
168)
For example, the law of inertia relates one event to another by specifying the 
geometric relationship between non-simultaneous events: “[Ejvery body continues 
in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line,26 unless it is compelled to 
change that state by force impressed upon it.” (Newton 1729, 17) A given body’s 
state of motion develops to other such states in accordance with the law. In other 
words, the law of inertia describes the evolution of physical systems by specifying
25 Weinert’s structuralist account of the nature of laws is proposed to take a third way between the 
“Necessitarian view” and the “Regularity view.” The former claims that the laws are supported by 
the relations among intrinsic properties of individual physical objects. In contrast, the latter 
maintains that laws of nature are contingent regularities, which come from inferences from a set 
of data. A major problem of the Necessitarian view is that law statements do not refer to essential 
properties, natural processes and existing objects. And in case of Regularity view, as pointed out, 
only contingent regularities are not sufficient to capture the nature of laws of science. To take a 
middle ground between these two troubled views, Weinert suggests a structural view of the laws 
of nature which claims that the laws of nature are based on structural properties which show the. 
networks of interdependence of many properties and relations, which appear in a given scientific 
theory. In other words, the lawlike statements express structural information of a given physical 
system which is formulated as theoretical structure. (Weinert 1993)
26 Within the modem geometric framework, Newton’s inertial motions are represented by 
geodesics. A geodesic is defined as a body’s curve that continues to parallel to itself. Accordingly, 
within this framework, the law of inertia states that a body unaffected by any external forces 
moves in a way that the tangent vectors to its trajectory remains parallel to itself. The thesis of my 
dissertation is that this structural constraint, which is expressed as the geodesic equation of 
motion plays an essential part that captures the continuity in the theory-change from Newtonian
to Einsteinian physics (both the special and the general theory).
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the relationship between the states of a given body’s motion over time, which 
originates from the dispositional property of inertia, as pointed out earlier. Yet, the 
law of inertia by no means involves underlying mechanism whatsoever which 
explains why a given body follows a straight trajectory.
The law of acceleration also dictates the relationship between the states of a given 
body’s motion over time, which Wigner described as “the correlations between 
events.” (Wigner 1967, 19) The law of acceleration is concerned with the change of 
motion subject to forces exerted on a given body, such that its acceleration is 
proportional to and in the direction of “the motive force impressed.” Although the 
law of acceleration involves a set of forces exerted on a given body and its mass, it 
does not involve any specific detailed mechanism whatsoever explaining why the 
body follows a curved trajectory. The law of acceleration specifies, instead, just the 
relationship between events.27
These characteristics of the laws of motion could be employed to support either 
Huggett’s or my view. Yet, along with his characterization of the laws of inertia and 
acceleration, Newton considered the law governing gravity as more than “a theorem 
of the strongest and simplest axiomatization of the totality of events.” He instead 
held that while the causal influence of gravity really exists, it is enough to explain
27 An accelerating motion of a body, within the geometric framework, is represented as a curve 
that is not geodesics. The curvature of its trajectory measures the magnitude of the acceleration of 
the body, and the total force acting on the body. In this way, the relationships between events 
codify all information encoded in the laws of motion.
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the behaviours of bodies through the laws of motion specifying the relations
between events without referring to any underlying mechanism:
I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for these properties of 
gravity, and I do not feign hypothesis. . . .It  is enough that gravity really exists and acts 
according to the laws that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all the motions of 
the heavenly bodies and of our sea. (Newton 1726, 943, my italics)
Another dynamical principle28, the principle of relativity, which plays a crucial role 
in the development from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, can be characterized in a 
similar manner. According to Wigner, the principle of relativity provides a 
constraint over the correlations between events in that it provides a further structure 
over the laws of motion: “the correlations between events, are the entities to which 
symmetry laws apply, not the events themselves.” (Wigner 1967, 19) This principle 
states that the dynamical laws obeyed by a given body cannot distinguish whether 
they are with respect to a rest or any uniformly moving frames. In other words, the 
physics of a body at rest and one moving uniformly is exactly the same. In this way, 
the principle of relativity provides additional constraints over dynamical laws, such 
as the law of inertia and acceleration, by identifying apparently distinct states of 
motion (the state of rest and uniform motion). This structural characterization is 
manifest in Einstein:
28 Two ways of providing dynamic information are differentiated in this thesis: (1) dynamic laws 
and (2) dynamic principles. These two notions are different in two different ways. The first 
involves the way they are expressed, rather than their contents. Dynamic laws, such as Newton’s 
three laws of motion, are Written quantitatively -  so easily translated into mathematical equations, 
while dynamic principles, such as the principle of relativity, and equivalence, are written 
qualitatively. The second way in which they are different is that, while a dynamic law imposes a 
structural constraint on events, a dynamic principle, on the other, provides a further meta-level 
constraint over laws. Of course since the laws in turn constrain events, dynamic principles also 
constrain events -  but unlike dynamic laws they do so indirectly via those laws.
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The principle of relativity, or, more exactly, the principle of relativity together with the 
principle of the constancy of velocity of light, is not to be conceived as a “complete 
system”, in fact, not as a system at all, but merely as a heuristic principle which, when 
considered by itself, contains only statements about rigid bodies, clocks, and light signals.
It is only by requiring relations between otherwise seemingly unrelated laws that the theory 
of relativity provides additional statements. (Einstein 1907, quoted from Brown and Pooley 
2006, 74)
In the above account, Einstein also characterized the principle of the constancy of 
speed of light as a structural one. The principle of the constancy of speed of light 
imposes a constraint over the dynamics of a given body. According to Norton, the 
principle of the constancy of speed of light specifies “a special velocity at each 
event.” (Norton 2000) In this way, the dynamical principles provide the constraints 
over the relationships between events.
My view is, then, quite different from Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism 
in that it states that the structure of space-time stems from dynamical laws. It is also 
different from Huggett’s view in that dynamical laws encapsulate the structural 
constraints over events. Although I am sympathetic to Brown’s view which 
emphasizes the micro-foundation of dynamical laws, my view admits only the 
structural characteristics of the dynamical principles which involve the relations 
between events without referring to their underlying mechanism. By providing a set 
of constraints over geometric trajectories of a moving body, dynamical principles 
specify the correlation between events. Thus, my view agrees with that of 
d’Espanat:
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A general agreement seems nowadays to exist among physicists that the aim of their 
scientific investigations is to discover structural relationships between individual 
“happenings.” (d’Espanat 1971, 372)
A modified version of space-time structuralism views the structure of space-time as 
being founded on these structural properties of dynamical laws. So far, two 
structures of space-time theory are specified. Firstly, space-time concepts encode 
the invariant spatio-temporal relations between events, which Dorato emphasized in 
his version of space-time structuralism. In other words, space-time concepts involve 
objective spatio-temporal relations between events. Secondly, the laws of motion 
exhibit relations of regularity between events. Spatio-temporal relations between 
events are associated with the regularities between events, which are captured by 
dynamical laws. A modified space-time structuralism claims that the former stems 
from the latter.
6. The Case for a Modified Space-time Structuralism in Newtonian Space-Time
It can be argued that the structure of Newtonian dynamics can be fully captured 
within a modified version of space-time structuralism. Newtonian dynamics is 
founded basically on the concepts of motion and force. In the preface to the 
Principia, Newton stated that “rational mechanics is the science, expressed in exact 
propositions and demonstrations, of the motions that result from any forces 
whatever and of the forces that are required for any motions whatever.” (Newton 
1726, 382) Accordingly, the basic problem of rational mechanics is to “discover the
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force of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other 
phenomena from these forces.” (ibid.) The concept of force is, in other words, 
characterized in relation to the concept of motion. Newton introduced two kinds of 
force, inherent and impressed force, in the Definition 3 and 4, and we can clearly 
see that the concepts refer to motion:
Definition 3: Inherent force of matter is the power of resisting by which every body, so far 
as it is able, perseveres in its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward, 
(ibid., 404)
Definition 4: Impressed force is the action exerted on a body to change its state either of 
resting or of moving uniformly straight forward, (ibid., 405)
These concepts of force are introduced without providing any clue about their nature
or inner mechanism. This is understandable given that in the Definitions Newton
provided general frameworks underlying his programme without specifying which
force, such as gravity or magnetic force, he dealt with. Yet this attitude continues
even when Newton dealt with the particular force of gravity. In the concluding
section, the General Scholium, we encounter Newton’s famous slogan against
contriving fictions of the properties of force, i.e. “Hypotheses non flngo”:
Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of 
gravity, ... I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for these 
properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the 
phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, 
or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.... 
And it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that we have set 
forth and is sufficient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea.
(ibid., 943)
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Instead, the concepts of the two forces, as pointed out in the aforementioned
Definitions, are characterized with reference to the concept of motion, that is, to
change of place. And the definitions become the basis for the first and the second
laws of motion, which in turn provide the relationship between the force and
change in the quantity of motion:
Law 1: Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight 
forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by force impressed, (ibid., 416)
Law 2: A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and takes place 
along the straight line in which that force is impressed, (ibid.)
Within these laws of motion, it is essential to distinguish (uniform rectilinear) 
inertial motions from non-inertial ones, i.e. accelerated motions. The former occurs 
in the absence of any external impressed force, whilst the latter occurs due to the 
action of an external force. Newton saw that any motion occurs because of 
combinations of these two forces. In other words, any motion can be decomposed 
into an inertial element, which occurs due to the inherent force, and a non-inertial 
element, which occurs due to the impressed force: “Projectiles persevere in their 
motions, except insofar as they are retarded by the resistance of the air and are 
impelled downward by the force of gravity.” (ibid., 416) In this way, the laws of 
motion, without referring to the properties or mechanism of inherent or impressed 
force, describe the relations of regularity between non-simultaneous events.29 The
29 Modified space-time structuralism could be criticized based on Newton’s well known attempt 
of providing a Cartesian style of explanation of gravity in terms of pressure gradients in some 
plenum. However, recall that in spite of his attempt, this mechanism is irrelevant in Newtonian 
mechanics, and its working parts are structurally characterized laws of motion.
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distinction between inertial and non-inertial motion is effected by means of the 
geometric relations between events, i.e. whether they form either uniform rectilinear 
or curved trajectories, which Wigner called “the correlations between events.”
Kinematical properties are then required in order to quantify motion. In other words, 
the state of motion can be specified through kinematical properties, such as 
locations, and spatio-temporal intervals, which have a Euclidean structure.30 
Quantitative studies of motion are thus based on the kinematical properties which 
constitute space-time structure.
We can see, then, that the concept of space-time is founded on dynamical 
information. This has been pointed out by modem commentators, such as Lange 
(1884) and Thomson (1885), and recently resuscitated by Torretti (1983) and 
DiSalle (1995). These commentators have emphasized that legitimate kinematical 
properties, can be captured only by reference to the laws of motion:
Newtonian time, like Newtonian space, is accessible only with the assistance of Newton’s 
dynamical principles. (Torretti 1983, 12)
And:
30 The conceptions of kinematics are constructed by means of geometry, since places and motions 
are defined with points and lines. And geometry plays a crucial role within Newtonian dynamics 
due to the weak principle of equivalence. The principle maintains that the trajectories of freely 
falling bodies are the same regardless of its internal constitution, i.e. whether the physical or 
chemical composition of bodies are aluminium or gold. Newton in his Principia explicitly 
endorsed the weak principle of equivalence: “the accelerative gravity, or the force that produce 
gravity is the same in all bodies universally.” (Newton 1729) The “weak” is included in the 
principle in order to distinguish it from other versions of principle of equivalence, such as strong 
principle of equivalence or Einstein’s principle of equivalence.
139
[T]he fundamental question of Newton’s Scholium was not whether space and time are 
absolute, or whether absolute space and time really exist. Instead, the question was how 
geometrical distinctions implicit in the structure of absolute space could be coordinated 
with the dynamical distinctions implicit in the accepted laws of dynamics. (DiSalle 1995, 
330)
The close connection between dynamics and kinematics has also been mentioned by
contemporary physicists such as Penrose, where Aristotelian physics is referred to
as Newtonian physics without considering Galilean relativity:
[L]et us ... try to see what kind of spacetime structure would have been appropriate for the 
dynamical framework of Aristotle and his contemporaries. In Aristotelian physics, there is a 
notion of Euclidean 3-space E3 to represent physical space, and the points of this space 
retain their identity from one moment to the next. This is because the state of rest is 
dynamically preferred, in the Aristotelian scheme, [over] all other states of motion. We 
take the attitude that a particular spatial point, at one moment of time, is the same spatial 
point, at a later moment o f time, if a particle situated at that point remains at rest from one 
moment to the next. (Penrose 2004, 383, my italics)
The above dynamical perspective can also capture the way that absolute time is
posited within Newtonian mechanics. One of the important characteristics of
Newton’s absolute time, according to Newton, stems from the objective fact that we
can decide the “order of succession” of events:
It is only through their reciprocal order and position that the parts of duration and space 
are understood to be the very ones that they truly are; and they do not have any other 
principle of individuation beside this order and position, which consequently cannot be 
altered.31 (Newton 1962, p. 103, trans. by Torretti, my italics)
31 The characterization of space-time from the orders and positions of events can be contrasted 
with substantival account of space-time: “spatiotemporal relations among such events and 
processes are parasitic on the spatiotemporal relations inherent in the substratum of space-time 
points and regions” (Earman 1989, 11). But it seems that Earman’s characterization of the 
meaning of absoluteness does not come from the reading of the Scholium. Earman’s paragraph by 
paragraph commentaries provided before his summarization of the senses of absoluteness never 
refer to Newton’s phrase which can be read as a claim that space-time is a substance.
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In characterizing the parts of space and the moments of time, Newton opposed 
individuating properties above and beyond orders and positions of physical events. 
Newton again made this clear in Principia: “all things are placed in time as to order 
of succession; and in space as to order of situation.” (Newton 1729, 19) Another 
important characteristic of absolute time is uniformity of temporal duration: 
absolute time “in itself and from its own nature flows equably without regard to 
anything external”.32 (ibid., 17) These characteristics of absolute time are only 
accessible through dynamical information since the law of inertia plays an essential 
role in determining the structure of absolute time. This is because a physical process 
keeping Newtonian time is identified as a straight uniform motion of a given body, 
which traverses equal distances in equal times. The uniform flow of time is required 
to maintain the law of inertia, because straight uniform trajectories can be turned 
into curved ones by selecting non-uniform time intervals. We can see here that the 
concept of absolute time, which sets the standard of swiftness and slowness of 
motions stems from a dynamical law that relates the events over time:
The critical question is not whether Newton successfully proves that “[the existence of] 
time is absolute” -  for this was never his purpose -  but whether his definition of absolute 
time is a good one. And in the context of the Principia, this amounts to asking, does this 
definition have objective physical content? That is, can we define equal intervals of elapsed 
time without recourse to some arbitrary standard? Is there a good physical definition of 
what it means for time intervals to be equal, even if no actual clock measures such interval
32 The phrase “time flows equably” might be interpreted as accepting the existence of medium or 
substratum underlying the process of time. But Newton made it clear that the flow of time does 
not presuppose certain medium or substratum, within which the flows take place. And the 
structure of time does not depend on the motion of any mechanical clock or standard of regular 
rotating bodies. The phrase “time flows equably,” without the ontological underpinning, is then 
understood as the structure of time, that is, the passage of equal intervals of time. So, the 
characteristic of absolute time is the structure of uniformity of the temporal duration, rather than a 
specific mode of existence of time.
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exactly? The answer is “yes”: this is precisely the definition of time implied by Newton’s 
laws of motion, which postulate an objective distinction between inertial motions, which 
cross equal distances in equal times, and motions that are accelerated by an impressive 
force. In short, an ideal clock that keeps absolute time is simply an inertial clock. (DiSalle 
2002, 39)
Furthermore, the concept of simultaneity, i.e., the existence of globally defined 
temporal intervals between any events is related to dynamical information: “we do 
not ascribe various durations to the different parts of space, but say that all endure 
together. The moment of duration is the same at Rome and at London, on Earth and 
on the stars, and throughout all the heavens33.” (Newton 1962, 137) Brown views 
this property of time as stemming from a dynamical law in a sense that this feature 
is related to positing a force acting at a distance like gravity:
In the rarified Newtonian world offree particles moving in Euclidean 3-space, there is no 
privileged notion of simultaneity, even when viewed with respect to the frame at rest 
relative to Newton’s hypothetical absolute space.
It follows that Newtonian simultaneity is a by-product of the introduction of forces into 
the theory. Indeed, Newton spread time through space in inertial frames in such a way that 
actions-at-a-distance like gravity are instantaneous and do not travel backwards in time in 
some direction. (Brown 2005, 20)
Thus the kinematical properties (Newtonian space and time) are required in order to
encode the relations of regularity between events, i.e. inertial and non-inertial
motions, which are specified by dynamical laws.
33 Absolute simultaneity between two events involves that there exist objective facts regarding 
whether or not two events occur at the same moment. The structure of absolute simultaneity 
enables us to partition every event into simultaneous classes. Accordingly, absolute time is 
characterized as absolute simultaneity and the unique temporal metric between events. From these 
two characteristics, the temporal intervals between any two events ex and e2, whether 
simultaneous or not, are well defined. If a Cartesian coordinate system is used to represent 
Newtonian space-time, the coordinates of x, y, z, and t is generally identified as three spatial 
positions and a temporal moment.
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Up to now, it has been argued that the essential aspect of both Newtonian dynamics 
is the inertial trajectories of a given body, which relate events over time. And this 
dynamical information determines which structure of space-time is appropriate to 
make sense of dynamical schemes at issue. While the state of rest within Newtonian 
dynamics requires a kinematical property of spatial points enduring over time, an 
equivalent class of inertial motions within neo-Newtonian (Galilean) dynamics 
requires an equivalence class of spatial points. Newton characterized absolute space 
as a set of locations, which are “similar and immovable”34: “Absolute space, in its 
own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and 
immovable.” (Newton 1729, 17) This phrase can be interpreted as providing a 
kinematical property of absolute rest:
[T]here is a unique, correct way to make the identification so that for any two events ex and 
e2, even ones lying in different instantaneous spaces, it is meaningful to ask, Do ex and e2 
occur at the same spatial location? (Earman 1986, 10)
By identifying the locations of events as time passes, a body’s being truly at rest is a
well-defined concept in Newtonian space-time. Because of the concept of true rest
of events, spatial distances between any two events, whether or not the events
occurs at the same time, are also well defined. In this kinematical framework,
34 The phrase “similar and immovable” can be interpreted as endorsing the conception of absolute 
space as substance. But as following quotation shows, Earman interprets the phrase “similar and 
immovable” as a structural claim. Earman in this context considers absolute space as “a 
theoretical entity,” which provides the explanation of phenomena of a given body’s motions 
(ibid.). In other words, the “similar and immovable” feature of absolute space is treated as a 
kinematical property which enables us to define absolute rest and spatial length between two 
events. At this point, Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism would views the kinematical 
property as stemming from the structure of space-time. On the contrary, the dynamical 
perspective of space-time considers the kinematical property as claiming that “there is a real 
difference between motion and rest in the same absolute place over time.” (DiSalle 2002)
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absolute motion can be defined as “the translation of a body from one absolute place 
to another.” (Newton 1729, 11)
However, this kinematical property is not supported by the dynamical information 
captured by the principle of Galilean relativity, one of the most cherished principles 
in classical mechanics. In his Corollary V to the laws of motion, Newton himself, 
recognizing a problem in positing the kinematical property of absolute rest, showed 
his belief in the relativity of motion: “The motions of bodies included in a given 
space [i.e., inertial frame] are the same among themselves, whether that space is at 
rest or whether it is moving uniformly straight forward without any circular 
motion.” (Newton 1729, 29) This suggests that a class of equivalent inertial 
trajectories of a moving body underdetermine at which point of space the body is 
located. At this point, we can clearly see the inconsistency between kinematics 
positing distinguishable individual points of space and the Galilean relativity 
principle of motion, which identifies individual points of space. Given that this 
tension is based on his rejection of certain privileged trajectories in the structure of 
space, it is doubtful that trans-temporal identity of individual points of space is what 
Newton actually intended in his overall framework. Contemporary commentators 
such as Slowik and Penrose point out that given his lack of sophisticated 
mathematical machinery, Newton had no choice but to employ kinematical 
properties, which are not supported by the dynamical laws at issue:
[S]ince Newton was intent on allocating the requisite geometrical structure to delineate
inertial motion, and since “absolute spatial position” represented the best available means
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of reaching goal, Newton would appear to have had no other choice but to violate the 
empirical import of Galilean relativity through the installation of this absolute structure. 
When Newton was faced with the dilemma of accepting either a theory too weak to render 
inertial motion coherent or one too strong to rationalize Galilean relativity, he chose the 
latter -  concluding that too much is better than incoherent! (Slowik 2000, 38)
Along these lines, we can also see that the geometry of space-time is specified by 
the transformational rules between a set of dynamically equivalent inertial frames. It 
was noted earlier that a set of inertial frames is determined by dynamical laws, 
which exhibits the regularity relations between events. Transformational rules hold 
between these coordinates. And these transformational rules reveal the geometry of 
space-time through their symmetry properties.35 In Cartesian coordinate systems, the 
spatial symmetries of Newtonian space-time can be written as x —► x’ = Rx + vt + 
Ci, where x consists of x, y, z components, R is a constant rotation matrix in SO(3) 
and Cj are real numbers. Temporal structure can also be characterized through the 
symmetry under a group of temporal translations, which actually represents 
Newton’s characterization of time: “absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, 
and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external.”
35 The characteristic groups enable us to sort out the essential elements of spatio-temporal 
relations that characterize space-time. The dynamical perspective considers the movements of an 
idealized rigid body as underlying the group. The invariance of the laws of motion under a group 
of spatial translations of the body characterizes the structure of space. In the same way, the 
invariance of the laws of motion under a group of spatio-temporal transformations characterize 
the structure of space-time. Since space-time geometry is decided by the invariants of groups of 
transformations, the geometry of space-time can be characterized by its symmetries. A specific 
symmetry, within group theoretic formulation, is defined as invariance under a specified group of 
transformations. In the coordinate system formalism of space-time, the transformation between 
coordinate systems that represents reference frames form a group. Note that the coordinate 
systems are determined by the motion of a given body, that satisfies the laws of motion. And the 
symmetries of space-time is determined by the invariant geometric structures independent of 
choosing any specific reference frame.
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(Newton 1729, 17) This uniformity can be written as t = t + C2, where t and C2 are 
real numbers. These spatial and temporal symmetries display the geometry of space­
time. The spatial and temporal intervals between two events remain invariant under 
the aforementioned coordinate transformations, and the symmetries allow mappings 
of space-time onto itself preserving absolute simultaneity and affine connection. In 
this way, space-time geometry encodes the invariance of laws.
6. Conclusion
In the previous section, we have seen that the relationships of regularity between 
events underpin inertial frames and space-time geometry. By emphasizing that the 
working parts of space-time theories are the structural properties of dynamical laws, 
a modified space-time structuralism has the advantage of clarifying the way that 
dynamical laws are associated with spatio-temporal relationships. In other words, 
space-time geometry is founded on the structural properties of dynamical laws, 
which exhibit the regularity relations between events.
Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism stresses that spatio-temporal relations 
between events consist of one essential part of space-time theories. According to the 
dynamical perspective of space-time, the spatio-temporal relations between events 
stem from the dynamical laws representing inertial or non-inertial trajectories of a 
given body. A modified space-time structuralism incorporates the strengths of 
space-time structuralism and of the dynamical perspective of space-time, such that it
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views the structural properties of dynamical laws as the essential elements of space­
time theories.
Given the strengths and the weaknesses of Dorato’s space-time structuralism, this 
chapter attempted to develop a modified version of space-time structuralism.
Dorato’s account captures a common element shared by substantivalism and 
relationism, that is, the relational property of space-time. On the other hand, the 
weakness is that by maintaining a central assumption of the traditional explanatory 
scheme of space-time, Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism is insufficient to 
capture the working part of space-time theories i.e. the dynamical laws of space­
time theories, as we have learnt from the dynamical perspective of space-time. A 
modified version of space-time structuralism attempted to integrate the strengths of 
space-time structuralism and the dynamical perspective of space-time. What is 
necessary for a plausible version of space-time structuralism is to comprehend the 
interrelationships between spatio-temporal relations, which Dorato emphasizes, and 
the dynamical contents of a theory, which the dynamical perspective emphasizes. In 
order to propose a modified version of space-time structuralism, which incorporates 
the lessons of the dynamical perspective, it was necessary to clarify the 
interrelationship between spatio-temporal relations and dynamical laws. My version 
of space-time structuralism emphasizes the relations of regularity between events, 
which underpin inertial frames and space-time geometry. In this way, a modified 
space-time structuralism has the advantage of clarifying the way that dynamical
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laws are associated with spatio-temporal relationships. Given that the essential parts 
of space-time theories are the structural properties of dynamical laws, i.e. the 
regularity relation between events, this provides the correct perspective from which 
to view the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physic. In the following 
chapters, we will see that the modified space-time structuralism supports an 
evolutionary view of this development, rather than a ‘revolutionary’ one.
148
Chapter 3
The Structuralist Account of the Development 
of the Special Theory of Relativity
1. Introduction
This chapter aims to provide a structuralist account of the theory-change from 
Newtonian mechanics to Einstein’s special relativity -  one based on the space-time 
structuralism developed in the previous chapter. The thesis is that the evolutionary 
development exhibited in this case can be brought into uniquely sharp relief when 
viewed from my modified space-time structuralism.
As pointed out in the first chapter, it is not at all straightforward to see the continuity 
in the theory-change given that there are significant differences between Newtonian 
and Minkowski space-times.1 However, by viewing their inertial structure2 as the
1 In the case of Newtonian space-time, the invariant spatio-temporal relations between any two 
events ex and e2 can be selected as follows; (1) whether ex and e2 are in a simultaneity class; (2) 
what the temporal interval is between ex and e2, (3) what the spatial interval is between ex and e2\
(4) whether two events are located at the same place. Given the principle of Galilean relativity, 
these spatio-temporal relations need to be modified to those in neo-Newtonian space-time by 
abandoning (4) and modifying (3) to (3’) what is the invariant spatial interval between two 
simultaneous events ex and e2. However, in the special theory of relativity, (1), (2), and (3’) 
become variable spatio-temporal relations dependent on the observers’ motions. But it does not at 
all mean that there are no exists any invariant spatio-temporal relations between events in the 
special theory. In this framework, the spatio-temporal distance between any two events is 
invariant, while this is variant within the earlier theory. Given that the spatio-temporal relations 
are determined from the structure of space-time and what is the intrinsic spatio-temporal relation 
between events in one theory is not intrinsic in the succeeding theory, it is easier to find the 
discontinuity in the course of the theory-change.
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essential part of these two theories, we are now in a better position to comprehend 
the common structure shared by these two theories.3 An earlier account along these 
lines was developed by Brading and Landry (2005), who argue that the inertial 
structures of Newtonian and Minkowskian space-times can be viewed as “shared 
structure between models of the theory,” showing “the relationship between 
predecessor and successor theories”:
[Sjhared structure between models of the theory can be used to tell us about the continuity 
of structure across theory change. ... [W]e compare the inertial structure of Galilean 
spacetime to that of Minkowski spacetime. Both Newtonian and Special Relativistic 
mechanics satisfy the principle of relativity, and this implies that for each theory the 
coordinate transformations between inertial frames must form a group. In the first case we 
have the Galilean group, and, in the second, the inhomogeneous Lorentz group; both the 
Galilean and Lorentz groups of transformations being permutations of R4. The relationship 
of shared structure between Newtonian mechanics and Special Relativity obtains when 
specific limiting conditions are imposed within Special Relativity. Under these conditions, 
the Lorentz transformations reduce to the Galilean transformations and so the two theories 
share the same group-structure. (Brading and Landry 2005, 17)
This emphasis on the group structure of the coordinate transformations between 
inertial frames dates back to Felix Klein’s Erlangen programme, which focuses on
2 Inertial structure is mathematically represented by the affine structure consisting of manifolds of
points and the connection. The task of this chapter is to interpret this mathematical structure.
By emphasizing inertial structures that are four-dimensional concepts, we can also see the 
commonality in the dimensionality between Newtonian space-time and Minkowski space-time. If 
we view the structures of space and time as theoretical entities represented by 3 + 1 and 4 
dimmensional manifolds, it seems that discontinuity is more essential. While classical space and 
time are seen as separate entities that are represented by 3-dimensional space and 1-dimmensional 
time, relativistic space-time is viewed as a single entity space-time represented by a 4- 
dimensional manifold. Then, Minkowski’s statement that “space by itself, and time by itself, are 
doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an 
independent reality” (Minkowski 1908, 75) can be read as providing an ontological significance 
of a single four dimensional manifold, which is clearly distinct from its classical counterpart. Yet, 
this ontological difference turns out to be insignificant given that an inertial structure is a four­
dimensional affine space. Only space-time has a enough structure to capture the inertial structure 
of Newtonian dynamics, i.e. symmetries under the Galilean transformations that relate an 
equivalence class of inertial frames.
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the formal properties of a continuous group in characterizing geometrical structure. 
According to the Erlanger programme, group theory can be employed to determine 
the essential structure of the geometry in that the genuine characteristics of the 
geometry are the invariant quantities under a group of specific transformations:
There are spatial transformations which leave the geometric properties of spatial structures 
completely unchanged. ... We designate the intention of all these transformations as the 
principal group of spatial alterations; geometric properties are not altered by 
transformations of the principal group. Also conversely one can say: geometric properties 
are characterized by their invariability under transformations o f the principal group. 
(Klein 1872, 463)
In the coordinate system formalism of space-time models, the transformations 
between coordinate systems representing inertial coordinates form a group, and the 
symmetries of that group distinguish the invariant geometric structures, 
independently of the choice of any specific reference frame. From this perspective, 
Brading and Landry maintain that a commonality of inertial structures can be 
identified in both Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. Hence we can say that this 
element is preserved in the theory-change.
This is a major step in the right direction. Yet, as pointed out in the first chapter, the 
mathematical group structure is not enough to capture fully an evolutionary 
development underlying this theory-change. One must ask also about the physical 
foundation of the group. We must take into account not only the formal aspects 
common to the two theories, but also how the evolving formalisms are given 
physical significance within them. It is possible for the shared group, which is
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exhibited by the relations between the reference frames, to have quite different 
interpretations within the context of different theories. Even if one insists on the 
shared formal structure being tied to observable phenomena in the same way, two 
quite different interpretations remain open in this particular case. One possibility is 
to view the group structure as stemming from space-time structure, which exists 
independently of particular physical objects and events. The other possibility is to 
consider the group structure as being based on dynamical laws concerning physical 
events.
This chapter will endorse the latter perspective. The basic structure of this chapter is 
to examine whether the two fundamental postulates within the special theory of the 
special theory stem from space-time structure or dynamical laws. The second 
section will introduce accounts that attempt to capture the two postulates through 
the former, which is elaborated by Janssen and Norton. The third section provides 
criticisms of their view, and instead argues that the problems of the space-time view 
(that considers the two postulates as stemming from the structure of space-time) can 
be remedied within modified space-time structuralism (that views the two postulates 
as expressing the relationships between events, which are specified by dynamical 
equations of electrodynamics). The fourth section will argue that the theory-change 
from Newtonian mechanics to the special theory of relativity can be viewed as 
essentially continuous if the two postulates are compared with their counterparts
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within Newtonian mechanics from the perspective of modified space-time 
structuralism.
2. Accounts of the Theory-Change Emphasizing the Structure of Space-Time
In the context of the theory-change from Newtonian mechanics to Einstein’s special 
theory of relativity, we find a view close to Dorato’s in the writings of Janssen 
(1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). He holds that in the case of Minkowski space-time, the 
common cause for the behaviours of physical events stems from the “causally 
efficacious structure” of space-time. This concept of “causally efficacious structure” 
is developed by using Salmon’s notion of causal explanation that is characterized by 
“causal interactions” and “causal processes,” which involve the exchange of 
conserved quantities such as energy, or momentum.4
4 In Salmon’s early characterization of causal processes, a causal process is a process capable of 
transmitting marks. (Salmon 1984) What transmission of a mark consists in is that the mark 
occurs “at” each successive point at each successive instant. Salmon’s idea of mark transmission 
is devised to distinguish pseudo-processes from the genuine ones, because pseudo-processes are 
lack of ability of transmitting marks. And another component of his explanation is a causal 
interaction that occurs when one causal process intersects another and produces a modification of 
its structure.
However, Kitcher (1989) points out that, because of the dependence of counterfactuals, Salmon’s 
characterization of causal processes cannot correctly capture a causal structure itself. The 
definition of mark transmission is based on counterfactual, because whether mark transmission 
occurs depends on how it would behave if unmarked. Since the truth values of counterfactuals, on 
which the definition of Salmon’s causal processes depends, is not available by empirical tests, 
causal structure is not empirically accessible on the Salmon’s theory.
Given this criticism, Salmon gives up his early causal mechanical model that depends on mark 
transmission, and develops a new conserved quantity theory. Salmon seriously considers the 
problem of counterfactual and elaborates the definition of causal processes that is free of 
counterfactual contents.
Salmon’s conserved quantity theory analyses causal interactions and causal processes, both of 
which are now defined by conserved quantities such as energy, or momentum. For example,
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Minkowski space-time certainly explains length contraction, but it hardly qualifies as a 
causally efficacious substance. This objection can be avoided by broadening Salmon’s 
concept of causation ... The COI [common origin inference] in this case is to a structure 
rather than a substance. (Janssen 2002a, 501)
According to Janssen, the essential part in the development of the special theory of 
relativity can be captured in the structure of space-time. This is best reflected in a 
single.sentence in Stachel’s “Einstein on the theory of relativity” prepared for the 
editorial notes to Einstein’s seminal paper “On the Electrodynamics of Moving 
Bodies”:
Einstein was the first physicist to formulate clearly the kinematical foundation for all of 
physics inherent in Lorentz’s electron theory. (Stachel et al. 1989, 253)
Janssen comments:
If I were allowed one single sentence to describe the breakthrough Einstein achieved with 
special relativity, this would be the one. No doubt about it. This one sentence, I claim, sets 
the agenda for the rational reconstruction of the history of special relativity. (Janssen 1995)
Janssen considers this “kinematical foundation” as stemming from the structure of 
space-time, as is elaborated by Minkowski. Janssen views the existence of space­
time structure as the “common cause” of the Lorentz invariance of Maxwell’s 
equations and of other laws governing physical interactions.
[F]rom a modem point of view, the central innovation of Einstein’s 1905 paper is the 
reinterpretation of Lorentz invariance, a well-known feature of the formalism of Lorentz’s 
theory, as reflecting a new space-time structure. ... [T]he strongest argument for this 
reinterpretation is that it traces the Lorentz invariance of Maxwell’s equations and the 
Lorentz invariance of other physical laws to a common cause, namely this new space-time 
structure. (Janssen 2002b, 430, my emphasis)
when the cue ball collides with the other ball, they causally interact with each other in a way that 
they exchange energy. On the other hand, white coloured chalk on the cue ball does not satisfy 
the condition to be a conserved quantity that transmits between the two balls, since the path of 
chalk is not a world line involving exchange of a conserved quantity.
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Janssen earlier (1995) endorsed the contemporary philosophy of space-time, which 
characterizes space-time as “a differentiable manifold dressed up with a metric field 
and maybe other geometric object fields encoding its metric and affine properties.” 
Although Einstein was silent about the elementary material substance underlying the 
special theory, Minkowski space-time, according to Janssen, does this job:
Special relativity, unlike the electromagnetic program, does not make any claims about the 
constitution of matter. The theory only imposes the constraint that all physical laws be 
Lorentz invariant. The reason Einstein did not want to commit himself to anything more 
specific was that he recognized that physics was in for another major overhaul, this one 
coming from quantum phenomena. ... With the introduction o f Minkowski space-time, 
however, it becomes a constructive theory. Minkowski space-time is the structure 
responsible for all the effects derivable from special relativity alone. Special relativity, 
from this point of view, replaced Newtonian space and time by Minkowski space-time and 
does not make any claims about the contents of the new space-time other than that their 
spatio-temporal behaviour had better accord with Minkowski’s new rules. (Janssen 2002a, 
505-6, my emphasis)
Janssen claims that the structure of space-time -  its postulated metric -  provides an 
elementary constructive foundation for the special theory, and the structure of 
space-time can be viewed as more primitive than the behaviour of any given body. 
Hence, the space-time theory based on the Minkowski metric is a “constructive 
theory.” What Minkowski’s spacetime does for the special theory of relativity is 
what Boltzman’s statistical mechanics does for thermodynamics.
Janssen’s view can be considered as sharing an intuition with Dorato’s in that both 
emphasize the structure of space-time: “Special relativity ... does not make any 
claims about the contents of the new space-time other than that their spatio-temporal
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behaviour had better accord with Minkowski’s new rules.” And given Janssen’s 
view that Minkowski space-time is a constructive element providing “a picture of 
the more complex phenomena out of materials of the more simple scheme,”
(Einstein 1919) he also endorses the independent existence of space-time structure.
Another clear explanation of this position can be identified within Norton’s writings, 
which basically endorse Janssen’s view that the dynamical effects are due to the 
structure of space-time: “Einstein shows us that forces of all types must transform 
alike because they inhabit the same space and time.” (Norton 2004) Norton in fact 
claims that the hypothesis of the constancy of the speed of light along with the 
principle of relativity can be viewed as stemming from the properties of space-time 
itself:
This constancy [o f the speed of light] is somehow built into the essence o f space and time 
according to the theory; spaces and times repeatedly contort themselves in order to 
preserve its constancy for all inertial frames of reference. We must of course recover from 
the novice error that there is something special about light that brings all this about. In 
principle, light -  electromagnetic radiation -  has nothing to do with it. Special relativity 
would say the same things about space and time in a completely dark universe. The real 
result is that there is a special speed built into the structure o f space and time and, in 
seeking to go as fast as it can, light happens to travel at that speed. (Norton 2000, my 
emphasis)
Although it is possible that Norton’s claims about spaces and times “contort[ing] 
themselves” are meant metaphorically, he surely holds the view that the constancy 
of the speed of light is a property of space-time in a straightforward literal sense.
This line of thought regarding the principle of relativity was also identified within 
Norton’s writings by Brown (1993, 251):
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[The principle of relativity in the special theory] does not arise as a fundamental postulate 
of special relativity, but as an important theorem dependent on the symmetries of the 
Minkowski metric [as space-time structure]. (Norton 1989, my emphasis)
More specifically, a model of space-time of the special theory of relativity consists
of a dynamically allowed triple < M, gab, Tab >, where M  is a four dimensional
space-time manifold representing a set of events, gab is the Minkowski metric
(which specifies the spatio-temporal relations between events) and Tab is a dynamic
tensor field (representing the distribution of matter). Norton then defines the
principle of relativity in special relativity as follows:
Principle o f Relativity (Special Relativity): If < Ms gab, Tab > is a model of a special 
relativistic theory and F  and F' are any two inertial frames, then the theory satisfies the 
principle of relativity only if there exists a member L of the symmetry group of the 
Minkowski metric gab such that
(a) L maps F  onto F ’ and
(b) < M, gab, L*Tab > is also a model of [the special relativistic theory]. (Norton 1989, 
1251-2).
Brown (1993, 250-1) interprets Norton as claiming that only the first condition 
follows from the complete equivalence of all inertial frames, which represents the 
symmetry of space-time associated with the principle of relativity:
Norton in fact recognises that condition (b) does not strictly follow from the nature of the 
symmetry automorphism L. His point is that insofar as PR is a ‘theorem’ it is encapsulated 
in condition (a ) ... which “reminds us that the Minkowski space-time itself designates no 
inertial frame as preferred” -  the metrical structure is preserved under change of frame. 
Condition (b) then independently
... stipulates that the [laws governing] additional structures defined on space-time, such 
as Maxwell fields or mechanical fluids, likewise do not distinguish any inertial frame 
as preferred. (Norton 1989, 1252)
As pointed out earlier, Brown (1993, 251) asserts that Janssen and Norton’s views
involve a particular ontological attitude -  one which views space-time geometry as
being “ontologically prior to the ‘additional [dynamical] structures,’ like fields,
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defined on the manifold.” Norton can thus be interpreted as viewing the principle of 
relativity as a property of the structure of space-time, which is independent of the 
dynamical laws governing material contents. Accordingly, “the shared structure” 
specified by the principle of relativity, pointed out by Brading and Landry, is 
concerned with that of the space-times of Newtonian mechanics and the special 
theory of relativity.
Janssen (2002a, 2004) and Norton (2005) also provide accounts of the development 
of the special theory of relativity as a modification of the space-time structure 
responsible for the dynamical laws of electrodynamics and optics. Their accounts, 
of course, emphasize on the concept of space-time.
Janssen (2002a, 2004) claims that Einstein’s well-known account of the 
asymmetries in the electro-magnetic interaction between a magnet and a wire leads 
ultimately to a view concerning the concept of space-time. Einstein, as is well 
known, showed his unease about the quite different theoretical accounts supplied by 
classical physics of (a) the case with a wire at rest in the ether while a magnet 
approaches and (b) the case with a magnet at rest in the ether while a wire 
approaches.5 Einstein claimed:
5 A reason that made Einstein give up the concept of the immobile ether came from a 
consideration of the electrodynamic interaction between a magnet and a wire. Einstein referred to 
the following two cases in order to show a failure of Lorentz’s ether theory in detecting the state 
of rest: (a) the case with a wire at rest in the ether while a magnet approaches and (b) the case 
with a magnet at rest in the ether while a wire approaches. Although it seems that these two cases 
are symmetric because their relative velocities and registered currents in the wire are identical,
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The existence of the electric field was therefore a relative one, dependent on the coordinate 
system used, and only the electric and magnetic field taken together could be ascribed some 
kind of objective reality. This phenomenon of electromagnetic induction forced me to 
postulate the [...] relativity principle. (Einstein 1919, Stachel et al., Vol. 7, 264-5)
In other words, there exists only a magnetic component in the electromagnetic field
in case (b), whereas both electric and magnetic components in the electromagnetic
field contribute in case (a). Although they have different theoretical explanations,
Einstein saw that these two cases are completely interchangeable because these two
cases are different only with respect to reference frames moving with different
velocities. (So, according to the principle of relativity, the dynamical laws
describing the two cases are identical.) Einstein employed this argument to show the
failure of Lorentzian ether theory to detect the state of rest. According to Janssen
(2004), this account amounts to a claim concerning space-time structure:
Maxwell’s theory is compatible with the relativity principle if it can be shown that the 
observer measuring the Lorentz-transformed electric and magnetic fields E ’ and B ’ also 
measures the Lorentz-transformed space and time coordinates (x\ t )  (Janssen 2004, my 
italics).
While in his (2002) he writes:
Special relativity not only merges the electric and the magnetic field into one 
electromagnetic field, it also merges space and time into space-time, and energy and 
momentum into energy-momentum. ... [T]he new theory posits one structure to account for 
phenomena that were attributed to various structures in the old one (Janssen 2002a, 505, 
my italics).
theoretical explanations for the two cases, according to Lorentzian ether theory, are quite 
different. Faraday’s law explains case (a): the approaching magnet induces the electric field, 
which causes electrons in the wire to move. As for case (b), on the other hand, the explanation is 
that while electrons in the wire move through the magnetic field, a Lorentz force, which is 
generated from the magnetic field, causes electrons move throughout the wire. Einstein felt it 
puzzling to explain the two obviously symmetric phenomena so differently. Although the two 
explanations produced by Lorentz’s theory based on the ether are different, the “asymmetries do 
not appear to be inherent in the phenomena.” (Einstein et al., 1954, 37)
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Norton (1992, 183) also emphasizes the essential role of the concept of space-time
in Einstein’s account establishing the principle of relativity in electrodynamics.
Einstein in his (1905) stated that this was motivated from the asymmetries in the
Lorentzian ether theory’s description of electro-magnetic interaction and the failure
of a set of optical experiments that attempted to detect the motion of the earth
relative to the immobile ether (“one truly immobile space”):6
Examples of this sort, together with the unsuccessful attempts to discover any motion of the 
earth relative to the “light medium,” suggest that the phenomena of electrodynamics as well 
as of mechanics possess no properties corresponding to the idea of absolute rest. They 
suggest rather that, as has already been shown to the first order of small quantities, the 
same laws of electrodynamics and optics will be valid for all frames of reference for which 
the equations of mechanics hold good [in all inertial spaces]. We will raise this conjecture 
(the purport of which will hereafter be called the “Principle of Relativity”) to the status of a 
postulate ... The introduction of a “luminiferous ether” will prove to be superfluous 
inasmuch as the view here to be developed will not require an “absolutely stationary space” 
provided with special properties . . . .  (Einstein 1905)
The last sentence (along with the aforementioned interpretation of the prinicple of
relativity), since it is concerned essentially with a kinematical property based on the
structure of space-time, seems to imply that the development of Einstein’s special
theory is indeed about the structure of space-time:
6 In the early 20th century, then current two overarching theoretical frameworks, i.e. Newtonian 
dynamics and Maxwell’s Electrodynamics, seemed to have a problem of inconsistency. Whilst 
Electrodynamics predicted that light, as an electromagnetic wave, propagated at the speed of c, 
this seemed impossible according to Newtonian kinematics. At that time, it was widely assumed 
that light was propagated through an immobile medium known as the ether, with respect to which 
Maxwell’s equations were assumed to hold. Given this assumption and Newtonian kinematics, it 
can be inferred that the speed of light cannot be constant in a frame at rest with respect to the 
Earth. Since the Earth is moving with respect to the ether, the velocity of light with respect to the 
Earth is the vector sum of the velocity of the light with respect to the ether and the velocity of the 
Earth with respect to the ether. In this context, it seems that Norton (1992) reads the concept of 
space-time as essential in Einstein’s account that the negative results of a series of optical 
experiments, which tried to detect the change of velocity of light, led him to think of the concept 
of the luminiferous ether identified the “one truly immobile space,” as “an idle metaphysical 
conception.”
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With these words, Einstein introduced the principle of relativity to this theory. The 
principle asserts, in effect, that the laws of mechanics, electrodynamics and optics are to 
hold equally well in all inertial spaces. (Einstein picks out the inertial spaces indirectly as 
those “for which the equations of mechanics hold good.”) Newton’s quest for the one truly 
immobile space among them is to be abandoned. (Norton 1992, 183)
The above emphasis on the structure of space-time seems to be consistent with
Einstein’s elimination of the apparent inconsistency between the principle of
relativity and the constancy of the speed of light. Because the speed of light is taken
to be a constant c with respect to all observers, it seems that a state of absolute rest
exists, with respect to which the speed of light is constant. However, this conflicts
with the principle of relativity, which rules out a state of absolute rest. Einstein
resolved this apparent inconsistency by giving up the concept of absolute time,
while maintaining the principle of relativity. From reflection on the concept of
simultaneity, Einstein argued that the principle of relativity and the constancy of the
speed of light are compatible if one abandons the absolute concept of simultaneity
between spatially distant events. Instead, observers in relative motion disagree on
which spatially distant events are simultaneous:
[BJefore relativity theory, simultaneity was taken to be a two place relation between events. 
Events A and B could be simultaneous simpliciter, after relativity theory, it was recognized 
that events A and B can be simultaneous only with respect to an observer or frame of 
reference. (Norton 2005, 16)
Accordingly, “use of the older concept had required the tacit presumption that 
judgements of simultaneity are independent of observer or frame of reference.” 
(ibid.) While within Newtonian space-time the temporal relationships between two
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events are invariant regardless of the choice of observers, within Minkowski space­
time the temporal relationships between two events are different dependent on the 
choice of observers. In contrast, what is invariant within Minkowski space-time is 
the combination of the spatial and temporal intervals between events, so that an 
invariant space-time is consistent with the constancy of the speed of light and the 
principle of relativity. In this way, the spatio-temporal structures of Newtonian 
physics are modified to the ones of Einstein’s special theory:
Since judgements of simultaneity arise through kinematics, Einstein now needed to 
ascertain how our traditional notions of space and time must be modified to accommodate 
this new result o f the relativity of simultaneity. That accommodation is the working out of 
the special theory of relativity, a new theory of space and time. (Norton 2005, 14)
The theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, from this point of view, 
can be described as essentially involving a modification of the posited structure of 
space-time: “one truly immobile space” is replaced by spaces and times that 
“repeatedly contort themselves in order to preserve [the constancy of the speed of 
light] for all inertial frames of reference.” (Norton 2001)
3. Criticisms of Janssen and Norton’s Space-Time View
Janssen and Norton’s view can be summarized as follows:
(1) The structure of Minkowski space-time is a causally efficient one that is 
“responsible for all the effects derivable from special relativity.” (Janssen 2002a, 
54)
(2) The light postulate and the principle of special relativity are the intrinsic 
properties of space-time. According to Norton, the speed of light is “a special speed 
built into the structure of space and time” (Norton 2000), and the principle of
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special relativity arises “as an important theorem dependent on the symmetry of the 
Minkowski metric.” (Norton 1989)
(3) The common group representing the inertial structures within Newtonian 
mechanics and the special theory of relativity, which Brading and Landry point out, 
stems from the structure of space-time.
(4) The development of Minkowski space-time can, therefore, be characterized as a 
modification of the structure of Newtonian space-time to retain the principle of 
relativity, while accommodating the hypothesis of the constancy of the speed of 
light.
I will argue in this section that, in fact,
(1’) Minkowski space-time does not provide a causal explanation of the phenomena 
derivable from the special theory of relativity.
(2’) Instead, the special theory offers a structural explanation that specifies 
“structural constraints [involved in the equations that express the dynamical laws of 
electrodynamics] that events are held to satisfy.” (Bub 1974, 143) The light 
postulate and the principle of special relativity encode structural information 
concerning the relationships between events, which are specified by the dynamical 
laws of electrodynamics, rather than by the intrinsic properties of space-time. 
Accordingly, the kinematical properties that are derived from these two postulates 
also capture the structural relationships between events.
(3’) The group structure common to Newtonian mechanics and the special theory of 
relativity is based on dynamical behaviours of material bodies: the group in the 
former case stems from the movements of body, the group in the latter stems from 
the behaviours of bodies and light pulses.
(4’) It will be argued in the next section that rather than Janssen and Norton’s 
conclusion (4), we should infer that an accurate account of the theory-change from 
Newtonian mechanics to the special theory of relativity must emphasize the 
essential continuity in their dynamical principles, such as the principle of inertia and 
the principle of relativity.
Janssen’s claim (1), that Minkowski space-time provides causal explanations of the 
phenomena derivable from the special theory, fails because it omits essential 
constituents of causal explanation. According to Salmon’s account, a legitimate
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causal explanation should provide ‘causal interactions’ and ‘causal processes.’ But, 
remember that Minkowski’s account of space-time does not involve any causal 
interactions and causal processes.
This shortcoming is further underlined by a recent development of the concept of 
mechanism. According to McChamer, Darden and Craver (2000, 2-3),
[M]echanisms are sought to explain how a phenomenon comes about or how some significant 
process works. Specifically:
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.
... Mechanisms are composed of both entities (with their properties) and activities. Activities 
are the producers of change. Entities are the things that engage in activities. ... Entities often 
must be appropriately located, structured, and oriented, and the activities in which they 
engage must have a temporal order, rate, and duration. ... Mechanisms are regular in that 
they work always or for the most part in the same way under the same conditions. The 
regularity is exhibited in the typical way that the mechanism runs from beginning to end ... 
Complete descriptions of mechanisms exhibit productive continuity without gaps from the set 
up to termination conditions. Productive continuities are what make the connections between 
stages intelligible.
Given that Janssen follows Salmon’s line of causal explanation, one way to support 
his view is to clarify the mechanism of space-time structure generating the behaviours 
of bodies. Yet, it is certainly not true that the explanation of phenomena provided by 
space-time theories satisfy the above standard of ‘mechanism.’ Although space-time 
can be considered as somehow being an entity, what are its “activities” that produce 
the motions of a given body? And what are the “productive continuities” involved in 
space-time? Until these are clarified, space-time theories cannot be viewed as 
providing a mechanism that produces the behaviours of a given body.
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Brown and Pooley (2006) criticize Janssen’s claims along similar lines:
[A]s matter of logic alone, if one postulates space-time structure as a self-standing, 
autonomous element in one’s theory, it need have no constraining role on the form of the 
laws governing the rest of content of the theory’s models. So how is its influence on these 
laws supposed to work? Unless this question is answered, space-time’s Minkowskian 
structure cannot be taken to explain the Lorentz covariance of the dynamical laws. (Brown 
and Pooley 2006, 84, my italics)
According to Brown and Pooley, Janssen’s common origin inference also fails to 
clarify why the structure of space-time should be the cause of the Lorentz invariance 
of Maxwell’s equations or the Lorentz invariance of any other physical law:
One might... go so far as to agree that all particular instances of paradigmatically 
relativistic kinematic behaviour are traceable to a common origin: the Lorentz covariance 
of the laws of physics. But Janssen wants us to go further. He wants us to then ask after the 
common origin of this universal Lorentz covariance. It is his claim that this can be traced to 
the space-time structure posited by Minkowski that is never clarified, (ibid., 85)
From the above perspectives, Brown and Pooley can be understood as making a
claim that Janssen’s view is not tenable because he fails to clarify the “causal
processes and interactions” (in Salmon’s term) or “mechanism” (in Darden,
Machamer and Craver’s term) originated from space-time, which generates “all
particular instances of paradigmatically relativistic kinematical behaviour.”
DiSalle’s argument introduced in the last section can also be applied to show that 
Minkowski space-time supplies no causal explanation:
To claim that space is Euclidean only means that measurements agree with the Euclidean 
metric; Euclidean geometry, if true, can’t causally explain those measurements, because it 
only expresses the constraints to which those measurements will conform. (DiSalle 1995, 
324)
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As Janssen himself (2002a, 429) points out, “there are important parallels between 
the geometry of Minkowski space-time and the standard Euclidean geometry of 
ordinary space”:
The choice of a particular inertial frame in Minkowski space-time is similar to the choice of 
a particular set of orthogonal axes to serve as a Cartesian coordinate system in Euclidean 
space. Using the space-time coordinates of such inertial frames, one can compute lengths 
and distances in Minkowski space-time with a formula similar to the Pythagorean theorem 
used when computing lengths and distances in terms of Cartesian coordinates in Euclidean 
space. A Lorentz transformation to get from one inertial frame in Minkowski space-time to 
another is similar to the rotation of a set of orthogonal axes in Euclidean space to get from 
one Cartesian coordinate system to another. The freedom to pick any inertial frame in 
Minkowski space-time is reflected in the invariance under Lorentz transformations of all 
laws governing physical systems in Minkowski space-time just as the freedom to pick any 
Cartesian coordinate system in Euclidean space is reflected in the invariance under spatial 
rotations of all laws governing physical systems in Euclidean space, (ibid.)
According to Einstein:
[Minkowski] also showed that the Lorentz-transformation (apart from a different algebraic 
sign due to the special character of time) is nothing but a rotation of the coordinate system 
in the four-dimensional space. (Einstein 1969, 59)
Substituting Minkowski geometry for Euclidean geometry, DiSalle’s criticism also
applies to the special theory. Just as the structure of Euclidean geometry does not
causally explain its laws, such as the Pythagorean theorem, the structure of
Minkowski geometry does not cause the phenomena derivable from the special
theory of relativity.
It seems that the above argument is consistent with Einstein’s own account in his 
Autobiographical notes, where the role of the geometry of Minkowski space-time 
was viewed simply as a convenient mathematical formalism which codifies the 
dynamical laws of the special theory:
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Minkowski’s important contribution to the theory [the geometry of Minkowski space-time] 
lies in the following: Before Minkowski’s investigation it was necessary to carry out a 
Lorentz-transformation on a law in order to test its invariance under such transformations; 
he, on the other hand, succeeded in introducing a formalism such that the mathematical 
form of the law itself guarantees its invariance under Lorentz-transformations. (ibid., my 
italics)
In other words, the laws expressing electrodynamics are codified within the 
invariance of Minkowski geometry.
So much for my criticism of step (1) of Janssen’s and Norton’s argument. I will now 
turn to the second step. Modem commentators on the special theory suggest that, 
contrary to Janssen’s and Norton’s (2), what Einstein’s special relativity provides is 
a structural explanation. We can see the two characteristics of a structural 
explanation in Hughes (1987) and DiSalle (2006).
The first characteristic is captured by Hughes (1987), who basically claims that
structural explanations provide structural constraints that events are held to satisfy.
He takes the light postulate in the special theory as an example showing that it
provides a structural constraint on the relationships between events by dictating the
maximum velocity that each event can reach:
[A] much better answer would involve sketching the models of space-time which special 
relativity provides and showing that in these models, for a certain pair o f events, not only is 
their spatial separation x proportional to their temporal separation t, but the quantity x/t is 
invariant across admissible (that is, inertial) coordinate systems; further, for all such pairs, 
x/t always has the same value. This answer makes no appeal to causality; rather it points 
out structural features of the models that special relativity provides. It is, in fact, an 
example of a structural explanation. (Hughes 1989, 256-7)
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The second characteristic of a structural explanation is that the above structural 
constraints between events stems from laws of electrodynamics, which are captured 
by Maxwell equations, rather than from their underlying entities and mechanisms.
In other words, the structure of Minkowski space-time stems from the laws of 
electrodynamics:
Minkowski space-time is not presented as a deeper sort of reality underlying the 
phenomena described by Einstein, explaining them as, say, the kinetic theory of gases 
explains the phenomena described by the ideal gas law. A more careful assertion would be 
one that acknowledged, at least, that a very different kind of explanation is at work. 
Minkowski space-time has been described as providing a “structural explanation” (see 
Hughes 1987): the phenomena are to be explained by the fact that the world is a model of a 
certain structure. But then in this way, the explanation would have to be that the world 
conforms to Einstein’s relativity principle because it is a model of Minkowski space-time. 
Then the seeming explanatory character is misleading. ... In order to explain the physical 
meaning of the Minkowski structure, we could do little more than make the same assertion 
in reverse: the world has that structure because the laws o f electromagnetic propagation 
are the fundamental invariants. (DiSalle 2006, 115-6, my italics)
Hence, structural explanations, in our context, can be characterized as ones that 
provide structural constraints between events, which are specified by equations that 
express the laws of electrodynamics. These two characteristics of structural 
explanations can be identified within the fundamental postulates of the special 
theory of relativity.
The first characteristic is obvious in the light postulate. Instead of capturing its 
underlying mechanism, the light postulate describes the structure constraining 
events, specifying “a special velocity at each event” (Norton 2000), which is 
encoded in Maxwell’s equations. As pointed out earlier, this structure constraining 
events is captured by Hughes as follows: “for a certain pair of events, not only is
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their spatial separation x proportional to their temporal separation t, but the quantity 
x/t is invariant across admissible (that is, inertial) coordinate systems; further, for all 
such pairs, x/t always has the same value.” (Hughes 1989, 256)
The second characteristic in a structural explanation can also be found in the light 
postulate; the light postulate stems from Maxwell equations, rather than its 
underlying mechanism. Einstein (1907) states that the light postulate came from 
Maxwell-Lorentz theory:
It is by no means natural to expect that the hypothesis stated above, which we call the 
principle of the constancy of the velocity of light, should be actually satisfied in nature, yet 
-  at least for a coordinate system of a certain state of motion -  it is made likely by the 
confirmations which Lorentz’s theory, that is based on the assumption of an absolutely 
resting ether, have obtained by experiment. (Einstein 1907)
However, Einstein was sceptical of mechanism underlying Maxwell equations in 
that “Maxwell’s equations did not permit the derivations of the equilibrium of the 
electricity which constitutes a particle”7:
[T]he bearing of the Lorentz transformation transcended its connection with Maxwell’s 
equations ... Maxwell’s theory did not account for the micro-structure of radiation and 
could therefore have no general validity. (Einstein 1955, a letter to Carl Seelig)
The then current version of Maxwell’s theory that implied the constancy of light
speed was underpinned by the Lorentzian ether. This provided the medium of
propagation of electromagnetic waves including, of course, light pulses. The
7 Given Planck’s work on black-body radiation implying energy-quantization of light, Einstein 
expressed doubts about whether the classical mechanics is valid at the micro-level: “All my 
attempts ... to adapt the theoretical foundations of physics to [Plank’s work] failed completely. It 
was as if the ground had been pulled out from under one[’s feet], with no firm foundation to be 
seen anywhere, upon which one could be built.” (ibid., 45)
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Lorentzian ether, at the early stages of its development, was viewed as providing a 
medium possessing mechanical properties, through which light is supposed to 
propagate. In contrast, at the later stages of its development, the ether was attributed 
no mechanical properties, but instead simply regarded as the ‘seat’ of the 
electromagnetic field. (Earman 1989, 51, Brown 1993, 229) Einstein also pointed 
out that the ether became superfluous in the development of the special theory. Yet, 
despite the rejection of the mechanism of the ether as a theoretical entity, the 
legitimacy of Maxwell’s equations was unquestioned because of their empirical 
success:
If mechanics was to be maintained as the foundation of physics, Maxwell’s equations had 
to be interpreted mechanically. This was zealously but fruitlessly attempted, while the 
equations were proving themselves fruitful in mounting degrees. (Einstein 1969, 25, my 
italics)
In the same spirit, Brown points out:
[I]n the Lorentz theory of the electron, developed from 1890 onwards, the ether lost its 
mechanical status; it was a new kind of imponderable matter, no thing more than the seat of 
the electromagnetic field . . . .  Thus Lorentz could provide no obvious explanation for light- 
speed constancy in the ether rest frame, other than the fact that it was a consequence of his 
fundamental field equations. (Brown 1993, p.229-230, my italics)
So these accounts can be viewed as further support for structural realism. As Duhem
stated, “what is essential in Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s equations” (Duhem
1954, 221-2). These “symbolize physical magnitudes which must be either
measurable experimentally or formed from other measurable magnitudes.” (ibid.,
223)
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The second characteristic of a structural explanation is also manifest in the principle
of relativity. In other words, the principle of relativity is a structural property of the
laws of electrodynamics.
[N]ot only the phenomena of mechanics but also those of electrodynamics have no 
properties that correspond to the concept of absolute rest. Rather, the same laws of 
electrodynamics and optics will be valid for all frames o f reference for which the equations 
of mechanics hold goo d ... [which postulate] will hereafter be called “principle of 
relativity” (Einstein 1905, my italics)
Accordingly, the Lorentz transformations codifies the laws of electrodynamics. 
General laws of nature are co-variant with respect to Lorentz transformations.
This is a definite mathematical condition that the theory o f relativity demands o f a natural 
law, and in virtue of this, the theory becomes a valuable heuristic aid in the search for 
general laws of nature. (Einstein 1917, my italics)
The principle of relativity is also considered as providing constraints on the 
relationships between events, which are represented by rigid bodies, clocks, and 
light signals:
Like all electrodynamics, [the special theory of relativity] to be developed here is based on 
the kinematics of a rigid body, since the assertions o f any such theory have to do with the 
relations among rigid bodies (coordinate systems), clocks, and electromagnetic processes. 
(Einstein 1905, my italics)
In other words, it provides “structural constraints [specified by electrodynamics]
that events are held to satisfy” (Bub 1974, 143) without referring to their underlying
hypothetical material constitutions.
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This characteristic of the principle of relativity is also captured by Wigner (1967): 
“the correlations between events, are the entities to which symmetry laws apply8.” 
(Wigner 1967, 19) The principle of special relativity states that the dynamical laws 
of a given body in a rest frame are the same as when they are referred to any 
uniformly moving frame. In other words, the physics of a body at rest or in uniform 
motion is exactly the same. In this way, the principle of relativity provides a 
symmetry relation between a set of events, which identifies apparently distinct 
states of motion of a body (the state of rest and uniform motion).
More importantly, the aforementioned characteristics of a structural explanation can 
be found in Einstein’s own methodological remarks about his special theory. 
According to Einstein (1919), the special theory based on the two fundamental 
hypotheses, i.e. the light postulate and the principle of special relativity, is a 
“principle theory” which provides “general characteristics of natural processes” by 
means of “mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the 
theoretical representation o f  them have to satisfy.” (Einstein 1919, 228) A 
“principle theory” is to be contrasted with a “constructive theory.” And the latter 
“attempt[s] to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the
8 In the same vein, Einstein (1907) mentioned the structural characteristic of the principle of 
relativity:
The principle of relativity, or, more exactly, the principle of relativity together with the 
principle of the constancy of velocity of light, is not to be conceived as a “complete system ”, 
in fact, not as a system at all, but merely as a heuristic principle which, when considered by 
itself, contains only statements about rigid bodies, clocks, and light signals. It is only by 
requiring relations between otherwise seemingly unrelated laws that the theory of relativity 
provides additional statements. (Einstein 1907, my italics)
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materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out.” (ibid.) 
According to Flores (2000), Einstein’s own distinction between the two types of 
theories is in fact a threefold one:
First, Einstein distinguishes principle and constructive theories by what these theories 
postulate as their starting points. One can regard this as an ontological distinction: 
constructive theories postulate the existence o f ‘entities’ (with specific properties) while 
principle theories postulate general physical principles that govern the behaviour of matter. 
Second, principle and constructive theories are distinguished by how we come to know 
their starting points. This is an epistemological distinction. The ‘principles’ or ‘postulates’ 
of a principle theory are empirically discovered. ... On the other hand, the starting points of 
a constructive theory are ‘free creations of the human mind,’ as Einstein might say, and 
thus are not empirically discovered. Finally, principle and constructive theories also differ 
because they play distinct conceptual roles in scientific theorizing. Principle theories 
establish constraints that the theoretical descriptions of phenomena offered by 
constructive theories must satisfy. (Flores 2000)
Given these three distinctions, we can see that these two different types of theories
are based on the aforementioned two different types of explanations, i.e., causal and
structural explanations. First of all, the postulated “entities” introduced in a
constructive theory fit well with Duhem’s characterization of the explanatory parts,
which is based on “judgements about the nature of things,” aim to provide “the
reality underlying the phenomena.” (Duhem 1914) In particular, constructive
theories aim to provide a causal mechanism, which “opens up the black boxes of
nature to reveal their inner workings.” (Salmon 1989, 182) Furthermore, just as
Duhem held that explanatory parts are not empirically based, so Einstein held that
the entities introduced by a constructive theory are not empirically discovered but
are instead results of “free creations of human mind.” Second, empirically based
principles or postulates fit well with Poincare and Worrall’s “structure revealing the
relations among things [or events].” Just as the latter are based on the “experimental
laws,” which provide “structural constraints that [separate] events are held to
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satisfy” the former “establishes constraints that the theoretical descriptions of 
phenomena offered by constructive theories must satisfy.” Principle theories can, 
therefore, be considered as providing structural explanations.
Einstein returned to this methodological issue in his Autobiographical Notes (1969):
By and by I despaired o f the possibility o f discovering the true laws by means of 
constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer and the more despairingly I tried, the 
more I came to conviction that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead 
us to assured results. The example I saw before me was thermodynamics. The general 
principle was there given in the theorem: the laws of nature are such that it is impossible to 
construct aperpetuum mobile (of the first and second kind). (Einstein 1969, 53, my italics)
Just as the laws of thermodynamics provide structural constraints over thermal
phenomena such as the impossibility of the construction of a perpetuum mobile, the
two postulates provide a set of structural constraints over the relationships between
events. And these two postulates are the fundamental principles capturing the
behaviours of electromagnetic moving bodies.
These two postulates suffice for the attainment of a simple and consistent electrodynamics 
of moving bodies based on Maxwell’s theory for bodies at rest. (Einstein 1905)
In the special theory, kinematical properties are derived from these two hypotheses. 
In other words, these kinematical properties describe structural constraints that are 
satisfied by both fundamental hypotheses capturing the relationships between events. 
For example, the derivation of length contraction can be viewed in this way:
What has, in effect, been shown [in the derivation of length contraction] is that if the speed of 
light as measured with respect to [inertially moving] frame F ’ is to be found to be the same 
value as when measured with respect to the ‘resting frame’ F, then rods and clocks at rest in 
F ’ had better contract and dilate (with respect to frame F) in the coordinated way that is 
encoded in the k-Lorentz transformations. ... What has been shown is that rods and clocks
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must behave in quite particular ways in order for the two postulates to be true together.
(Brown and Pooley 2006, 76)
In this way, kinematical properties within special relativity capture the structural 
relationships between events. In order to make sense of the invariance of the speed 
of light and of the principle of relativity, the relationships between events, which are 
measured by rods and clocks, need to be modified in a systematic way codified in 
the Lorentz transformation. Accordingly, special relativity provides structural 
explanations because the two fundamental hypotheses, i.e. the light postulate and 
the principle of special relativity, provide “structural constraints that [separate] 
events are held to satisfy.”
Notice, then, the difference between Janssen’s view -  a view that might be called as 
‘space-time structuralism’, and my modified space-time structuralism. As pointed 
out in the previous section, Janssen’s view is close to Dorato’s space-time 
structuralism in the context of the special theory. Janssen in particular views space­
time as a “causally efficient structure,” which explains the Lorentz invariance of 
Maxwell’s equations and other physical laws: “[w]ith the introduction of 
Minkowski space-time, ... [special relativity] becomes a constructive theory. 
Minkowski space-time is the structure responsible for all the effects derivable from 
special relativity alone.” (Janssen 2002a, 506) Norton (1989) writes along similar 
lines that the light postulate represents “a special speed built into the structure of 
space and time,” and the principle of special relativity arises as “important theorem 
dependent on the symmetries of the Minkowski metric.” So according to Janssen’s
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structuralism, space-time is the structure that plays essential and causal role in the 
special theory. By contrast, in my modified view, the light postulate and the 
principle of special relativity are fundamental postulates which encode the 
relationships between events, -  relationships specified by the dynamical equations 
of mechanics and electromagnetism. The structure of space-time provides only a 
geometric way of exhibiting these relationships between events, and is not 
considered as a causally efficient entity.
I turn now to critique of step (3) of Janssen’s and Norton’s argument, and my 
argument for a revised premise (3’). My main point here is that once the dynamical 
relationships between events are placed at centre stage, the common group 
structures shared by Newtonian mechanics and the special theory can be viewed as 
stemming from the relationships between events, rather than from space-time 
structure.
Brown (1993) sees the essential role of dynamical information within the two 
theories as implicit in Earman’s account of the symmetry principles:
Earman ... is careful to distinguish between the ‘space-time symmetries’ (related to the 
symmetry group) of a given manifold and the ‘dynamical symmetries’ (which appear to 
incorporate the boosts) of a given dynamical theory defined on that manifold. I take it that, 
until dynamical objects and their laws are ‘introduced’ into a given space-time, Earman’s 
view must be that coordinate transformations representing real boosts are simply not 
defined. (Brown 1993, 249)
Earman seems to provide a physical foundation for the relevant space-time
symmetry, which is different from the accounts provided by Janssen and Norton. In
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his World Enough and Space-Time (1989), Earman distinguishes the space-time
symmetries of T (a classical theory of motion), which characterize its space-time
structures, from the dynamical symmetries of T encapsulating the equivalence of the
states of motion. (Earman 1989, 45-6) In the light of this distinction, Earman
(1989) formulates the following two symmetry principles:
SP1 Any dynamical symmetry of T is a space-time symmetry of T.
SP2 Any space-time symmetry of T is a dynamical symmetry of T. (Earman 1989, 46)
Yet, it seems that what Earman says here is that the space-time and the dynamical 
symmetries are interrelated with neither having priority.
Behind both principles lies the realization that the laws of motion cannot be written on thin 
air alone but require the support of various space-time structures. The symmetry principles 
then provide standards forjudging when the laws and the space-time structure are 
appropriate to one another, (ibid.)
Earman’s account in his (1989) is rather close to the space-time view. Aside from 
his position in the substance-relation debate, Earman characterizes space-time 
substantivalism as a claim that substantival space-time explains the behaviours of a 
body, (ibid., 10) Given his own interpretation of Newton’s Scholium, it seems that 
Earman holds a position close to the space-time interpretation concerning space­
time substantivalism:
Space-time is endowed with various structures that are intrinsic to it. ... Space-time is a 
substance in that it forms a substratum that underlies physical events and processes, and 
spatiotemporal relations among such events and processes are parasitic on the 
spatiotemporal relations inherent in the substratum of space-time points and regions. 
(Earman 1989, 11, my italics)
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And if the space-time symmetry in a dynamical system is viewed as a map of space­
time structure onto itself that underlies dynamically possible systems of world lines 
into dynamically possible system of world lines, the space-time interpretation is not 
so farfetched reading of Earman’s account. So, it seems that Brown reads what he 
wants to see from Earman’s accounts of the symmetry principle.
However, I still think that Brown’s view on the dynamical perspective of space-time
holds. A better line of reasoning can be found in the accounts of those who applied
group theory to Newtonian mechanics and special relativity. In the case of
Newtonian mechanics, the geometry of space, according to Poincare, arises from
abstraction from the movements of an idealized rigid body: “[The geometry of
space] would be only the study of the movements of solid bodies; but its object is
certain ideal solids, absolutely invariable, which are but a greatly simplified and
very remote image of them.” (Poincare 1905, 70) This means that our idea of space
stems from our perception of bodily behaviour such as moving up to, away from,
and around the objects that occupy space, rather than the other way around. An
idealized rigid body can move freely without change of dimensions, and by
abstraction we can characterize spatial relations, such as the lengths between points.
Poincare emphasized the role of the group in studying geometry:
[TJhere exist in nature some remarkable bodies which are called solids, and experience tells 
us that the different possible movements of these bodies are related to one another in much 
the same way as the different operations of the chosen group. (Poincare 1887, 290)
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Consider transformations of the locations of an idealized rigid body, which are 
represented by the mappings that take the body from a location a to a location b by 
any path, whether straight or not. In this situation, the transformations of the body’s 
locations from a t o b  satisfy a group in that (1) the transformations have their 
inverses since the body can move freely from b to a\ (2) inverse mappings of the 
transformations yield the identity mapping; (3) the transformation of the body’s 
locations from a to b is the sum of composite mappings of a series of small 
transformations. In this way, spatial relations arise from the group structure of the 
movements of a rigid body: “what we call [spatial] geometry is nothing but the 
study of formal properties of a certain continuous group; so that we may say space 
is a group.” (Poincare 1898, 41)
Minkowski (1908) similarly employed the concept of a group to comprehend 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity. According to Miller, Minkowski considered 
Einstein’s “principle of relativity” as stating that the covariance specifies “definite 
relationships between real observed quantities of moving bodies.” (Miller 1981, 
240) In Minkowski’s seminal lecture “Space and Time” (1908), this empiricist 
thesis is reiterated: “The views of space and time which I wish lay before you have 
sprung from the soil o f  experimental physics, and therein lies their strength.” 
(Minkowski 1908, 75) The symmetry groups of Newtonian mechanics and 
Einstein’s special theory are characterized as the invariance under two different 
groups of coordinate transformation. The former is the group of Galilean
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transformations (G*,), while the latter is the group of Lorentz transformations (Gc). 
The special theory is characterized by Gc because of the constancy of the speed of 
light. Here, these groups are related to the behaviour of rigid bodies and of light 
pulses:
[T]he impulse and true motive for assuming the group Gc came from the fact that the 
differential equation for the propagation of light in empty space [Maxwell equation] 
possesses that group Gc. On the other hand, the concept of rigid bodies has meaning only in 
mechanics satisfying the group Go. (Minkowski 1908, 81)
The kinematical consequence, such as Lorentz contraction, for example, stems from 
the motions of bodies:
[The Lorentz contraction hypothesis] sounds extremely fantastical, for the contraction is 
not to be looked upon as a consequence of resistance in the ether, or anything of that kind, 
but dimply as a gift from above, -  as an accompanying circumstance of the circumstance of 
motion, (ibid.)
In the special theory, “the circumstance of motion” is essentially characterized by 
the behaviours of a body whose speed is close to that of light. Accordingly, the 
common group structure of Newtonian mechanics and the special theory is founded 
on the relationships between events; in the former case, the movements of body 
provides the relationships between events, and in the latter case, the behaviours of 
bodies and light pulses provides the relationships between events.
4. The Evolutionary Development from Newtonian to Einsteinian Physics
The previous section has refocused our attention from the structure of space-time
within the special theory to the relationships between events, which are specified by
dynamical principles of the special theory. This section aims to clarify the
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continuity (or quasi-continuity) between Newtonian dynamics and the special theory 
by emphasizing the relationships between events -  namely those specified by the 
dynamical principles of these two theories of physics.
In the last chapter, I noted that the core of Newtonian dynamics is Newton’s laws of 
motion along with the principle of Galilean relativity. The dynamical laws, such as 
the laws of inertia and acceleration, constrain the relationships between events, i.e. 
the trajectories of inertial and accelerated motions. These laws specify how the 
initial state of a given body’s motion develops into other states. That is, these laws 
of motion describe the evolution of physical systems by specifying the relation of 
regularity between the states of a given body’s motion over time. The other essential 
part of Newtonian dynamics is the principle of relativity, which asserts that the 
dynamical laws of a given body cannot be distinguished when they are referred to 
any uniformly moving frame.9 In this way, the principle of Galilean relativity 
provides additional constraints on the behaviours of a body in that it identifies 
apparently distinct states of motion. These structural constraints on events determine 
a set of privileged frames (inertial frames), i.e. the structure of space-time. The 
structure of space-time, an inertial frame, is determined by a set of parallel straight
9 The principle of relativity is not just a projection from relativity theory. But the principle is in 
fact essential part of Newtonian mechanics. In his Corollary V to the laws of motion in the 
Principia, Newton again expressed concern about the relativity of motion: “When bodies are 
enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation to one another are the same whether that 
space is at rest or whether it is moving uniformly straight forward without any circular 
motion.” (Newton 1729, 423) And we can also see the principle of relativity in De Motu: “the 
whole space of the planetary heavens either rests (as is commonly believed) or moves 
uniformly in a straight line, and hence the communal center of gravity of the planets are the 
same ... .” (Newton 1962, 301)
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lines representing the behaviour of inertial motions, and this behaviour is specified 
by the law of inertia.
In this section, we will see that within Einstein’s special theory of relativity, these 
two essential elements continue to play the same essential role just as they did in 
Newtonian dynamics. Specifically, concerning the two fundamental postulates of 
the special theory: (1) The principle of special relativity is a result of a modification 
of the principle of Galilean relativity; (2) the dynamically privileged motions in the 
special theory also play essential roles, just as in Newtonian physics, while the 
consideration of the electrodynamics of moving bodies calls for a modification of 
these relationships between events.
Just as within Newtonian dynamics, the dynamically privileged inertial system, as 
Lange (1885) showed, is determined by the behaviours of three free particles, the 
dynamically privileged system in the special theory is determined by the behaviours 
of light pulses. (Torretti 1983, 55) In other words, the behaviour of light plays the 
role of selecting the privileged states of motion. Given that the light postulate plays 
a similar role to that of the law of inertia, the commonality between Newtonian 
dynamics and the special theory cannot be neglected. Before examining the role of 
the light postulate in the special theory of relativity, we will now consider another 
dynamical constraint between events, that is, the principle of special relativity.
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According to Einstein, the principle of special relativity is a result of the application 
of the principle of relativity to the theory describing optical and electro-magnetic 
phenomena. Newtonian laws of motion describe regularity relations between events 
without considering the above dynamical law of electrodynamics. Einstein’s special 
theory of relativity then aims to modify the relationships between events so that they 
satisfy the laws of electrodynamics: “the same laws of electrodynamics and optics 
will be valid for all frames of reference for which the equations of mechanics hold 
good.” (Einstein 1905)
Brown (1993) maintains that the principle of relativity in the special theory is 
indeed analogous to Newton’s principle of Galilean relativity:
Galileo’s ship experiment did not explicitly mention optical or electro-magnetic effects.
But it would be foolhardy to conclude that they constituted for him a probable 
counterexample to the inertial relativity principle, given the role it played in his defence of 
Copernicanism. (Brown 1993, 232)
And one cannot argue that Brown reads too much into Newton. Consider Newton’s
own account provided by Brown as follows:
In the case of Newton, the point can be put forcibly. Nothing in his semi-corpuscular theory 
of light indicated a possible violation of relativity in optics, and as regards magnetism, 
Newton explicitly referred to it in the Principia as just one of the several possible central 
(‘centripetal’) forces in nature which come under the sway of his laws of motion (Newton 
1934). Magnetism was in principle as much part of Newtonian mechanics as gravity was, 
and although it had not the same dependence on distance, there is every reason to think that 
it was likewise to be read as velocity-independent. (Newton’s less frequent references in 
the Principia to the then even more obscure phenomenon of electrical activity do nothing to 
alter this overall picture.) (ibid.)
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Yet, the principle of relativity needs to be modified in the context of electro­
dynamical phenomena, since these seem to imply that there exists a privileged 
inertial frame that makes the velocity of a light pulse constant:
[T]he situation that led to setting up the theory of special relativity [is as follows.] ... 
Mechanically all inertial systems are equivalent. In accordance with experience, this 
equivalence also extends to optics and electrodynamics. However, it did not appear that this 
equivalence could be attained in the theory of the latter. I soon reached the conviction that 
this had its basis in a deep incompleteness of the [classical] theoretical system. (Einstein’s 
letter to Erika Oppenheimer on 13 Sep 1932, quoted from Stachel, 2004, 110)
This inconsistency between the principle of relativity and the light postulate was
resolved by Einstein’s conclusion that the principle of relativity as classically
understood needs to be modified by changing the concept of simultaneity between
events. The light postulate specifies the way time is diffused, and so Einstein argued
that for the speed of light to be invariant, observers in relative motion might have
different simultaneity relationships to spatially distant events. In order to make
sense of the light postulate, it turns out that the principle of relativity involves
transformations between inertial frames, which do not preserve relationships of
simultaneity. Without this modification, the two fundamental principles that
constitute the special theory -  the light postulate and the principle of relativity -  are
inconsistent.
Norton seems again to claim that this particular modification is ultimately about the 
structure of space-time:
Since judgements of simultaneity arise throughout kinematics, Einstein now needed to 
ascertain how our traditional notions of space and time must be modified to accommodate 
this new result of the relativity of simultaneity. That accommodation is the working out of 
the special theory of relativity, a new theory of space and time. The new theory solves
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Einstein’s original problem of conforming Maxwell’s electrodynamics to the principle of 
relativity ... (Norton 2005, 14)
Yet, as was argued in the previous section, if Norton’s view is that the structure of 
space-time founds the kinematical properties, then it gets the relationships between 
space-time and dynamical principles upside down. For what has been shown is that 
in order to be faithful to the two fundamental principles that capture the 
relationships between events, spatio-temporal structure needs to be deformed 
according to the rule of the Lorentz transformation. In this way, the structural 
constraints expressed by the two fundamental principles, which stem from laws of 
electrodynamics, are encoded within the structure of space-time, not the other way 
around.
The structural constraints in the principle of special relativity can thus be viewed as 
a modification of its counterpart of its predecessor, i.e. Newtonian dynamics. 
Furthermore, given that the light postulate plays the role of characterizing inertial 
motions for light pulses, the commonality between Newtonian dynamics and the 
special theory becomes manifest. Torretti in his Relativity and Geometry (1983) 
claims that the light postulate (LP) corresponds to the principle of inertia (IP) for 
light quanta:
[T]he LP [the light postulate] may be regarded as the Principle of Inertia applicable to light 
quanta. (For greater clarity, one ought perhaps to replace ... Einstein’s expression “a light 
ray moves,” which anyway sounds peculiar, by “a light point moves.”) We must not lose 
sight of the striking analogy between Lange’s treatment of the classical Principle of Inertia 
(IP), that governs -  also in Special Relativity -  the free motion of material particles, and 
the manner how Einstein introduces the LP. (Torretti 1983, 55)
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The principle o f  inertia suggested by Ludwig Lange (1885) considers the motions o f
free particles, which are rectilinear and travel equal distances in equal times, as
determining an inertial system.10 He analysed Newton’s law of inertia as consisting
of spatial and temporal parts. The former is characterized by the rectilinear shape it
assigns to the trajectory of a freely moving body, whereas the latter is characterized
by constant speed of the body that moves along such a trajectory. To make sense of
these two parts, he defines an inertial system in which the trajectory of a freely
moving body is rectilinear and the speed of the body, which provides the scale of
time, is constant. Lange called each of these two elements inertial. The principle of
inertia, then, consists of two definitions and two theorems as follows:
Definition 1. A rigid frame F is said to be inertial if three freely moving particles11 
projected non-collinearly from a given point in F  describe straight lines in [relative space] 
Sp-
10 Lange’s attempt is to provide empirical meaning to the inertial law. What is the inertial motion 
of a body referring? The statement that the law refers to absolute space is more than an empirical 
one since absolute space cannot be observed. To resolve this question, Lange (1885), along with 
Thomson (1884), defines inertial frame by means of the motions of free particles.
11 Lange required the motion of three free particles in order to determine inertial frame. Given 
that the curved trajectory Gi of a given particle Pi can be considered as moving in a straight line 
by constructing a moving coordinate system, it is impossible to define an inertial frame by 
employing only one moving particle. It is also impossible for any two or three moving particles 
Pi, P2 (P 3) to have a coordinate system in which both of the trajectories become straight, since 
these moving particles could have a coordinate system in which all of the trajectories become 
straight. “Three arbitrary moving points can be represented as moving on three straight lines, for 
the triangle formed by the points at any moment corresponds to a some triangle whose vertices lie 
on three (concurrent and coplanar) straight lines.” (DiSalle 1988, 91)
Although the above three particles that move in straight lines are not enough to determine inertial 
frame, an additional constraint completes the task. The constraint is to rule out the collinearity of 
the three points, and the parallelism of the trajectories of the three points. The former case enables 
a fourth curve to be transformed to a straight line by rotating the coordinate system around the 
line where the three points are placed. And the latter case enables the entire system to be shifted 
back and forth in the common direction of the three lines. The motions of the three free points
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Theorem 1. Every freely moving particle describes a straight line in an inertial frame.
Definition 2. A time scale t is said to be inertial if a single particle moving freely in an 
inertial frame F travels equal distances in SF in equal times as measured by t.
Theorem 2. Every freely moving particle travels equal distances (in the relative space of an 
inertial frame) in equal times (measured by an inertial time scale). (Torretti 1983, 17)
Thus Lange claimed that an inertial system needs to be constructed in order to make
sense of the principle of inertia: “The law of inertia involves the assumption that an
inertial system can be constructed: that is, a system in which all paths of points left
to themselves are rectilinear and increase in proportion of time.” (Lange 1885, 273)
The above two definitions show that this inertial system is defined by considering
the behaviours of three freely moving particles.
According to Torretti (1983; 51), when Einstein referred in his (1905) to the 
“stationary” frame, i.e. “a coordinate system in which the equations of Newtonian 
mechanics hold good,” the frame is best described as Lange’s arbitrary inertial 
frame. This is supported by Einstein’s later statement (1916; 772) that “a Galilean 
system of reference” is one with respect to which “a mass, sufficiently distant from 
other masses, moves with uniform motion.” Torretti, taking Einstein (1911) into 
consideration12, also suggests that in addition to Lange’s first definition of an 
inertial system, “[t]he rectilinear propagation of light in vacuo provides ... an
satisfying the constraints, determine the inertial frames. Accordingly, any fourth free point can be 
viewed as traveling in a rectilinear way. (ibid.)
12 According to Torretti, Einstein (1911) assumed that “[i]f an inertial and a non-inertial frame 
move past each other with uniform acceleration, a light-lay emitted through empty space in a 
direction normal to the mutual acceleration of the frames, describes a straight line in the inertial 
frame, a curved line in the other.” (Torretti 1983, 51)
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additional criterion for the identification of inertial frames, which ... does not 
presuppose a definition of time.” (ibid.) In other words, these two conditions 
correspond to the spatial part of Lange’s definition of inertial system. Hence, the 
spatial part of Einstein’s stationary system can be defined as:
Definition 1’. Three free particles projected non-collinearly from a point in F describe 
straight lines in SF.
Definition 1* (Supplement). A light pulse transmitted through empty space in any 
direction from a point in F describes a straight line in SF. (ibid.)
Yet, in order to describe the motion of any body, a temporal part is also necessary:
If we want to describe the motion of a particle, we give the value of its coordinates as 
functions of time. However, we must keep in mind that a mathematical description of this 
kind only has physical meaning if we are already clear as to what we understand here by 
“time.” (Einstein 1905)
Lange’s view of time entails that, given that the inertial motion of a body, as pointed
out in the last chapter, provides the measure of Newtonian time, Newtonian time
can be measured only in the place where an inertial motion of the body occurs. In
other words, Newtonian time is accessible only based on dynamical information
exemplified in certain natural processes. Einstein seriously considered this local
nature of time, as did Poincare.
It might seem that all difficulties involved in the definition of “time” could be overcome by 
my substituting “position of the small hand of my watch” for “time.” Such a definition is 
indeed sufficient if  a time is to be defined exclusively for the place at which the watch is 
located; but the definition is no longer satisfactory when series o f events occurring at 
different locations have to be linked temporally, or -  what amounts to the same thing -  
when events occurring at places remote from the clock have to be evaluated temporally. 
(Einstein 1905, my italics)
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“Einstein time” is then suggested in order to define a time coordinate for an inertial 
system. In opposition to Newton time, which “diffuses indivisibly throughout all 
space,” (Hall and Hall 1962, 104), Einstein time is supposed to diffuse throughout 
all space, which can be measured by reflected photons.
The [common time for the locations A and B] can now be determined by establishing by 
definition that the "time ” required for light to travel from A to B is equal to the "time ” it 
requires to travel B to A. For, suppose a ray of light leaves from A for B at “/1-time” tA, is 
reflected from B toward A at “5-time” tB and arrives back at A at “A -time” t ’A. The two 
clocks are synchronous by definition if
t B - t A =  t ’A - t B
(Einstein 1905, my italics)
Hence, from the above equation, the time at B can be determined as tB = l/2(t*A + tA). 
Given that the location B is arbitrary, the reflected photons can be employed to 
define a function of the time coordinate over all inertial frames:
By means of certain (imagined) physical experiments, we have established what is to be 
understood by synchronous clocks at rest relative to each other and located at different 
places, and thereby obviously arrived at definitions of “synchronous” and “time.” (ibid., 
my italics)
A function of the time coordinate is defined on inertial frames “in such way that at
each instant the light-front lies on a sphere with its centre at the source and its radius
proportional to the time elapsed since the light was emitted.” (Torretti 1983, 55)
Accordingly, Lange’s definition of the temporal part of inertial system is modified
by means of the behaviour of a light-pulse, which propagates in every direction
from a point at rest in a Lange’s inertial frame.
Definition 2’. A light pulse transmitted through empty space in any direction from a source 
at rest in F traverses equal distances in equal times. (Torretti 1983, 54)
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Hence, one can identify a clear analogy between the principle o f  inertia and the light
postulate. Just as Lange’s definition of inertial frame becomes meaningful by
providing an inertial system in which the principle of inertia is satisfied, Einstein
employs the behaviour of the light pulse in order to make sense of the required
system of reference in which the light postulate is satisfied.
Lange saw that the IP [the principle of inertia] is meaningless unless we define at least one 
frame in which it holds good. Lange defines such a frame by considering the behaviour of 
three free particles in motion. ... The IP is the factual statement that every other free 
particle moves in the frame thus defined in the same way as those three, that is, in a straight 
line, with constant speed. ... [The definition 2’] concerns the behaviour of a single light- 
pulse, propagating in every direction from a point at rest in a Lange’s inertial frame. Time 
is to be defined on the frame in such way that at each instant the light-front lies on a sphere 
with its centre at the source and its radius proportional to the time elapsed since the light 
was emitted. Having thus defined the requisite system of reference, Einstein is able to 
formulate the LP [the light postulate]. It is the factual statement that every other light-pulse 
propagates in the said frame in the same way as the former, regardless of the state of 
motion of its source ... (Torretti 1983, 55)
In this way, Torretti claims that “[I]n this the LP [the light postulate] does not differ
essentially from the IP [principle of inertia].” (ibid.)
How then does the theory-change from Newtonian theory to special relativity look 
when considered in this light? My claim is that although there are undoubtedly 
discontinuities between the space-time structures posited by Newtonian dynamics 
and by special relativity, the commonality is much more important than the 
discontinuities. It is because their dynamical principles relating events -  (1) the 
principle of inertia and the light postulate; (2) the principles of Galilean relativity 
and special relativity -  carry out identical work. These principles specify the
190
dynamically-preferred motions, and determine the structures of space-times.13 In the 
last section, I have argued that the structural constraints between events, which are 
specified by the equations of electrodynamics, play essential roles in the special 
theory. And this section clarifies the commonality between the structural constraints 
within Newtonian dynamics and special relativity. This is captured by the law of 
inertia, which is expressed by geodesic equations in these two theories. Although 
this equation in the special theory gains additional physical significance including 
the phenomena of electrodynamics, its essential status, as is pointed out in this 
section, does not change during our case of theory-change. Modified space-time 
structuralism emphasizes this commonality of this relationship between events. 
These relationships are specified by dynamics, and are more deep-rooted than the 
spatio-temporal relationships between events. Hence, it follows that the element of
13 The essential role of the behaviours of light pulses in determining the structure of space-time 
can also be identified in Einstein’s following account.
... [W]e imagine the two ends (A and B) of the rod equipped with clocks that are 
synchronous with the clocks of the rest system, ...
We further imagine that each clock has an observer commoving with it, and that these 
observers apply to the two clocks the criterion for the synchronous rate of two clocks 
formulated in section 1. Let a ray of light start out from A at time tA; it is reflected from B 
at time tB, and arrives back at A at time t ’A. Taking into account the principle of the 
constancy of the velocity of light, we find that
t B - t A = rAB/ V - v
and
t ’A - t B = rAB/ V + v
where rAB denotes the length of the moving rod, measured in the rest system. Observers co- 
moving with the rod would thus find that the two clocks do not run synchronously, while 
observers in the system at rest would declare them to be running synchronously.
Thus we see that we cannot ascribe absolute meaning to the concept of simultaneity; 
instead, two events that are simultaneous when observed from some particular coordinate 
system can no longer be considered simultaneous when observed from a system that is 
moving relative to that system. (Einstein 1905)
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continuity in this theory-change was definitely more deep-rooted and more 
important than the one of discontinuity.
5. Conclusion
In chapter two, we saw that the working parts of space-time are the relationships 
between events specified by the laws of motion. In this chapter, I have argued that 
this perspective can clarify the extent to which the shift from Newtonian dynamics 
to special relativity was a continuous (or “quasi-continuous”) one. If the spatio- 
temporal relationships between events are considered as the essential parts of the 
two theories, then the discontinuity between these two theories seems more salient 
than what is continuous. This is because the structure ascribed to space-time by the 
later theory has properties that the structure assigned by earlier theory definitely 
does not have.
However, by looking at the shared group representing their inertial structures, we 
can see the essential continuity between these two theories. With the dynamical 
perspective of space-time, dynamical information is brought to centre stage in 
comprehending our case of theory-change. And modified space-time structuralism 
clarifies the continuity (or “quasi-continuity”) in the theory-change. In other words, 
if we consider the aspect of the two theories to concern the relationships between 
events specified by dynamical principles, then we can see and indeed highlight the 
important element of continuity in the theory-change. Inertial trajectories play an
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essential role in Newtonian dynamics that does not, however, take the laws of 
electrodynamics into consideration. Accordingly, the concept of inertial trajectories 
needs to be modified within the special theory by considering the dynamical 
constraint provided by the equations of electrodynamics. By considering the 
constant speed of light, the extent to which the principle of inertia is applied is 
extended to involve the behaviours of light quanta. And this is in fact what underlies 
the conceptual change in the suppositions about space-time. In this way, the theory- 
change is seen as evolutionary: the laws of the predecessor theory capturing the 
relationships between events are modified by the new theory into more general laws 
by considering the dynamical elements neglected by the predecessor.
Two pleasing results further endorse this view. First, modified space-time 
structuralism can avoid the criticism that afflicts the unmodified version of space­
time structuralism, namely that emphasizing the concepts of space-time is post hoc. 
Given that space-time concepts become essential after the development of the 
special theory, it might seem that emphasizing space-time concepts are arbitrary. 
However, if the concepts of space-time can be viewed as encoding the laws of 
motion, which is considered as the working part of the overall theory, this criticism 
is avoided. If it is accepted that dynamical laws play a central role both in 
Newtonian dynamics and in the special theory, then the story of an evolutionary 
change cannot be charged with being ‘whiggish’ or post hoc.
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Second, no one really denies that there is a strong element of continuity (as their
very names suggest) between the special and the general theories of relativity.
However, this continuity too is in fact difficult to capture unless one again focuses
on the dynamical contents of space-time theories. We can see this in different
tradition involved in the two theories. On the one hand, Minkowski space-time is
developed within the tradition of Klein’s Erlangen program, in which genuine
geometric properties are characterized in terms of invariants under groups of
transformations. The geometric properties that are not invariant under groups of
relevant transformation are considered as conventional. Norton calls this tradition
“Klein’s subtractive strategy,” which “over-describe[s] the space and then direct[s]
which parts of the over-description should be accepted as geometrically real.”
(Norton 1999, 130) On the other hand, the general theory of relativity follows a
different approach to geometry, that of “Riemann’s additive strategy.” According to
this strategy, one begins with an impoverished description such as a bare manifold,
and then adds further geometric entities such as a metric and an affine connection:
In the Riemann tradition, one considered a space and a group of transformations. But the 
geometric entities investigated are no longer the invariants of the transformations, for in 
that case there are essentially none. Instead one is interested in the invariants of a quadratic 
differential form, the fundamental or metrical form, that is adjoined to the space. As a result, 
the groups associated with geometries in the two traditions have very different significance. 
(Norton 1993, 42)
Hence, trying to understand the continuities between the special theory and the 
general theory of relativity (or the Newtonian theory and Einsteinian theory of 
gravitation) by means of common group structure by no means provides a complete
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picture. Yet, by emphasizing the dynamical contents in both theories, one can avoid 
this problem. The task of the next chapter will be to demonstrate this.
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Chapter 4
The Structuralist Account of the Development 
of the General Theory of Relativity
1. Introduction
This chapter considers the theory-change from the special theory to the general 
theory of relativity from the perspective of modified space-time structuralism. In the 
first chapter, I considered the weaknesses of various different accounts of the 
ontological continuities and discontinuities in the theory-change. In this chapter, I 
will reconsider these weaknesses from the perspective of modified space-time 
structuralism. This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I will argue 
(1) that modified space-time structuralism can identify the essential part of the 
general theory, and (2) that when viewed within this structuralist’s framework, the 
theory-change from the special theory to the general theory of relativity is 
essentially continuous (or “quasi-continuous”). And in the last section, I will 
consider a response from the supporter of a revolutionary view.
2. The Essential Role of Inertial Motions within General Relativity (GR)
(1) Evolutionary and Revolutionary Views on GR Reconsidered
Apparently evolutionary and revolutionary features of the general theory of 
relativity were discussed in the first chapter:
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(1) Space-time identified as the substantival entity “ether,” which causes the motion 
of bodies according to the laws of motion, is alleged to provide an evolutionary 
element in the theory-change from the special to the general theory.
(2) The general theory is viewed as revolutionary given that the space-time metric 
has an identical ontological status to that of matter fields such as the electro­
magnetic field.
(3) The background-independent formulation of the general theory shows that the 
theory-change from the special theory to the general theory of relativity is 
essentially revolutionary.
In this section, we will see that the weaknesses of these claims about the general 
theory can be remedied from the perspective of my modified space-time 
structuralism. By criticizing claims (1) and (2), which emphasize the causal roles of 
general relativistic space-time, we will see that the essential part of the general 
theory, just like its predecessors, is the specification of the inertial motions of bodies 
(specified by the geodesic equations of motion). And this basic framework based on 
inertial trajectories that specify the relationships between events obtains additional 
physical significance by incorporating dynamical information about gravitational 
interactions, i.e. Einstein’s principle of equivalence, which provides a further 
constraint over the relationships between events. In this sense, we can say that the 
development from the special to the general theory is essentially continuous. We 
will see that this is in fact what underlies the aforementioned formal continuity 
within the theory-change. As for claim (3), we will see in the next section that the 
background-independent formulation of the general theory in fact endorses an 
evolutionary view, rather than a revolutionary view, when looked at from the 
perspective of modified space-time structuralism.
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The evolutionary claim (1), as was pointed out earlier, was in fact endorsed by 
Einstein himself:
The inertia-producing property of this ether [absolute space], in accordance with classical 
mechanics, is precisely not to be influenced, either by the configuration of matter, or by 
anything else. For this reason, one may call it ‘absolute.’ That something real has to be 
conceived as the cause for the preference of an inertial system over a non-inertial system is 
a fact that physicists have only come to understand in recent years. ... Also, following the 
special theory of relativity, the ether was absolute, because its influence on inertia and light 
propagation was thought to be independent of physical influences of any kind. ... The ether 
of the general theory of relativity ... differs from that of classical mechanics or the special 
theory of relativity respectively, in so far as it is not ‘absolute,’ but is determined in its 
locally variable properties by ponderable matter. (Einstein 1924)
The structure of space-time in general relativity is represented as a four dimensional
differential manifold M, which is equipped with a semi-Riemannian metric tensor g
of signature (1,3). And the distribution of material things is encoded in its stress
energy tensor T. The dynamics is specified by Einstein field equation (EFE) Gy =
R y  -  l / 2 g y R  = 8Gn/c4Ty, which associates the curvature of space-time (the function
of g  and its first derivatives) with T. What is notable about this equation is that the
metric tensor g  occurs not only in the left hand side of EFE which decides the
spatio-temporal structure, but also in the right hand side of EFE which encodes the
matter distribution. And this correlation between the two metric tensors in EFE
shows the way that space-time directs the motion of material bodies, while the
mass-energy distribution in turn influences spatio-temporal structure.
This theoretical posit of the general theory of relativity is considered as providing a 
causal explanation showing how “space acts on matter, telling it how to move. In
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turn, matter reacts back on space, telling it how to curve.” (Misner et al. 1973, 5)
More importantly, Einstein in the Meaning o f Relativity (1922) expressed that the
general theory was motivated by this causal view:
[AJbsolutum means not only ‘physically real,’ but also ‘independent in its physical 
properties, having a physical effect, but not itself influenced by physical condition. ... [I]t 
is contrary to the mode of thinking in science to conceive a thing (the space-time 
continuum) which acts itself, but which cannot be acted upon. (Einstein 1922, 55-6)
Dorato also follows this line of thought:
By using the spatiotemporal structure as an explanatory tool, and declaring it to be a mind- 
independent property of certain physical systems, structural realists about spacetime may 
rely on the fact that properties (spatiotemporal ones included) simply are, in any 
respectable metaphysical theories, the causal powers of the entities having them. ... What 
causes the deflection of the orbit of the massive body is the gravitational field, a thoroughly 
physical field, via its geometrical, causally active relational properties. (Dorato 2000, 1616, 
my italics)
However, as pointed out in the first chapter, these causal accounts of space-time, 
according to Brown, are not only superfluous, but even problematic within the 
context of the general theory:
From his earliest inklings of a theory of gravity based on the principle of equivalence and 
the curvature of space-time, until 1927, Einstein assumed that all test bodies would follow 
the grooves or ruts of space-time defined by curves that are straight, or equivalently that are 
of extremal length. We have seen that during this period Einstein assigned a causal role to 
space-time structure in precisely this sense: to nudge the particles along such privileged 
ruts. This kind of action o f space-time on matter was taken to primitive; fortunately it 
turned out to be unnecessary. Appeal to the form of the field equations was enough to 
deliver the principle o f geodesic motion. ... In particular, [C. Misner, K. Thome, and J. 
Wheeler] explain how the geodesic behaviour of test bodies can be derived from the 
vanishing of the covariant divergence of the stress-energy tensor associated with the body. 
(Brown 2005, 141, my italics)
The geodesic principle within the general theory, which corresponds with the law of
inertia, can be derived from the dynamical content of general relativity, rather than
from its space-time geometry.
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In fact, we can see that the above explanation, i.e. the derivation of the geodesic 
equation, is a structural one in the two sense elaborated in the previous chapter. First, 
the geodesic equation of motion can be derived from a structural constraint over 
events, i.e. the conservation of energy-momentum in a world tube around the world 
line of a particle. This constraint requires that “the energy-momentum emerging out 
of [the upper boundary of the world tube] has to equal the energy-momentum 
entering [the bottom boundary of the world tube]”. (Misner et al. 1973,473) This 
can be said to be structural given that the requirement is the consequence of a 
geometric consideration of the ‘Bianchi identity,’ which is intuitively expressed as 
the boundary of a boundary is zero1” (ibid, 365-7):
The one central point is a law of conservation (conservation of charge; conservation of 
momentum-energy).
The other central point is “automatic fulfillment” of this conservation law.
“Automatic conservation” requires that source not be an agent free to vary arbitrarily 
from place to place and instant and instant.
Source needs a tie to something that, while having degrees of freedom of its own, will 
cut down the otherwise arbitrary degrees of freedom of the source sufficiently to guarantee 
that the source automatically fulfills the conservation law. Give the name “field” to this 
something.
Define this field and “wire it up ” to the source in such a way that the conservation of 
the source shall be an automatic consequence o f the “zero boundary o f a boundary. ” (ibid., 
366, original italics)
In case of the general theory, this automatically conserved quantity is the Einstein 
tensor G. Just like the conservation of the source (d*J = 0) within electrodynamics 
is a consequence of the Bianchi identity satisfied by the dual of the Maxwell field
1 In case of a 3-dimensional space-time region, the Bianchi identity captures a geometric intuition 
that the 1-dimensional boundary of the 2-dimensional boundary of the 3-dimensional region is 
zero. And in case of a 4-dimensional space-time region, the identity represents a geometric 
intuition that the 3-dimensional boundary of the 3-dimensional boundary of the 4-dimensional 
region is zero, (ibid., 356-7)
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tensor *F, the conservation of the energy-momentum tensor (d*T~  0) within the 
general theory is a consequence of the Bianchi identity satisfied by Einstein tensor 
G. The physical significance of this structural constraint is simply to prohibit any 
events in this region from being neither created nor destroyed:
Conservation demands no creation or destruction of source inside the four-dimensional 
[space-time region]. Equivalently, integral of “creation events” (integral of d*J for electric 
charge; integral of d*T for energy-momentum) over this four-dimensional region is 
required to be zero, (ibid., my italics)
Furthermore, the procedure of the derivation of geodesic equation does not involve 
the complexities about the internal structure of a particle.
Is there not an inner contradiction in trying to apply to a “particle” (implying idealization to 
a point) a field equation that deals with the continuum? Answer: There is a contradiction in 
dealing with a point. Therefore do not deal with a point. Do not deal with internal structure 
at all. Analyze the motion by looking at the geometry outside the object. That geometry 
provides all the handle one needs to follow motion. ... Surrounding “the Schwarzschild 
zone of influence” of the object, mark out a “buffer zone” that extends out to the region 
where the “background geometry” begins to depart substantially from flatness. Idealize the 
geometry in the buffer zone as that of an unchanging source merging asymtotically 
(“boundary /? of buffer zone”) into flat space. It suffices to recall the properties of the 
spacetime geometry far outside an unchanging (i.e., nonradiating) source ... to draw the 
key conclusion: relative to this flat spacetime and regardless of its internal structure, the 
object remains at rest, or continues to move in a straight line at uniform velocity, 
(conservation of total 4-momentum) In other words, it obeys the geodesic equation of 
motion, (ibid., my italics)
The complexities of a particle’s internal structure require a consideration of the
coupling of the curvature of space-time to the particle’s internal structure such as
angular momentum, mass quadruple momentum, and higher moments. These
elements of internal structure couple with the curvature of background space, and by
no means allow the buffer zone where its metric approaches Minkowskian. Yet, by
considering a test particle, “geometry provides all the handle one needs to follow
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motion” in that the buffer zone reduces in size to zero while the metric of the buffer 
zone approaches Minkowskian. Along with this consideration, the structural 
constraint of events within the world tube (i.e. the conservation of energy- 
momentum) then entails the required relationships between events, that is, the 
geodesic equation of motion.2
The second aspect characterizing the above derivation as a structural one is that this 
geodesic equation of motion is derived from Einstein’s field equation as the 
conservation of energy-momentum is essentially incorporated within Einstein’s field 
equation. This becomes manifest when the general theory is compared with 
electrodynamics:
[I]n no theory but Einstein’s is this principle incorporated as an identity. Only [in the 
general theory] does the conservation of energy-momentum appear as a fully automatic 
consequence of the inner working of the machinery of the world. ... Out of Einstein’s 
theory one can derive the equation of motion of a particle. Out of Maxwell’s one cannot. ... 
The Maxwell’s field equations are so constructed that they automatically fulfil and demand 
the conservation of charge; but not everything has charge. The Einstein field equation is so 
constructed that it automatically fulfils and demands the conservation of momentum- 
energy; and everything does have energy. ... Why ... is the derivation of the geodesic 
equation of motion of an object said to be based on “Einstein’s geometrodynamic field 
equation” rather than on “the principle of conservation of 4-momentum? Because geometry 
responds by its curvature to mass-energy in every form. Most of all, because geometry tells 
about mass-energy inside, free of all concern about issues of internal structure. (Misner et. 
al. 1973, 475)
In fact, the law of the energy-momentum conservation is a consequence of the 
Bianchi identity satisfied by Einstein tensor along with Einstein field equations in a
2 Misner, Thome, and Wheeler (ibid. 476) contrast this derivation of the geodesic equation of 
motion with the one of Lorentz’s equation of motion from the conservation of energy-momentum, 
which requires to deal with a particle’s interaction with a field and with its own electromagnetic 
field. In other words, “no advantage was taken of geometry outside as indicator of motion inside;
(2) a detailed bookkeeping was envisaged of the localization in space of the electromagnetic 
energy; and (3) this bookkeeping brought up the issue of the internal structure of the particle, 
which could not be satisfactorily resolved.”
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sense that the (contracted) Bianchi identify Gj;j = 0 guarantees that Einstein field 
equations contain the law of energy-momentum conservation. (This is analogous to 
Maxwell equations, which contain the charge conservation with the help of the 
Bianchi identity satisfied by the dual of Maxwell tensor) Accordingly, the 
conservation law stems from dynamical information that “all matter and fields are 
wired into the geometry of space-time.” (ibid., 409) So, the geodesic equation of 
motion, which specifies the relationships between events, stems from the dynamics 
of the general theory of relativity, rather than from its space-time structure, as 
modified space-time structuralism claims.
So much for my criticism of the step (1). I turn now to the step (2) of the causal 
account of the general theory of relativity. The geodesic equations of motion in fact 
play an essential role in comprehending gravitational waves, which appear to 
provide causal account of the general theory. As pointed out in the first chapter, 
Rovelli (1997, 2001) emphasizes this causal role of gravity:
[T]he gravitational field is represented by a field on spacetime, gMVi just like the 
electromagnetic field AM. They are both concrete entities: a strong electromagnetic wave 
can hit you and knock you down; and so can a strong gravitational wave. (Rovelli 2001, 
107)
And:
A strong burst of gravitational waves could come from the sky and knock down the rock of 
Gibraltar, precisely as a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation could. Why is the first 
“matter” and the second “space”? Why should we regard the first burst as ontologically 
different from the second? (Rovelli 1997, 193)
Gravitational waves are basically small fluctuations of the metric g^v, which are
described as ‘ripples’ of space-time. When the gravitational field in empty space is
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very weak, the metric is split into the Minkowski metric rj^ and the metric 
perturbation hHVj i.e., gMV = rjMV + h^. By neglecting terms in /^-squared and higher 
powers, ‘linearized field equations’ can be derived from Einstein’s field equations. 
The result is a set of linear second-order partial differential equations for huv. And 
with the choice of Lorentz gauge, which corresponds to the choice of coordinates, 
these equations can be transformed so as to be similar in form to Maxwell’s 
equations, which predict electromagnetic waves. This linearized theory of 
gravitation, just like its electromagnetic counterparts, has a solution that predicts 
gravitational waves travelling with the speed of light. Accordingly, gravitational 
waves seem to pass through space just like electromagnetic waves.
However, we have seen in the first chapter that this mathematical analogy between
gravitational and non-gravitational waves breaks down, when one considers the
difference between the gravitational energy-momentum and the non-gravitational
energy-momentum. The latter quantity is a tensor, while the former is not. Although
physically meaningful quantities should be tensors, the gravitational energy-
momentum does not pass this test. It is instead a pseudo-tensor, which is variable
(and may even vanish) dependent on the choice of coordinate system:
[I]ts non-tensorial nature means that there is no well-defined, intrinsic ‘amount of stuff 
present at any given point. In particular, unlike a genuine tensor, [a pseudo-tensor] can be 
made to vanish at any given moment by a suitable coordinate transformation. [This] 
therefore cannot really be telling us about the local interchange o f energy-momentum 
between gravity and matter. (Hoefer 2000, 193, my italics)
And Norton (2000) expresses the same view:
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In so far as I can understand this response, it really just tells us that a pseudo-tensor should 
be given no physical interpretation. It should merely be used as a mathematical 
intermediary in computing the gravitational energy and momentum of extended systems. 
(Norton 2000, ch. 3, my italics)
Can this problem be avoided by considering the gravitational energy-momentum of 
some extended system? Norton’s answer is “no”:
The difficulty with this problem is that the gravitational energy and momentum of extended 
systems fare only marginally better. ... Following the classical model, one would expect 
that we could take the energy and momentum densities of [gravitational and non- 
gravitational energy-momenta] and sum them up over the space occupied by, for example, a 
galaxy of stars to find the galaxy’s total energy and momentum. In general, this cannot be 
done. One cannot define meaningfully the total energy and momentum of some extended 
system, where the total energy and momentum is to include both gravitational and non- 
gravitational contributions. At best, these total quantities can be defined in special 
[unrealistic].cases} (ibid., my italics)
Hence, just as in the special theory, Salmon’s notions of “causal interactions” and
“causal processes,” which are based on the exchange of conserved quantities, do not
fit in the general theory either.
Instead, the physical significance of gravitational waves is captured in terms of the 
inertial motions of the general theory:
When the rock is hit by a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation, the natural motions of 
the parts of the rock do not (significantly) change. Rather the parts of the rock are 
differently accelerated by forces that overcome the contracting forces between the parts of
3 Norton explicates why it is difficult to define the total energy and momentum of certain 
extended system as follows:
The summation of the information in [gravitational and non-gravitational energy- 
momentums] to recover a total energy can be done if there is a rest frame in which the 
geometry of the spacetime is independent of time. That would rise if we had a completely 
isolate galaxy not of stars but of passive lumps of matter held apart by sticks such that the 
whole system just sat there completely motionless. Real systems are not so nicely behaved. 
Stars radiate and thereby change their mass; stars in galaxies move about relativie to each 
other; gravitational waves impinge upon the galaxy form the outside. All this affects the 
geometry of spacetime and precludes the summation. (Norton 2000, my italics)
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the rock. When the rock is hit by gravitational radiation, however, no additional 
accelerative forces are applied. Rather the natural motions are no longer towards the 
rock's centre but are radically divergent. So divergent, in fact, that the electromagnetic 
binding forces of the rock are no longer sufficient to accelerate the parts of the rock away 
from their natural trajectories. (Pooley 2002, my italics)
The distortion by a gravitational wave is in fact captured by considering its effect on
the motions of bodies that the wave passes. Here the equation of geodesic deviation,
which describes the relative motions of two or more bodies, describes that a set of
particles, which follows their own geodesics, is deformed by the tidal acceleration
generated by the gravitational wave. In other words, this equation describes the
oscillations in the separation between neighbouring inertailly moving particles,
which are described as the oscillating curvature tensor of a gravitational wave.
We can see that the essential role of the specification of the inertial motions of
bodies in the above account properly fits within the framework of the general theory
of relativity, if we look at how current standard textbooks (such as Misner et al.
1973, Wald 1984, and dTnvemo 1992) motivate Einstein’s field equations (EFE).
Here, the physics of the curvature tensor R  on the left hand side of EFE  is motivated
from a Newtonian equation that expresses the relative acceleration of neighbouring
test particles -  so called “the tidal acceleration of two nearby particles.” And its
corresponding general relativistic expression, i.e. the equation of geodesic deviation,
then provides the expression of the curvature tensor R .4
An important clue [in deriving EFE] is provided by the comparison of the description of 
tidal force in Newtonian gravity and general relativity. In the Newtonian theory, the
4 The right hand of EFE stems from the correspondence between the mass density of matter p 
within Poisson’s equation (V20  = Anp) and a stress-energy tensor Tab. Tabvavb *-> p.
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gravitational field may be represented by a potential, <D, and the tidal acceleration of two 
nearby particles is given by -  (jcV)V<D, where x  is the separation vector of the particles. On 
the other hand, in general relativity, from [the geodesic deviation equation] the tidal 
acceleration of two particles is given by -  Rcbf v cxbvd, where va is the 4-velocity of the 
particles and xa is the deviation vector. This suggests that we make the correspondence, 
Rcb fv cvd <-► dbda4>. (Wald 1984, 71-2)
Hence, the geometrical structure of space-time, i.e. the curvature tensor in fact
encodes the relationships between events, which are specified by the equations of
geodesic motion and geodesic deviation. Geroch’s analogy also makes this point
well:
[W]e might imagine the earth inhabited by small, very flat, two-dimensional ants, which 
crawl about the surface . . . .  We ask, Would such ants be able to determine whether or not 
the surface of the earth is curved? In order to answer this question, we might begin with a 
more general question: What is the sum total o f all the information (of a geometrical 
character) that these ants could accumulate about the surface o f the earth? They could 
certainly locate various points on the surface of the earth, and they could certainly measure 
distances between pairs of points (by crawling between points) -  and that is about it. ... The 
ants have access only to points on the earth and distances between nearby points; we have 
access only to events in space-time and intervals between nearby points. The ants, from the 
information they have, can detect curvature ... This analogy suggests, then, that, using only 
geometrical constructions involving the events in space-time and the intervals, we may 
introduce a quantity which may be thought of as the “curvature of space-time geometry” 
itself. (Geroch 1978, 166-9, my italics)
So, within the general theory of relativity, the inertial motions of bodies play the 
key role. Brown in his Physical Relativity clearly expressed this point:
[The fact that geodesic motion is a theorem and not a postulate] sheds light on the meaning 
of inertia (in the sense of inertial motion) and gravity.
Gravity traditionally has had two faces. It explains why things fall down and it explains 
why the fall is not uniform across space and time. Take the latter aspect first. Two objects 
are in free fall in my office: the head of my student who has just nodded off in a tutorial, 
and the copy of Misner, Thome and Wheeler’s Gravitation that I am throwing at him. ... 
[T]he two objects do not quite move along parallel lines -  they are each heading after all 
towards the centre of the Earth. This of course has to do in GR with geodesic deviation, 
with the so-called ‘tidal’ effects of space-time curvature. It is tempting to think that in GR 
this is all we mean, or should mean, by gravity. For when we come to explaining why the 
objects are falling in the first place, the answer seems almost banal. It is because the frame 
defined by my office is accelerating in relation to the local inertial frames, and in relation 
to the latter frames the objects, being force-free, are simply moving inertially. The glory of
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this explanation is that it accounts for the universality of free fall — that all bodies, 
independent of their constitution, fall at the same rate. ... [W]hen ‘force-free’ test bodies 
undergo geodesic flow in GR, whether there is geodesic deviation or not, such motion is 
ultimately due to the way the Einstein field gMV couples to matter, as determined by the field 
equations. (Brown 2005, 142-3, my italics)
(2) Inertial Motions in the Development of the General Theory of Relativity
In this section, we will see that the trajectories of inertially moving bodies in fact
play an essential role in the development of the general theory. Yet, given additional
dynamical information about gravitational interactions, the characterization of
which trajectories are inertial needs to be modified. A dynamical principle involved
here is the equivalence principle. The special theory stems from electrodynamics,
but neglects gravity. Introducing consideration of the gravitational interactions
inevitably involves the equivalence principle. This reflects the fact that a body’s
inertial mass is always the same as its gravitational mass. In the Newtonian theory
of gravity, the identity of these two (apparently quite different) concepts is a mere
coincidence. The former measures a body’s resistance to acceleration, whereas the
latter measures a body’s susceptibility to gravity. Within the general theory, this
connection is incoporated into a dynamical principle, which results in a new concept
of inertial motion. The principle stems from the fact that a given body should satisfy
the same laws of motion whether this motion is considered with respect to a rest
frame or to a frame uniformly accelerated by a homogeneous gravitational field:
[0]ne can ask oneself whether an observer, uniformly accelerated relative to K  in the region 
considered, must understand his condition as accelerated, or whether there remains a point 
of view for him, in accord with the (approximately) known laws of nature, by which he can 
interpret his condition as “rest.” Expressed more presiely: do the laws of nature, known to a 
certain approximation, allow us to consider a reference system 1C as at rest, if it is
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accelerated uniformly with respect to AT? Or somewhat more generally: Can the principle of 
relativity be extended also to reference systems, which are (uniformly) accelerated relative 
to one another? The answer runs: As far as we really know the laws of nature, nothing stops 
us from considering the system K ’ as at rest. If we assume the presence of a gravitational 
field (homogeneous in the first approximation) relative to for all bodies fall with the 
same acceleration independent of their physical nature in a homogeneous gravitational field 
as well as with respect to our system K \  The assumption that one may treat K ’ as at rest in 
all strictness without any laws of nature not being fulfilled with respect to AT’, I call the 
“principle of equivalence.” (Einstein 1916)
So, the true strength of the gravitational field cannot be identified simply by
observing the motions in a frame of reference. The inertial or accelerating motions
of a given body, which are assumed to be considered with respect to a rest (or a
uniformly moving) frame, could be relativitized to any uniformly accelerating
reference frames that involve a uniform gravitational field:
This assumption of exact physical equivalence makes it impossible for us to speak of the 
absolute accelerations of the system of reference, just as the special theory of relativity 
forbids us to talk of the absolute velocity of a system. (DiSalle 2002)
In this way, the equivalence principle exhibits the close connection that exists 
between inertia and gravity. In the above passage, Einstein viewed the principle as 
extending the principle of relativity, which relativitizes the absolute acceleration of 
a system. Yet, it has been pointed out that this role of the principle of equivalence is 
misleading.5 (Friedman 1983, Earman 1974, Janssen 2004) This is because the
5 Einstein (1907) initially thought that the principle of equivalence enabled him to generalize the 
relativity between uniform and accelerated motions. By transforming the space-time coordinate of 
an accelerated observer, it seemed that her acceleration could be relativitized. An accelerated 
observer can maintain that she is at rest by stating that the gravitational field for her is different 
from the gravitational field of the inertial observer. This is the core of Einstein’s thought 
experiment of a free falling person in an elevator. But according to Janssen (2004), this view of 
the principle is not tenable: “Two observers in uniform motion are physically equivalent. [In 
contrast], two observers in non-uniform relative motion obviously not” Sitting at one’s desk in 
the patent office does not feel the same as feeling from the roof of the building, even though the 
man falling from the roof can, if he were so inclined, claim that he is at rest and that the
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distinction between accelerating and non-accelerating motion is manifest in the 
general theory: the latter is represented by a geodesic and the former is represented 
by a non-geodesic. What Einstein in fact intended with this principle turned out to 
be the dual role of the metric tensor representing inertia and gravity (Norton 1985, 
Janssen 2004).6 According to Einstein:
The inertio-gravitational field, represented by the metric tensor field, describes the metrical 
properties of space, inertial behaviour of bodies in space, and the effects of gravity. 
(Einstein 1918)
Norton and Janssen reiterate this point:
Einstein’s principle of equivalence asserted that the properties of space that manifest 
themselves in inertial effects are really the properties of a field structure in space: moreover 
this same structure also governs gravitational effects. ... The structure responsible for 
inertial and gravitational effects is the metric tensor. (Norton 1985, 40-1)
And:
In its mature form, the equivalence principle says that inertial effects (i.e., the effects of 
acceleration) and gravitational effects are manifestations of one and the same structure, 
nowadays called the inertio-gravitational field. How [a given] inertio-gravitational effect 
breaks down into an inertial component and a gravitational component is not unique but
dishevelled patent clerk whose eyes he meets on the way down is accelerating upward in a space 
with no gravitational field at all.” (Janssen 2004, 10)
6 Norton (1985) introduces failed attempts to comprehend Einstein’s principle of equivalence.
Pauli (1921) considered the principle as a claim that by transforming to an appropriate 
space-time coordinate system, an arbitrary gravitational field could be transformed away in an 
infinitely small region of space-time: “[F]or every infinitely small world region . . . ,  there always 
exist coordinate system in which gravitation has no influence either on the motion
of particles or any other physical processes.” (Pauli 1921, p. 145)
Yet this view is not tenable, since the presence of a gravitational field corresponds with non­
vanishing curvature of the space-time, which is the intrinsic property of geometry. Consider a 
case that tidal force acts on a free falling droplet. The aim of the above equivalence principle is to 
eliminate the tidal force. But it is impossible to do this. The tidal bulges on a freely falling droplet 
remains as the droplet becomes arbitrarily small, ignoring such effect as surface tension (Ohanian 
1976). Given that the gravitational field is described by an invariant quantity, it remains the same 
under any coordinate transformations. In this spirit, Synge states that “[i]n Einstein’s theory, 
either there is a gravitational field or there is none, according as the Riemann tensor does not or 
does vanish. This is absolute property; it has nothing to do with any observer’s world line (Synge 
1960, ix).”
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depends on the state of motion of the observer making the [judgement], just as it depends 
on the state of motion of the observer how an electromagnetic field breaks down into an 
electric field and a magnetic field. (Janssen 2004, 9)
Just as the special theory of relativity assumes that the electric and the magnetic
fields are special aspects of one entity called the electromagnetic field, so the
general theory of relativity takes it that the inertial structure of space-time and the
gravitational field are both special aspects of the inertio-gravitational field. The
principle of equivalence does not suggest a relativity of inertial and accelerating
motions, but rather one of inertia and gravity.
The extended relativity of inertia and gravity then results in new concepts of inertial
and accelerating motions. In order to see the way the concept of inertial motion
becomes modified, we need to examine its counterpart within the framework of
Newtonian mechanics. Within the Newtonian theory of gravity, the motion of a
gravitationally accelerating body can be decomposed into two separate elements; (1)
its inertial motion and (2) the acceleration due to gravity. The former is a “natural
tendency to move uniformly in a straight line” and the latter is a motion due to the
gravitational field. Within Einstein’s general theory of relativity, the principle of
equivalence (the relativity between inertia and gravity) states that the decomposition
of motion into inertial and gravitating components is not unique:
The focus of Einstein’s concern is the necessity in special relativity and classical mechanics 
of presuming an immutable division of relative spaces and frames of reference into the 
privileged inertial and the noninertial. The principle of equivalence enabled him to 
eliminate the immutability of this division, by reinterpreting the nature of the inertial 
effects which distinguish the privileged inertial spaces and frames from all others. (Norton 
1985,21)
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This results in a new concept of an inertial motion, which is the trajectory of a free- 
falling body in curved space-time. According to Penrose:
[In the Newtonian theory of gravity], an inertial motion was distinguished as the kind of 
motion that occurs when a particle is subject to a zero total external force. But with gravity 
we have a difficulty. Because of the principle of equivalence, there is no local way of 
telling whether a gravitational force is acting or whether what ‘feels’ like a gravitational 
force may just be the effect of an acceleration. Moreover,... the gravitational force can be 
eliminated by simply falling freely with i t . ... This was Einstein’s profoundly novel view: 
regard the inertial motions as being those motions that particles take when the total of non- 
gravitational force acting upon them is zero, so they must be falling freely with the 
gravitational field. (Penrose 2004, 393-4).
Why is a free-falling trajectory chosen as the privileged inertial one among the
infinite alternative combinations of inertial and gravitational motions, which are all
allowed by the principle of equivalence? According to DiSalle, one could choose
any decomposition into an inertial motion and a gravitational motion in
constructing a theory of gravity:
We can choose any coordinate system and identify its straight lines as geodesic worldlines; 
then we can construct the gravitational field as is required in order to make up the 
difference between these geodesics and the actual motions. (DiSalle 1995, 332, my italics)
However, Einstein did not choose an arbitrary coordinate system and identify its 
straight lines as corresponding to inertial motion, but determined a free-falling 
trajectory of a system as the privileged one. What is the justification of this? DiSalle 
points out that along with the equivalence principle, the requirement of general 
covariance selects gravitational free fall as the privileged state of motion:
Combined with the equivalence principle ... [the principle of general covariance] implies 
that a central Newtonian idea -  that gravity is a force causing deviations from uniform 
rectilinear motion -  is based on an arbitrary choice of coordinates. For a trajectory that 
satisfies all empirical criteria for being inertial in a particular frame of reference -  e.g. the
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trajectory of the center of mass in our example -  may be freely falling relative to some 
other trajectory that satisfies the same criteria. By contrast, a freely-falling trajectory is a 
freely falling trajectory in any coordinate system; it is only the decomposition of it into its 
inertial and gravitational parts that will be different in different coordinate systems.
(DiSalle 2002)
Thus, because other decompositions violate the principle of general covariance, one 
should consider the unique decomposition into an inertial motion and a gravitational 
motion. As DiSalle points out, the requirement of general covariance is then by no 
means an argument against a privileged state of motion. On the contrary, it is an 
argument that the privileged states of motion should not be a mere artifact of our 
choice of coordinate system (ibid.). Accordingly, gravitational free-fall, in the 
framework of the general theory of relativity, is a privileged state of motion.
(3) Modified Space-time Structuralism Looks At the Theory-Change
Modified space-time structuralism thus captures the continuity (or quasi-continuity) 
in the theory-change from the special to the general theory. In the last chapter, we 
have seen that the inertial principle, which stems from the light postulate, plays 
essential role within the special theory. And the special theory modifies inertial 
trajectories through the principles of the special relativity and the light postulate. In 
a similar manner, inertial motions play the essential role in the general theory, and 
the principles of equivalence, a dynamical principle of the general theory of 
relativity, once more modify the concept of inertial motion. Although these inertial 
motions, which specify the relationships between events, gain additional physical 
significance through the additional constraint involving the principle of inertia 
applied to light pulse in the special theory and the principle of inertia considering
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the equivalence principle in the general theory of relativity, these inertial motions 
are all represented by the same mathematical structure, that is, geodesics. A 
geodesic is defined as a body’s curve that continues to parallel to itself. So, the 
inertial motion of a body involves a local constraint between events, i.e. the tangent 
vector to the trajectory of the body remains parallel to itself. This structural 
constraint, which is expressed as the geodesic equation of motion, plays an essential 
part that captures the continuity in the theory-change from the special theory to the 
general theory of relativity.
Another way to see this structural continuity in the theory-change can be identified 
in the “comma-goes-to-semicolon” rule, which is the mathematical expression of the 
equivalence principle. The principle stems from a theoretical posit that the 
gravitational interaction is universal, and thus the trajectory of a freely falling body 
in a gravitational field does not depend on the internal structure of the body. In the 
special theory, one can determine the inertial trajectory of a given body with respect 
to a preferred inertial frame, which singles out an inertial observer who is unaffected 
by any force field. The straight trajectory of a body with respect to Minkowski 
space-time is defined as the inertial one. In contrast, given that the equivalence 
principle obliterates any preferred inertial frame, all bodies might experience 
acceleration due to the gravitational field. Instead, with reference to a local inertial 
frame, the trajectories of free-falling bodies are selected as a privileged one. This
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essential role of local inertial motions within the general theory is clearly captured 
by Misner, Thome, and Wheeler.
Don’t try to describe motion relative to faraway objects. Physics is simple only when 
analyzed locally. And locally the world line that a satellite follows [in spacetime, around 
the Earth] is already as straight as any world line can be. Forget all this talk about 
‘deflection’ and ‘force of gravitation.’ I’m inside a spaceship. Or I’m floating outside and 
near it. Do I feel any ‘force of gravitation’? Not at all. Does the spaceship ‘feel’ such a 
force? No. Then why talk about it? Recognize that the spaceship and I traverse a region of 
spacetime free of all force. Acknowledge that the motion through that region is already 
ideally straight. (Misner et al. 1973, 4-5)
The theory-change from the special theory to the general theory of relativity can be 
captured in a single sentence representing the principle of equivalence -  namely, 
that “physics is simple only when analysed locally.”
Whenever one is and whenever one probes, one finds that then and there one can introduce 
a local inertial frame in which all test particles move along straight lines. Moreover, this 
local inertial frame is also locally Lorentz: in it the velocity of light has its standard value, 
and light rays, like world lines of test particles, are straight. But physics is more, and the 
analysis of physics demands more than an account solely of the motions of test particles 
and light rays. What happens to Maxwell’s equations, the laws of hydrodynamics, the 
principles of atomic structure, and all the rest of physics under the influence of “powerful 
gravitational fields”?
The answer is simple: in any and every local Lorentz frame, anywhere and anytime in 
the universe, all the (nongravitational) laws of physics must take on their familiar special- 
relativistic forms. ... This is Einstein’s principle of equivalence in its strongest form ... The 
principle of equivalence has great power. With it one can generalize all the special 
relativistic laws of physics to curved spacetime. (Misner et al. 1973, 385-6, my italics)
Then, we can see the structural continuity in the theory-change from the special to 
the general theory of relativity within the so-called “comma-goes-to-semicolon” rule, 
which is “guaranteed by, and in fact is a mere rewording of, the equivalence 
principle.” (ibid., 387) This rule states that the transformation from laws in special 
relativistic space-time to ones in curved space-time merely requires that the partial
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derivatives of special relativistic laws, i.e. flat space-time gradients, are replaced by 
covariant derivatives, i.e. curved space-time gradients.7 Here, there are strong 
similarities within their mathematical structures although the latter obtains new 
physical significance by incorporating gravitational interactions:
Compare the abstract geometrical law ... in curved spacetime with the corresponding law 
... in flat spacetime. They are identical! ... The laws of physics, written in abstract 
geometric form, differ in no way whatsoever between curved spacetime and flat spacetime; 
this is guaranteed by, and in fact is a mere rewording of, the equivalence principle.
Compare the component version of the law ... as written in an arbitrary frame in curved 
spacetime ... ,with the component version in a global Lorentz frame of flat spacetime . . . .  
They differ in only one way: the comma (partial derivative; flat-spacetime gradient) is 
replaced by a semicolon (covariant derivative; curved-spacetime gradient). This procedure 
for rewriting the equations has universal application. The laws of physics, written in 
component form, change on passage from flat spacetime to curved spacetime by a mere 
replacement o f all commas by semicolon (no change at all physically or geometrically; 
change due only to switch in reference frame from Lorentz to non-Lorentz!). This statement, 
like the nonchanging of abstract geometric laws, is nothing but a rephrased version of the 
equivalence principle, (ibid., 386-7)
This structural similarity captures the essential continuity in the theory-change from
the special theory to the general theory. Consider the generalization of the trajectory
of freely-falling bodies with respect to flat space-time to one with respect to curved
space-time.8 Freely-falling bodies move in straight lines with respect to flat
Minkowski space-time. And this is mathematically represented as the vanishing of
the second derivative of the parameterised paths yf (A): <fy? IdX2 = 0. Yet, although
cbf IdX are the components of a well-defined vector, i.e. tensor, (fy? IdX2 are not.
Accordingly we adopt the chain rule as follows: cPyf IdX2 = (dxv ldX)dv{dyfx IdX). Then,
by “comma-goes-to-semicolon” rule the partial derivative is replaced by a covariant
7 A simple recipe for generalizing laws of physics to the curved spacetime context, known as the 
minimal coupling principle. In its baldest form, this recipe may be stated as follow. 1. Take a law 
of physics, valid in inertial coordinates in flat spacetime. 2. Write it in a coordinate-invariant 
(tensorial) form. 3. Assert that the resulting law remains true in curved spacetime. (Carroll 2004, 
152)
81 follow Carroll (2003) for this example.
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one: (dx” ldX)dv(dx? IdX) -> (dx” /dX)Vv(dxf IdX) = ify? IdX2 + (cbf IdX)(dx°/dX). So
we can see that in the general thoery, the trajectory of free-falling bodies satisfies 
the geodesic equation: cPxfldX2 + F 11 pa {dbf /dX){dxaIdX) = 0.
From the perspective of modified space-time structuralism, the equivalence 
principle modifies the relationships of events in that it identifies apparently different 
states of motions. And it specifies the trajectories of free-falling bodies under 
gravitational interaction. So, my modified version of space-time structuralism can 
provide an evolutionary account of the theory-change from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian physics. By emphasizing the essential role of the relations of regularity 
between events, which specially specify the inertial trajectories of bodies, we can 
see the commonality in our case of theory-change. The inertial trajectories of bodies 
are all specified by the relations of regularity between events, which are represented 
by the principle of inertia in Newtonian mechanics, the light postulate in the special 
theory, and the equivalence principle in the general theory. By considering physical 
interactions that are not taken into account within predecessor theories, the shared 
mathematical structures, i.e. geodesics obtain additional physical meaning in the 
course of the theory-change.
Furthermore, from the above perspective, we can understand why continuity is more 
essential than discontinuity within the theory-change from the special to the general 
theory. Within both the special and the general theories, the dynamical laws
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determine the structure of space-time in that these behaviours of bodies codify the 
spatio-temporal relations between events. Within the special theory, these spatio- 
temporal relationships between events are represented by the Minkowski geometry, 
which relates the inertial frames defined by the trajectories of bodies and light 
pluses. In contrast, within the general theory, the spatio-temporal relations between 
events are represented as curved space-time constituting the patchwork of local 
inertial frames defined by the trajectories of free falling particles under the 
gravitational field. Given that free-fall trajectories are viewed as the geodesics in the 
general theory, the curvature of space-time encodes the information that the free- 
falling trajectories of two nearby particles exhibit relative acceleration. And this 
idea is clearly captured by Misner, Thome, and Wheeler:
[I]t was the whole point of Einstein that physics looks simple only when analyzed locally. 
To look at local physics, however, means to compare one geodesic of one test particle with 
geodesics of other test particles travelling (1) nearby with (2) nearly the same directions 
and (3) nearly the same speeds. Then one can “look at the separations between these 
nearby test particles and from the second time-rate o f change of these separations and the 
‘equation of geodesic deviation ’ ... read out the curvature o f spacetime. (Misner et al 1973, 
33)
Accordingly, what curved space-time exhibits is the fact that the trajectories of two 
neighbouring free-falling bodies are encoded within the geometry of curved space­
time, just as what flat space-time signifies is the fact that the motions of bodies are 
encoded within Euclidean geometry. So, when Misner, Thome, and Wheeler (1973, 
5) famously wrote “space acts on matter, telling it how to move,” they were in fact 
summarizing the following essence of the general theory:
(1) [L]ocally, geodesics appear straight; (2) over more extended regions of space and time, 
geodesics originally receding from each other begin to approach at a rate governed by the
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curvature of space-time, and this effect of geometry on matter is what we mean today by 
that old word ‘gravitation.’ (ibid.)
And Ellis and Williams (2000) capture this essential role of inertial motions within 
the context of the theory-change.
As in the case of particle world-lines, the relative separation of neighbouring light rays can 
be used to detect space-time curvature, . . .In the space-time context, Euclid’s axiom that 
parallel straight lines never meet is replaced by an equation (the equation o f geodesic 
deviation) determining how the distance between neighbouring geodesics varies as a result 
of space-time curvature. In the case of light rays, these effects are directly observable by 
measuring apparent angular diameters of distant objects. (Ellis and Williams 2000, 213, my 
italics)
Accordingly, the structure of space-time in the general theory is determined by the 
behaviours of bodies just like its predecessors. Just as the geometries of Newtonian 
and Minkowski space-times encode information about the law of inertia that 
inertially moving particles move straight lines with constant velocity, the curvature 
of space-time of the general theory encodes the information that neighbouring 
inertially moving particles exhibit a relative acceleration.
In this way, the modification of the conceptions of inertial motion throughout the 
theory-change from the special theory to the general theory underlies the conceptual 
change of space-time. While inertial motions of bodies both within the special 
theory determine not only local but global inertial frames, a local inertial frame 
within the general theory cannot be extended into a single global inertial frame. 
Einstein’s equivalence principle prohibits inertially moving observers from 
determining a global inertial frame. So, “physics looks simple only when analysed
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locally.” This fact that the members of a set of locally inertial frames (that are 
determined by inertially moving bodies) are mutually disoriented (because of 
different distribution of the gravitational field) with respect to one another is 
characterized as the curvature of space-time.
Thus, if we look at the theory-change from the Newtonian theory of gravity to the 
Einsteinian theory of gravity from the perspective emphasizing the dynamical laws 
rather than space-time, the essential continuity between the two theories is easily 
identified. Although their different space-time structures exhibit a discontinuity, the 
general theory of relativity still maintains the essential framework of Newtonian 
mechanics and of special relativity: the relationships between events specified by 
the dynamical laws play essential role and determine the spatio-temporal structure. 
Given that the relationships between events, which are specified by the dynamical 
laws, are more essential than the structure of space-time, I endorse the evolutionary 
view in this case of theory-change i.e., the general feature of the theory-change is 
“essential continuity with modification,” just as Einstein himself implied.
The defenders of a revolutionary view might claim that my thesis of continuity 
between Newtonian dynamics, the special and the general theory of relativity based 
on the central role of inertial motions could be challenged by its following 
conceptual changes; (1) within the general theory there is no separate law of inertia 
given that the concept of inertial motions under ordinary circumstances, as
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discussed in the previous section, can be derived from Einstein’s field equations, 
whereas within Newtonian dynamics and the special theory inertial motion is 
posited independent from dynamical equations.
However, we can see that this response is not tenable if one considers where 
Einstein’s field equations stem from. We have seen that Einstein’s field equations 
stem from a Newtonian equation expressing the relative acceleration of 
neighbouring test particles. So, it is no surprise that Einstein’s field equations 
contain the information of inertial motions of bodies. Given that Einstein’s field 
equations can be viewed as a generalization of Newtonian equation, it is 
problematical to say that the notion of inertial motion in the general theory 
originates independently from its predecessors.9
Another response from advocates for a revolutionary view could come from the fact 
that in contrast to inertial motion in Newtonian dynamics and the special theory, the 
same notion in the general theory of relativity is not universal. It is because bodies 
with internal angular momentum do not follow geodesics in the absence of external 
forces:
The object possesses an angular momentum, mass quadruple moments. And higher
multipole moments. They interact with the tide-producing accelerations (Riemann
9 When Brown (2005: 141) emphasizes this characteristic in the general theory, it does not 
show that the notion of inertial motions in the general theory is fundamentally different from 
the one in its predecessors. Rather his main point is the important role of dynamics in overall 
theoretical structure of the general theory. However, this role of dynamics, as discussed in the 
chapter 2, is as important within Newtonian dynamics and the special theory as within the 
general theory.
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curvature) of the background geometry. Depending on the orientation in space of these 
moments, interactions drive the object off its geodesic course in one direction or another.
... No object of finite mass moving under the influence of a complex background will 
admit a buffer zone where the geometry approached Minkowskian values with arbitrary 
precision. Therefore it is incorrect to say that such an object follows a geodesic world line. 
(Misner etal. 1973, 476-9)
Within the general theory, a massive particle, which involves internal structure such 
as an angular momentum, mass quadruple momentum, do not follow geodesics 
because of its interaction with a background geometry. It seems to be an undeniable 
conceptual change in our case of the theory-change.
Yet, this response is not tenable either. This is because inertial motion within 
Newtonian dynamics and the special theory can be defined under approximated and 
ceteris paribus conditions. The former involves a test particle with zero mass, and 
the latter involves there is no external force, which abstracts the complexities of 
phenomena that real world involves. If the internal structure of a massive bodies and 
its interaction with a background are considered, the inertial motions within 
Newtonian and the special theory does not follow geodesics either. So, just as the 
inertial motion in the general theory can be defined by means of abstraction 
eliminating internal angular momentum from body, the inertial motion in its 
predecessor can be defined by means of abstraction eliminating any external forces. 
The notions of inertial motion within all these three theories involve these 
approximations. Hence, it seems difficult to claim the occurrence of the radical 
change in the notion of inertial motions based on its approximation within the 
general theory.
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2. Can We Still Say That Curved Space-time Revolutionizes Physics?
The defenders of a revolutionary account of the theory-change from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian physics might also respond that radical change is involved in a 
difference between the concepts of space-times in the special theory and the general 
theory of relativity, that is, flat space-time in the former vs. curved space-time in the 
latter. Actually, this is the most frequently mentioned revolutionary feature in the 
general theory in contrast to its predecessors.
[W]e motivated our discussion of manifolds by introducing the Einstein Equivalence 
Principle, or EEP: “In small enough regions of spacetime, the laws of physics reduce to 
those of special relativity; it is impossible to detect the existence of a gravitational field by 
means of local experiments.” The EEP arises from the idea that gravity is universal; it 
affects all particles (and indeed all forms of energy-momentum) in the same way. This 
feature of universality led Einstein to propose that what we experience as gravity is a 
manifestation of the curvature of spacetime. The idea is simply that something so universal 
as gravitation could be most easily described as a fundamental feature of the background 
on which matter fields propagate, as opposed to as a conventional force. (Carroll 2003, 151, 
my italics)
Within the general theory, the gravitational interaction emerges from the curvature 
of space-time. In contrast, its predecessors adopt the gravitational field posited 
independently from the rigid structure of space-time. This seems to suggest that the 
general theory of relativity can be viewed as revolutionary in terms of different 
understanding of the relationships between the dynamical field and space-time 
structure (i.e., between matter and space-time). This section criticizes this 
revolutionary claim from the perspective of modified space-time structuralism.
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In order to do this task, we will consider the relationship between the Newtonian 
theory of gravitation (a theory based on flat space-time) and the Newton-Cartan 
theory of gravitation (a theory based on curved space-time). These two alleged rival 
theories are chosen in our context because the relationship between these two 
theories maintains the identical structure to the two theories in our case of the 
theory-change in terms of the difference between the concepts of space-times.10 
Then, our thesis of this section is: “Can the structure of space-time within the 
Newton-Cartan theory of gravitation can be viewed as being revolutionary -  a 
genuinely incompatible rival -  in comparison to the one within the Newtonian 
theory of gravitation?” If the argument for a revolutionary view succeeds here, there 
is a good reason to view that Einstein’s theory of gravitation, i.e., the general theory 
of relativity, revolutionizes the special theory of relativity.
But I will argue that if we emphasize dynamical laws, we can in fact see the 
conceptual change from flat to curved space-time as a gradual modification. We will 
see here that curved space-time is the result of the elimination of superfluous space­
time structure, which is not supported by dynamical laws. Before we argue the case 
as regards the classical theories of gravitation, we examine a similar case of
10 This case employing neo-Newtonian space-time and Newton-Cartan theory of gravitation is a 
rational reconstruction of history in a sense that these two theories in fact post-date, respectively, 
the transitions from Newtonian physics to the special theory relativity, and from the special 
theory to the general theory of relativity. Despite the fact that they are post hoc inventions and 
hence played no role in history of science, I am considering these cases because they maintain 
exact identical structure in comparing the structure of space-time.
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Newtonian and neo-Newtonian (Galilean) space-times since its moral is easier to 
draw.
(1) Van Fraassen on the Multiple Possibilities of Specification of an Inertial Frame
In a section of his Scientific Image, van Fraassen provides a specific case study 
showing that Newtonian mechanics (construed realistically) has an infinite number 
of empirically equivalent, but logically incompatible rivals.11 (van Fraassen 1980, 
44-50) This claim is based on an interpretation of Newton’s Principia (1726). In the 
Scholium, Newton begins with distinctions between ‘saved phenomena’ and 
‘postulated reality’ and between the ‘apparent motions’ and ‘true motions’ of a 
particular body. The apparent motions of a planet are relative motions that depend 
on the position of the observer. True motions, on the other hand, are those that can 
be uniquely defined in the Absolute Space that provides the framework for
11 A general form of the empirical equivalence thesis maintains that for any theory T which entails 
observational evidence E, there exists another rival theory T’ such that T  also entails E and 
therefore is empirically equivalent to T. As a consequence, T and T’ warrant the same degree of 
belief. Accordingly, one reaches the sceptical conclusion that E cannot provide a reason for 
believing one theory rather than the other.
This empirical equivalence thesis makes a very strong claim in that it is concerned with every 
possible theory rather than with particular cases. In a section of the Scientific Image, van Fraassen 
provides a guide for building an empirically equivalent rival in general cases: from any given 
theory T, we can create the rival T\ which claims that the empirical consequences of T is true, but 
that T itself is false, (van Fraassen 1980, ch.3) By construction, T and T’ are empirically 
equivalent but logically incompatible theories.
However, the above van Fraassen’s construction has been criticized on the ground that it might be 
“excluded from serious scientific discourse for failing to satisfy an a priori constraint on the 
proper form for a scientific theory.” (Kukla 2000, 22) Yet, he also provides a specific case based 
on Newtonian space-time, which this section is concerned with.
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Newtonian mechanics. Van Fraassen assumes that Newton takes Absolute Space to 
exist in a literal sense (ibid., 45):
The ‘apparent motions’ form relational structures defined by measuring relative distance, 
time intervals, and angles of separation. For brevity, let us call these relational structures 
appearances. ... When Newton claims empirical adequacy for his theory, he is claiming 
that his theory has some model such that all actual appearances are identifiable with 
(isomorphic to) motions in that model. ... Newton’s theory does a great deal more than this. 
It is part of his theory that there is such a thing as Absolute Space, that absolute motion is 
motion relative to Absolute Space, that absolute acceleration causes certain stresses and 
thereby deformations in the appearances, and so on. (ibid., 45-6)
Van Fraassen defines TN as Newtonian mechanics, and TN(y) as any theory that
entails that the centre of mass of the solar system moves at constant velocity v with
regard to Absolute Space. Because of Newton’s famous ‘hypothesis’ -  that the
centre of mass of the solar system is at rest in absolute space -  Newton’s own
dynamics can be identified as TN(0). But as Newton himself in effect pointed out, if
TN(0) is empirically adequate, then we can construct an infinite number of 77V(Vj)’s,
which are also empirically equivalent to, but logically incompatible with, TN(0).
Here it seems that there is a genuine underdetermination of theory, because there is
no way of selecting the ‘best’ theory from this infinite set, as the one which can
most justifiably claim to represent the real world.
Van Fraassen, as already mentioned, in effect assumes that absolute space can be 
understood as existing in a literal sense. Given this, absolute position and velocity 
also seem to be physically significant concepts. Although absolute velocity, which 
is the rate of change of absolute position, cannot be measured, it is a well-defined 
term in the kinematics of Newtonian dynamics. TN(0) and TN(y) thus represent
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different pictures of the world. The main line of reasoning in van Fraassen’s 
argument is that empirically equivalent but logically incompatible theories result 
from the realist’s interpretation of space. Consequently, realists about space-time 
confront a major epistemological difficulty. Constructive empiricists, on the other 
hand, do not believe that we need to select one particular TN(v) as the realistic 
account of the world; all 7W(v) are equally empirically adequate (with respect to all 
possible phenomena) and hence all are equally good from the constructive 
empiricist perspective.
Apparently, Newton himself thought that absolute space exists and absolute position 
is a physically significant concept. In de Gravitatione, he characterized the parts of 
space from our “exceptionally clear idea of extension,” by means of
abstracting the dispositions and properties of a body so that there remains only the uniform
and unlimited stretching out of space in length, breadth and depth In all directions,
space can be distinguished into parts whose common limits we usually call surfaces; . . . .  
[W]e can possibly imagine that there is nothing in space, yet we cannot think that space 
does not exist... (Newton 1962, 132-7)
According to this account, it seems that space is taken as having substantial
existence analogous to that of a material body independent of matter in space. And
concerning absolute position:
It is from their essence or nature that [the parts of absolute space] are places; and that the 
primary places of things should be movable, is absurd. These are therefore the absolute 
places; and translations out of those places, are the only absolute motions. (Newton 1729)
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Leibniz also considered Newton as asserting the reality of absolute space: 
“[Newtonians] maintain, therefore, that space is a real absolute being” (Alexander 
25)12
Nevertheless, I believe that van Fraassen’s argument stems from a careless 
interpretation of Newtonian theory that emphasizes a space-time as existing “over 
and above” the dynamical laws. Although Newton clearly thought that absolute 
space and position have physically significant meanings, and although we must 
admit a certain absoluteness to make sense of inertial trajectories of moving bodies, 
absolute position and velocity should in fact be discarded in Newtonian dynamics. 
Nor is this a retrospective, or post hoc, judgement -  Newton himself recognized the 
problem of positing superfluous structure in Cartesian concept of space, and 
expressed his concern in De Gravitatione:
[I]t is impossible to pick out the place in which a motion begins, for this place no longer 
exists after motion is completed, so the space passed over, having no beginning, can have 
no length; and hence, since velocity depends upon the distance passed over in a given time, 
it follows that a moving body can have no velocity, just as I wished to prove at first. 
(Newton 1962, 130)
This is because “the whole space of the planetary heavens either rests (as is 
commonly believed) or moves uniformly in a straight line, and hence the communal 
centres of gravity of the planets are the same ... .” (Newton 1962, 301)
12 This reading of Newton’s account is associated with the debate between substantivalism and 
relationism about space. According to van Fraassen, “it is part of his (Newton’s) theory that there 
is such a thing as Absolute Space...” (van Fraassen 1980,45). In this spirit, Rynasiewicz 
characterizes the substance-relation controversy as a choice “whether we should be realists in 
some suitably robust sense about space and time (space-time), or whether no such entities exist 
over and above the objects and events of the material world.” (Rynasiewicz, 1996, 279)
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Slowik suggests that Newton recognized the requirement to “equip space and time 
with the necessary structure to discern inertial motion,” (Slowik 2002, 38) and 
employed absolute space to complete this task. Nevertheless, the lack of 
sophisticated mathematical techniques made Newton posit a “stronger” space-time 
structure than was needed for the laws of motion, (ibid.) Newtonian space-time 
provides superfluous structures, i.e. absolute position and velocity to capture 
absolute motions such as acceleration.
[S]ince Newton was intent on allocating the requisite geometrical structure to delineate 
inertial motion, and since “absolute spatial position” represented the best available means 
of reaching this goal, Newton would appear to have had no other choice but to violate the 
empirical import of Galilean relativity through the installation of this absolute structure. 
When Newton was faced with the dilemma of accepting either a theory too weak to render 
inertial motion coherent or one too strong to rationalize Galilean relativity, he chose the 
latter -  concluding that too much is better than incoherent! (ibid.)13
This redundancy is witnessed by the fact that a set of absolute positions is actually 
identified by the principle of Galilean relativity. In his Corollary V to the laws of 
motion in the Principia, Newton again expressed his concern about the relativity of 
motion: “When bodies are enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation to one
13 Penrose (2004: 387) expresses the similar view as Slowik’s, and suggests that this unavailable 
mathematics in Newton’s time is actually a fibre bundle within modem differentiable geometry. 
Clearly we should take Galileo seriously. There is no meaning to be attached to the notion 
that any particular point in space a minute from now is to be judged as the same point in 
space as the one that I have chose. ... It may seems alarming that our very notion of physical 
space seems to be something that evaporates completely as one moment passes, and reappears 
as a completely different space as the next moment arrives! But here the mathematics 
[introduced earlier] comes to our rescue . . . .  Galilean spacetime is not a product space E1 x 
E3, it is a fibre bundle with base space E1. In a fibre bundle, there is no pointwise 
identification between one fibre and the next; nevertheless the fibres fit together to form a 
connected whole.
230
another are the same whether that space is at rest or whether it is moving uniformly 
straight forward without any circular motion.” (Newton 1729, 423) The Galilean 
principle states that physics is identical within any reference frame that moves in a 
uniform and rectilinear way with respect to absolute space. Thus we can see that 
Newtonian space, as Newton himself realized, has a physically superfluous structure, 
which is not supported by a dynamical principle. The multiple possibilities of 
inertial structure are best thought of as an equivalence class representing a single 
inertial structure. Given the principle of Galilean relativity, it is better to get rid of 
remnant structures. Neo-Newtonian (Galilean) space-time can, as shown in the 
previous chapter, be formulated without absolute position and velocity since they 
are excess structures, which have no physical significance.
Another way to look at this superfluous structure is from the perspective of the 
space-time and the dynamical symmetries of Newtonian theory. Within Newtonian 
dynamics, the Galilean group is the dynamical symmetry leaving Newton’s 
equations invariant. On the other hand, the space-time symmetry that characterizes 
the invariant geometric structure is the group of Euclidean rotations and translations. 
This is a smaller group than the Galilean one. (Earman 1986, 45-55) Due to these 
ill-adjusted symmetries, Newtonian space-time has an excess structure that enables 
us to identify absolute position. Given the group of dynamical symmetries, which is 
larger than the group of space-time symmetries, absolute rest and absolute velocity 
cannot be distinguished by any empirical means. Within neo-Newtonian space-time,
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the space-time symmetry becomes the Galilean group by getting rid of absolute 
position. In this modification of Newtonian space-time, the group of space-time 
symmetries is identical to that of the dynamical symmetries.
The problem with van Fraassen’s argument is, therefore, that it employs superfluous 
space-time structure, which is not supported by a law of motion. If the situation that 
van Fraassen cites is considered from the dynamical perspective of space-time, it is 
easy to see that the empirically equivalent space-time models he points to are not in 
fact genuine rivals. The dynamical perspective views the structure of space-time as 
stemming from dynamical laws which specify the relationships between events. 
Hence, the superfluous structure of space-time, which is posited over and above 
dynamical laws, cannot be considered as doing real work within Newtonian 
dynamics. Van Fraassen constructs an infinite number of empirically equivalent 
theories by attaching space-time structures that makes no physical contribution to 
the original theory TN. Absolute position is irrelevant to the dynamical laws of TN. 
Moreover, as Newton himself saw, it was recognizably irrelevant at the time and not 
merely in retrospect. If A is a remnant structure within TN, then it can be stripped 
away, not just without empirical loss, but without any theoretical loss whatsoever. 
Call the stripped down theory T N -A . This should be regarded as the real theory, 
because adding A back by conjoining it with T N -A  to regain TN, adds nothing that 
really makes an assertion about the world. Hence, two apparently distinct theories, 
TN(0) and 77V(v) cannot be considered as genuine rival theories.
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Van Fraassen’s ‘problem’ stems from the claim that the structure of space-time 
exists “over and above” the dynamical laws that specifies the motions of material 
bodies. Empirically equivalent rival space-time models become an issue only if the 
structure of space-time is incorrectly viewed as an essential working part of the 
theory, which is independent from dynamical laws. Accordingly, van Fraassen’s 
argument is effective only to one who -  mistakenly -  views space-time as an 
independently existing entity or structure.
(2) Earman on the Newtonian Theory vs. the Newton-Cartan Theory of Gravity
Earman seems to provide a more convincing case in support of the empirical 
equivalence thesis by providing two different formulations of classical theories of 
gravity. Earman considers two theories:
TN (a theory with force and Euclidean space) [the Newtonian theory of gravity] is opposed 
by a theory [the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity] that eschews gravitational force in 
favour of a non-flat affine connection (a theory with non-Euclidean geometry, and without 
force) and which predicts exactly the same particle orbits as TN for gravitationally 
interacting particles. (Earman 1993, 31)
In more detail, the Newtonian theory of gravity can be formulated as a theory with a 
gravitational field that propagates through a background flat neo-Newtonian space­
time. However, another formulation is available -  the so-called Newton-Cartan 
theory of gravity. In this theory, the gravitational field is absorbed into the structure 
of space-time (the connection with non-zero curvature). There is a clear and 
important dissimilarity in the relation between the posited space-time structure and
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the dynamical structures of these two theories. While space-time in the Newtonian 
theory of gravity is independent of its dynamical structure, the space-time structure 
of the Newton-Cartan theory involves a connection that depends on the matter 
distribution. These two theories then appear to be genuine empirically equivalent 
rivals: they are constructed so as to be empirically equivalent and they seem to be 
genuine rivals in that positing gravitational interaction as a fundamental force is 
significantly different from treating it as a curvature of space-time.
In the case of the Newtonian theory of gravity with neo-Newtonian space-time, its 
models are formulated by (1) the four-dimensional differentiable manifold, (2) the 
spatial metric, (3) the temporal metric, (4) the flat derivative operator associated 
with the connection on the differentiable manifold, (5) the gravitational potential, 
and (6) the Newtonian mass-density function. The first four geometrical objects 
represent the structure of neo-Newtonian space-time, and the other objects represent 
the contents that govern the dynamics. Within this space-time, the connection of 
curvature of which is vanishing, the inertial motion of a given body is represented 
by its geodesics. And over and above the space-time, the gravitational field is 
posited as propagating as a fundamental force. The gravitational field is expressed 
as the negative gradient of the gravitational potential: G = -  grad(O). And Poisson’s 
equation, d2<$>/dx2 + d2<t>/dy2 + d2Q>ldz? = Anp, relates the gravitational potential O to 
the mass density function p. The equation of motion can be written as mcfxi/dt2 =
-  md<S>/dt, which can be read as the mass m times acceleration equates to the
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gravitational force acting on the given body with mass m. From this formulation, 
non-inertial motion of a given body is described as a trajectory deviating from a 
geodesic, the curvature of which measures the total force per unit mass. A notable 
characteristic of these space-time structures is their immutability in the sense that 
they are posited independently of dynamical structure, i.e., of the gravitational 
potential and the mass-density function. In this way, the Newtonian theory of 
gravity can be described as the propagation of the gravitational field through a rigid 
space-time structure.
In contrast, the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity is a geometrized formulation of the 
Newtonian theory of gravity. Given the equivalence principle, by absorbing the 
gravitational potential into the connection, the gravitational interaction within this 
framework emerges from the space-time curvature, rather than as a fundamental 
force. The physical motivation for “geometrizing away” Newtonian gravity stems 
from the conventionality of the choice of the affine connection and the gravitational 
potential. Friedman provides an example to show the motivation behind modifying 
the Newtonian theory of gravity (Friedman 1983, 95-6). Instead of a given 
gravitational potential <X> set in an inertial frame [xj (of which the equation of 
motion is mcfxi Idt2 = -  md<S>/dx), we can set a new gravitational potential = O + 
Xj cfbj/dt2, which is measured in a different frame [yj moving with the acceleration 
cfbi/dt2 with respect to the original inertial frame [xj. As a result, a new equation of
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motion can be written as mcfyi Idt2 = -  md^/dy = 0, which has an extra gravitational 
potential Xj cfbjldt2 replacing the acceleration (fbi Idt2.
These two gravitational potentials satisfy the same dynamical theory, and thus are 
empirically equivalent. On the basis of local conditions alone, we cannot single out 
which one is the true gravitational potential. The possibility of having different 
potentials suggests that the connection r  ljk is also be underdetermined. The 
alternative choice of the gravitational potential in terms of space-time geometry 
means that the flat connection, of which all components vanish, is now replaced by 
the non-flat connection with a non vanishing component r  l00 = The law of 
motion within geometrized framework is <£xtIdt2 + T ljk (dxj/dt)(dxk/dt) = 0. In other 
word, since the geodesics in the non-flat connection now represent the free falling 
trajectories, the motions of a given body are due to the structure of curved space­
time. In this way, the difference between the two frameworks seems to become 
manifest:
In the geometrized formulation of the theory, gravitation is no longer conceived as a 
fundamental “force” in the world, but rather as a manifestation of spacetime curvature (just 
as in relativity theory). Rather than thinking of [gravitating] point particles as being 
deflected from their straight natural (i.e. geodesic) trajectories, one thinks of them as 
traversing geodesics in curved spacetime. (Malament 2007, 266)
Are these two theories genuine rivals? The main reason for thinking so is the 
different status given to the gravitational interaction within them. The gravitational 
interaction within the Newtonian theory of gravity is posited as a fundamental force,
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which propagates independently of neo-Newtonian space-time. On the contrary, the 
gravitational interaction in the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity is related to the 
curvature of space-time. This difference seems to stem from the fact that the two 
theories are constructed from different ontological underpinnings. In spite of his 
reservation about characterizing the metaphysical properties of gravity, Newton 
seemed to hold that the independence of gravity and space-time is manifest. The 
force of gravity, without assigning a specific mechanism of gravity, is characterized 
as arising “from cause that penetrates the sun and planet without any diminution of 
power to act.” (Newton 1726, 943) On the contrary, space-time is considered as the 
set of spatio-temporal relations between events: “it is only through their reciprocal 
order and position that the parts of duration and space are understood to be the very 
ones that they truly are.” (Hall and Hall, 103) Furthermore, space-time is not 
supposed to be influenced by matter. So, if the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity 
relates space-time structure with dynamics, together with the original theory it 
seems to provide a genuine example of two empirically equivalent but logically 
incompatible theoretical frameworks.
However, I would argue that Earman’s reasoning in fact involves a similar trick to 
van Fraassen’s. Earman also bases his case on superfluous space-time structure 
within Newtonian theory. As pointed out in Friedman’s account, what differentiates 
the two theories of gravity is their different combination of the affine connection 
and the gravitational potential. In other words, the ‘difference’ of these space-time
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structures stems from a different division between the spatio-temporal structure and 
the dynamical structure. However, this division is by no means supported by a 
dynamical principle underlying gravitational interaction. According to the 
equivalence principle, a specific combination of the flat connection and the 
gravitational potential <D within the Newtonian scheme is arbitrary.14 In other words, 
uniformly accelerating reference frames cannot be distinguished from the rest frame. 
Accordingly, the over-rigidity of spatio-temporal relations between events, which 
sets the components of the connection as vanishing, counts as superfluous structure. 
By incorporating the gravitational potential into the connection, this redundant 
space-time structure can be eliminated. Given that the element that makes the 
empirically equivalent rivals possible is superfluous structure of the Newtonian 
theory of gravity, it seems difficult to consider the two theories of gravity as 
genuine rivals.
However, couldn’t it be argued that it is easy to demonstrate a continuity between 
the Newtonian theory and the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity if one in effect 
introduces ideas that belong to the later theory within the earlier one? However, this 
response is not tenable. For the judgement of what is “superfluous” within the 
former theory is not made by the latter theory since Newton explicitly recognized
14 One could ask why should anyone believe the equivalence principle when we are concerned 
with pre-Einstein physics. Yet, this is what essentially distinguishes the Newton-Cartan theory of 
gravity from the Newtonian theory of gravity. The issue here is whether or not the the former’s 
employment of the equivalence principle provides a genuine rival of the latter.
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the above fact although he did not incorporate this consideration when he 
constructed his theory of gravity:
If bodies are moving in any way whatsoever with respect to one another and are urged by 
equal accelerative forces along parallel lines, they will all continue to move with respect to 
one another in the same way as they would if they were not acted on by those forces. 
(Newton 1726, 423, my italics)
And he also applied this idea to the case of the solar system:
It may be alleged that the sun and planets are impelled by some other force equally and in 
the direction o f parallel lines', but such a force (by Cor. VI of the Laws of Motion) no 
change would happen in the situation of the planets to one another, nor any sensible effect 
follow... (Newton 1729, 558, my italics)
Accordingly, the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity modifies the previous space-time
framework to eliminate superfluous structures that enable us to make a conventional
choice of the gravitational potential and the connection.
These superfluous structures can be easily identified from the perspective of the 
coordination between the space-time symmetries and the dynamical symmetries. In 
the case of the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity, the group of both dynamical and 
space-time symmetries is the ‘Maxwellian group’, whose elements are invariant 
under transformations between rigid Euclidean, non-rotating, non-accelerating 
references. And in the case of the Newtonian theory of gravity, the group of space­
time symmetry is the Galilean group, whereas the group of dynamical symmetry is 
the Maxwellian group. Although the space-time symmetries of both theories, which 
provide structures sufficient for the description of the bodies’ motion, are distinct, 
we can see that the dynamical symmetries are identical. So, although the two 
examples in Earman’s case are represented within apparently different ontological
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schemes (neo-Newton space-time vs. Newton-Cartan space-time), they are by no 
means genuine rivals if one adopts the dynamical perspective since the dynamical 
structures are indistinguishable. (Bain 2004)
A defender of a revolutionary view in this case might still argue that this analogy 
between van Fraassen’s argument and that of Earman is by no means complete. In 
van Fraassen’s argument, the inertial trajectories of a given body, which are 
specified by its laws of motion, do not support the distinction between two rivals 
TN(0) and TN(y). The inertial trajectories within Earman’s two rival theories are, 
however, different. On the one hand, the Newtonian theory of gravity employs the 
motion of bodies subject to a zero total external force as being inertial motion. On 
the other hand, the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity considers the motion exerted by 
a zero total external non-gravitational force as an inertial motion. So, the analogy 
between the two cases is not exact.
But this response is not tenable. In van Fraassen’s case, two rivals TN(0) and TN(v) 
cannot be distinguished because the laws of motion that the two theories satisfy are 
the same. In contrast, the Newtonian theory of gravity and the Newton-Cartan 
theory of gravity cannot be considered as genuine rivals despite the fact that their 
laws of motion are different. Although the laws of motion are expressed in different 
forms, the inertial trajectories relating events, which are specified by the laws, are
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dynamically indistinguishable. The difference is simply in the way the laws of 
motion are described. This was clearly recognized by Penrose:
[TJhis does not actually represent a change in Newton’s theory [of gravity], but merely 
provides a different description of it. ... Roughly speaking, in [Newton-]Cartan’s scheme, it 
is the inertial motions in this Einsteinian, rather than the Newtonian sense, that provide the 
‘straight’ world lines of space-time. Otherwise, the geometry is like the Galilean [space­
time] ... [In the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity,] the Newtonian gravitational field is 
completely encoded into its structure. (Penrose 2004, 394)
So, if we consider the relationship between flat and curved space-time formulations 
from the point of view of modified space-time structuralism, the latter is seen as a 
modification , in that the curved space-time formulation eliminates the structure of 
space-time that is not supported by its underlying dynamical laws. Just as neo- 
Newtonian space-time is a result of a gradual modification from Newtonian space­
time, the curved space-time formulation is a result of a gradual modification of flat 
space-time formulation. According to Friedman:
[T]here is a close analogy between the move from [the Newtonian theory of gravity] to [the 
Newton-Cartan theory of gravity] and our earlier move from the kinematics of [Newtonian 
space-time] to the kinematics of [neo-Newtonian space-time]. Both cases start with a theory 
that invokes indeterminate entities. In the kinematics of [Newtonian space-time] the 
absolute space V is indeterminate ... .In [the Newtonian theory of gravity] the gravitational 
potential O (together with the flat connection D°) is indeterminate. [I]n both cases we move 
to a new theory that eliminates the indeterminate entities in question by taking formerly 
definable objects as primitive. In the kinematics of [Newtonian space-time] the flat 
connection D° is definable in terms of dt, h, and V; in [neo-Newtonian space-time] we take 
D° as primitive and drop V. In [the Newtonian theory of gravity] the nonflat connection D 
is definable in terms of D° and O; in [the Newton-Cartan theory of gravity] we take D as 
primitive and drop D° and O. (Friedman 1983, 121)
In comparison to the former case which eliminates absolute velocity, the latter case
does not get rid of absolute acceleration relative to D°. The Newton-Cartan theory of
gravity replaces it with new notion of absolute acceleration. Yet, both cases have the
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same structure, in that theories with superfluous space-time structures are replaced 
by theories without them. So, if one can accept that the development from 
Newtonian to neo-Newtonian space-time is an evolutionary process, one should 
again accept the development of flat to curved space-time as the same.
Yet, if these conceptual changes are considered from the perspective of space-time 
alone, our evolutionary view seems to be weak. According to Friedman (1983):
[A] more reasonable criterion of ontological commitment [of geometrical objects] requires 
only that a theory is commintted to objects that are explicitly definable from its primitive or 
basic objects. The objects not only exist mathematically; they are distinguished by the 
formulas of the theory. On this criterion, the formulation of [the Newton-Cartan theoty of 
gravity] is no longer committed to the flat connection and gravitational potential of [the 
Newtonian theory of gravity]. In fact, ... the formulation of [the Newton-Cartan theory of 
gravity] does not even imply the existence of a unique gravitational potential and flat 
connection. On a more reasonable criterion of ontological commitment the two theories are 
not equivlaent, for they are not committed to the same objects, (ibid., 122, note 15)
However, as modified space-time structuralism suggests, postulating the inertial 
principle that free-falling particles follow the geodesic trajectories of space-time 
does not imply the existence of an unobservable entity, the “affine structure.” 
Instead, what is essential about this principle is the relationships between events, 
which are specified by the dynamical principle.
The modification of kinematics in accordance with dynamical principles is an 
evolutionary process. This is because that a modification, according to modified 
space-time structuralism, is concerned with a change in the decomposition into 
inertial and gravitatiting motions, rather than a change of ontological commitment.
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In other words, what is essentially at stake in the two different formulations of 
classical theories of gravity is a difference concerning the way the motion of a 
gravitionally accelerating body can be decomposed into its inertial component and 
its gravitational one. Given that within the two classical theories of gravity, these 
two motions are all represented by the relationships between events, there is no 
change in ontological commitment. The modification is instead concerned with the 
way the relationships between events, i.e. the world-lines of inertial observers and 
the world-lines of test particles subject to external force field, are differently 
comprehended by means of the additional consideration of gravitational interaction. 
Given that these relationships between events are modified by considering an 
additional force field on top of its predecessor’s characterization of the relationships 
between events, the theory-change from flat to curved space-time formulation is an 
essentially evolutionary process.
243
244
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis argued for an evolutionary account of the theory-change from Newtonian 
to Einsteinian physics. Two opposing points of view can be found in the literature, 
which characterize the theory-change as either evolutionary (for example, Hempel 
and Friedman) or revolutionary (for example, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend). These 
views attempt to support their positions by referring to the formal, conceptual and 
ontological aspects of both Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. We have seen that 
these two views by no means provide appropriate accounts of this particular theory- 
change. And I tried to provide a new version of the evolutionary view -  one that 
responds to the weaknesses and builds on the strengths of already existing views.
The weaknesses of the existing evolutionary views provide important clues for my 
own account of the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. Although the formal 
aspect yields important information concerning the continuity (or quasi-continuity) of 
the theory-change, it is deficient -  the formal mathematics requires a physical 
interpretation that is essential to the theories involved and captures the theories’ 
essential aspect contributed to their empirical success. The ontological accounts of 
space-time are expected to remedy the shortcomings of the formal accounts of the 
theory-change.
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However, in order to provide an acceptable account of the theory-change, one needs 
to solve a major problem pointed out by critics such as Brown, DiSalle, and Huggett 
(who can be categorized as supporting the dynamical perspective of space-time). 
These critics have criticized these ontological accounts for mischaracterizing the 
relationships between space-time and the laws of motion, which constitute the two 
pillars of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics.
Another central motivation of my thesis is structuralism as advocated by Duhem, 
Poincare, and recently resuscitated by Worrall. This view provides a perspective to 
maintain the strengths and remedy the shorcomings of the formal and ontological 
accounts of the theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physcis.
I have argued that the dynamical perspective of space-time and structuralism can be 
natural allies because they oppose both ‘formalism-alone’ accounts and ‘deep-down’ 
ontological accounts of scientific theories. Along these lines, I have attempted to 
develop the modified space-time structuralism by realizing the weaknesses of 
Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism and incorporating the strengths of the 
dynamical perspective of space-time.
Dorato provided an initial attempt to specify what is the essential structure in 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. He considers the spatio-temporal relations
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between events as the essential structure that explains the behaviours of bodies. 
However, we cannot expect this view to provide an acceptable account of the theory- 
change. For Dorato’s view is based on the dubious assumption that the spatio- 
temporal relations between events underpin the laws of motion. We can see this 
problem from the lesson suggested by the dynamical perspective of space-time, which 
provides a much more straightforward account of the relationships between space­
time and the laws of motion; the laws of motion underpin space-time, not the other 
way around.
As a result, my version of space-time structuralism views the relations of regularity 
between events as essential parts of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. A similar 
view is suggested by Huggett’s regularity account of space-time, which considers the 
laws of motion as involving nothing but “a theorem of the strongest and simplest 
axiomatization of the totality of events in this history.” However, my view is different 
from Huggett’s in that mine sees dynamical laws as encapsulating the structural 
constraints over events. And my view is also different from Brown’s view which 
emphasizes the micro-foundation of dynamical laws. Unlike Brown’s, my view 
stresses the structural characteristics of the dynamical principles which involve the 
relations between events and does refer to any underlying mechanism.
Within this framework, the continuity between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics 
can be brought to centre-stage. My version of space-time structuralism suggests that
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the continuity in the theory-change can be clarified if we recognize that the essential 
part of that theories i.e., the relations of regularity between events specified by 
dynamical principles, are the dynamically-privileged trajectories of material bodies. 
These dynamical principles in the special and the general theory are the light postulate 
and the equivalence principle, which pick out the dynamically-privileged relations 
between events, i.e. the inertial trajectories of a given body. Although the relativistic 
dynamical principles of electrodynamics i.e., the constancy of the speed of light and 
the principle of relativity, modify the relations of regularity between events as 
compared to Newtonian theory, their role in picking out dynamically privileged 
trajectories continues to operate within the special theory of relativity. And the 
additional dynamical information about gravitational interaction involved in the 
principle of equivalence modifies the concept of inertial trajectories in the general 
theory. Yet, inertial motions specifying the dynamically-privileged trajectories also 
play the essential role within the general theory, just as in Newtonian mechanics and 
in the special theory. This aspect highlights the most important way in which the two 
theories are related to each other. Hence, we can see that a modified space-time 
structuralism gives the clearest and most defensible argument for the view that the 
shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics was an evolutionary one.
In summary, in addition to clarifying the continuity between Newtonian and 
Einsteinian physics, my view improves the existing accounts of the theory-change in 
following aspects:
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(1) In comparison to previous evolutionary accounts that emphasize the formal aspect 
of the theory-change, my view captures the essential elements underlying the formal 
aspects, which contribute to the empirical success of both theories.
(2) In comparison to previous evolutionary accounts that emphasize the influence of 
the ontological aspect of space-time and in fact fail to clarify the relationships 
between space-time and the laws of motion (these are two essential elements in 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics), my view straghtforwardly captures these 
relationships without difficulty.
(3) My view has the advantage over Dorato’s version of space-time structuralism in 
that it better explicates the relationships between the laws of motion and space-time 
geometry and the continuity between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics.
(4) While a modem geometric view emphasizing space-time geometry faces a 
problem in explicating the continuity between the special and the general theory of 
relativity because two theories adopt quite different approaches of geometry (Klein’s 
and Riemann’s approaches), my view is free from this problem because the laws of 
motion are emphasized rather than space-time geometry.
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(5) My view avoids a criticism legitimately aimed at a modem space-time view -that 
the space-time view is post hoc (or whiggish) in its account of the theory-change from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. In contrast, emphasis on the laws of motion, 
involved in my view, can be clearly identified in the founders of Newtonian and 
Einsteinian physics, i.e. Newton and Einstein themselves.
(6) My view can easily avoid the criticism based on the empirical equivalence 
arguments claiming that there exist logically distinct but empirically equivalent rivals, 
such as flat and curved space-time theories. By emphasizing dynamical laws, the 
modified space-time structuralism can explain why the alleged empirically equvalent 
rivals are not in fact genuine rivals.
(7) Finally, my view, in comparison to Brown’s, faces no demand to provide an 
account of the micro-foundation of the relations of regularity between events. This is 
because my view emphasizes that the structural information involved in the laws of 
motion is what makes both Newtonian and Eisnteinian physics emprical successful.
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